One Dead in Mauritania [Two dead]
Posted: 27 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Maghreb, Mauritania, Sahel 10 Comments »UPDATE: Al-Akhbar reports a second death. The Interior Ministry is being quoted by Sahara Media as saying that it will “consider” protesters’ demands but will continue with the census, with the Interior Minister condemning violence by protesters and pledging not to allow demonstrations to disrupt the effort to issue biometric identity documents. The “Don’t Touch My Nationality” campaign has released a video condemning the killing of Lamine Mangane. Political leaders are reacting to the disturbances with National Assembly head Messaoud Ould Boulkheir calling the census and the resulting disturbances “the greatest threat to national unity” and together with Senator Youssouf Sylla and others calling for a halt to the census.
As of late this blog has been sparse on Mauritania-specific topics. Apologies; non-blog things have taken the lead. An important and depressing thing happened there this week: gendarmes shot a young protestor in the chest, killing him amid fierce protests in the southern town of Kaedi. The country’s history of racial tension between Arabs and blacks is bloody and sad; the country is still struggling to come to terms with the racial violence that led to the expulsion of tens of thousands of black Mauritanians to Senegal and the killing of black Army officers twenty years ago (many refugees remain across the border in Senegal, and their repatriation is ongoing to simplify things for the sake of space; the government recently announced a plan to pay damages to black military personnel who were purged, detained or abused from 1981-2004). Recent clashes between protesters and security forces over a census scheme many black Mauritanians view as discriminatory should command readers attention.
Black Mauritanians have been protesting against the government’s census campaign, meant to replace old identity papers with biometric ID cards, since at least August claiming that the government is undercounting blacks and threatening their citizenship and voting rights. Others complain about the sorts of questions asked of black respondents as compared to those asked of Arab ones; questions for blacks, many fume, imply the respondent is foreign or of recent arrival rather than native to Mauritania — understandably offensive given the trauma of the expulsions of the early 1990s when blacks were accused of being Senegalese. The “Don’t Touch My Nationality” campaign has led numerous sit-ins and demonstrations in Nouakchott and major southern towns, including Kaedi (Gorgol Province) where violence broke out early this week. Earlier this month police detained protesters (and a journalist) for protesting in the capital; police used teargas to break up protests in Kaedi on 24 September, drawing round condemnations from opposition parties and rights groups. Kaedi has seen three days of protests against the census; some thirty people have been detained by police there. Leaders of the protest movement met with Interior Ministry officials on Sunday evening to negotiate the release of detainees. (Al-Akhbar has a list of names of those detained.) The head of local security was replaced on Sunday but unrest continued. Kaedi’s market has shut down, and protesters have burned tire, police cars and other state properties. There are reports of looting at shops and public offices. The gendarmerie claims they used force after being confronted by protesters with knives and weapons. Demonstrators then stormed the local office for government statistics, which runs the census, burning it to the ground. The gendarmerie sent reinforcements (twenty trucks of men) from the capital to quell the unrest. A young man named Lamine Mangane was shot dead by gendarmes in nearby Maghama at a protest in front of a census operations office. This is the first instance of a protestor being killed in Mauritania’s protests this year. News reports describe a tense calm in Kaedi today, though the controversy over the census is unlikely to go away. The killing of Mr. Mangane will win it no friends. The government claims the census has counted more Mauritanians in predominantly black areas than mostly Arab ones; it dismisses claims of discrimination or that the effort is meant to take away black citizenship. Many Arab and black Mauritanians agree the census has been slow going, badly managed damaging to the government’s credibility — some even say the government postponed October’s parliamentary election less as a way of appeasing the opposition as because the census effort bungled both the population count and voter registration. The current violence highlights an often overlooked point of instability in Mauritania, lost in many outsiders discourses over terrorism and religion: enduring distrust and unresolved grievances between large parts of the black minority and the government and military.
Fast Thoughts
Posted: 13 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, AQIM, Geopolitics, Libya, Maghreb, Sahel, terrorism 3 Comments »There has been a flurry of commentary and analysis in recent weeks and days focusing on the implications of weapons scattered about the Sahel in the wake of the collapse of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. It ranges from the alarmist to the sensible. There highly technical pieces and more general ones; some have also focused on the out-migration of Nigerien, Malian and Libya Tuareg out of Libya since the conquest of Tripoli and the socio-politics this may lead to in the wider Sahel. These tend to focus on the Tuaregs as (foreign) mercenaries, infrequently mentioning the many Libyan Tuareg who fought on either side of the conflict or who have been and are being drastically impacted by the conflict’s course. Given the very little attention Tuaregs receive from English speakers in general, one notices many problems in these articles, especially in the middle-brow magazines and newspapers that have recently discovered the Sahel. A more systematic attack on some of the assumptions and assertions guiding these would probably be done by some one like Tommy Miles, with the expertise to give a really strong break down. For sure, the return and/or migration of large numbers of Tuareg former fighters, refugees and others into countries like Niger and Mali, coupled with the political troubles that might to places like Burkina Faso and Chad as a result of the loss of Libya as a strong backer and/or patron will shake things up in the region. Sophisticated weapons in the hands of smugglers, “bandits,” rebel factions, terrorists (read: AQIM) and other criminal elements is a serious threat to everyone in the region; the Mauritanians have favored areal assaults in recent engagements with AQIM. Imagine if the group had surface to air misiles. The recent summit in Algiers was noted for its focus on the conflict in Libya, leaving the conventional conversations about AQIM in its shadow. It was also notable for the criticism offered up by the Nigeriens over the lack of “concrete” action in Algerian-led efforts. Tensions between the new government in Tripoli and Algiers could slow down any effort at successfully managing these problems.
For several years, analysts have looked at the Sahel as a potential “hot spot” for terrorism and other symptoms of weak states and poor/low capacity governance. A recent Time magazine piece reiterated this theme this week. A Twitterized version of this general debate took place this evening between Christopher Boucek and Clint Watts (of Selected Wisdom).
Later posts will look at the Sahel as a “hot spot”; having followed the region for a little while this blogger believes there are two things to consider: (1) that many assumptions and predictions are easily challenged and overturned, quickly; and (2) the traditional areas AQIM has targeted (northern Algeria and Mauritania) and AQIM (as an organization) have evolved in the last two years especially, in governmental approaches and AQIM’s composition and locality. Not having much time, one can argue that the Libyan episode has significantly changed the balance of power and the function of space in the region (though not necessarily fundamentally or in the long term). The region is different this summer than last summer; and last summer AQIM did not look especially threatening in macro-perspective for all sorts of reasons even if it was awash with ransom money and snatching up Europeans. The weapons factor is important and the solvency and levels of political risk facing some countries is higher. AQIM is not a strategic threat to global security. It remains a basically technical threat as opposed to a political one. The Mauritanian government’s approach to AQIM, if imperfect, looks more sensible in 2011 than it did in 2009-2010. The Malians and Nigeriens are somewhat more engaged though the Algerians’ posture seems to have remained constant throughout (which may or may not be in itself productive so far as the Sahel states are concerned; one sees the Algerians’ rigid commitment to principles like national sovereignty and non-intervention playing out in the Sahel as in Libya — such ideas have serious weight among Algerian military and diplomatic officials, more than many outsiders often give them credit, and their reluctance to bring western powers deeper into regional security arrangements are not necessarily evidence of a tangled conspiracy). In any case, the region is likely to get more interesting in coming months.
[. . .]
Posted: 11 September, 2011 Filed under: history, terrorism, US Leave a comment »The tenth anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks is a depressing thing. Relatives and friends were lost in and as a result of the attack. These people are missed. And communally there are many lost opportunities that passed by in the time afterward. These are reminders of both how much and how little agency humans have. Ten years after we still have to ask ourselves if we found “justice” for these attacks — did the two large and costly wars bring Americans closer to that objective? Are our government structures and intelligence services more rational? Did we respond to the attacks justly and rationally (as opposed to “understandably given the circumstances”)? Has the country moved beyond “Suck. On. This.“? Certainly, some would like to pretend we have. We often say that 9/11 brought out the best in America and Americans; there is some truth to this. The articles in the middle-brow papers and periodicals commemorating the tenth anniversary are more sober than those in years past, likely a result of the misery of the financial crisis and the fanaticism running amok in the Congress. This is notable. Your blogger heard a commentator challenge the cliche that “9/11 changed everything”; indeed, it changed somethings but major national trends — hyper-partisanship, living beyond our means, widening income inequality, the erosion of quality public education, sectarianism, hostility toward science, an inflated sense of national purpose (“American exceptionalism”), etc., etc. have continued unabated by the sense of unity that came in the wake of the atrocity. (There is the addition of moral panic, though, around terrorism and Muslims.) This was interesting to hear. It is time to remove the blinders and think clearly and cooly. Perhaps that time was actually five or seven years ago; but given where things stand in America (and how people behave generally) it seems “now” is always the time to adjust course and behave more reasonably and rationally.
Guest Post: “Revolutionary Road – On the Nafusa Highway”
Posted: 9 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Imazighen, Libya, Maghreb, Sahel 1 Comment »Below is a report from western Libya by Eileen Byrne (ebyrne202@yahoo.com), a friend of the blog and journalist based in Tunis, special to TMND. Read the rest of this entry »
Electoral Lists in Tunisia
Posted: 9 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Imazighen, Maghreb, politics, Tunisia 2 Comments »Registration for the Constituent Assembly elections on October 23rd began Thursday, September 1st and is set to close on Wednesday, the 7th of September. This week-long stage leading up to the actual campaigning for election, set to begin on October 1st, has revealed some surprises. The lists of candidates of various parties given to the press reveal organization in some parties, disorder in others.
As of today, September 5th, few parties have compiled complete lists of candidates. Leading with candidate lists in 23 governorates throughout Tunisia is the main Islamist party, Ennahda. No other party matches this total.
Abdelfattah Morou, an ex-member of Ennahda who has seemingly split with his party, has compiled an alliance of lists in 20 districts.
The Communist Party of Tunisia (PCOT) is also well represented. They have submitted 14 lists of candidates for seats on the Constituent Assembly, mostly in coastal regions.
Another party that has submitted names of candidates for their list is the Party of Culture and Work (PCT), a new party on the left of the political spectrum. They have submitted 9 lists of candidates for the upcoming election.
The Reform and Development Party, a new center-left party, has submitted 8 lists.
The Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), however, is thought to be facing some internal problems. Though they are considered a major player in the Tunisian political scene, they have published only 8 lists. The PDP office in Kairouan is known to be facing some problems after releasing an official statement on September 2nd that they froze their membership. The PDP has not yet officially discussed this pressing issue.
“Available Election Lists Favor Ennahda and Point to PDP in Crisis,” Tunisia Live, 5 September, 2011.
This is interesting: though the PCOT is probably less popular than the PDP and a number of larger center left parties. It would appear that the PCOT has a strong organizational culture, typical of the communist parties in the Arab world (in his The Communist Movement in the Arab World (2005), Tareq Ismael argues that superior organizational discipline is one of the most important features and legacies of the Arab communists). This is a party that has been active in hiding for nearly thirty years. One is not surprised to find their lists concentrated on the coast as opposed to the interior. It is surprising to see the PDP and similar parties without so wide a spread. It is also notable that the organized parties appear to be en-Nahdah and mostly leftist or center-left parties. There seems to be a demand for politics that recognizes and respects Arab-Islamic identity and/or makes use of populist economics. On the left there is a lot of rhetoric against the IMF/World Bank and the liberal economics. One sees a similar trend in Egypt emerging; the Ben Ali and Mubarak political and economic models helped produce the uprisings. Many seem eager to move off them; international and internal elite pressure will likely moderate these tendencies. This is already very evident in Egypt as far as the SCAF and Gulf states’ behavior can be indicators.
More to Read
Posted: 9 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, AQIM, Arabs, Imazighen, Maghreb, Sahel 5 Comments »“De l’archaïsme de l’université tunisienne,” Jolanare, Nawaat. 9 September.
“Libya: policing the middle of nowhere,” Alex Warren, The Guardian. 9 September.
“Mauritanian army compensates abuse victims,” Defense Web. 9 September.
“The impact of Libya’s missing missiles,” Andrew Lebovich, The Wasat. 8 September.
“Algeria, revolutionary in name only,” John P. Entelis, Foreign Policy. 7 September.
“So will Algeria blow on 17th September?” Though Cowards Flinch. 7 September.
“The full story of ‘Abu Younis al-Mauritani’ an al-Qa’ida man who planned bombing in Europe,” Sahara Media, 7 September. [Arabic]
“The Arrest of Younis al-Mauretani: On the trail of the al-Qaida Phantom,” Der Spiegel. 6 September.
“The Arab Counterrevolution,” Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, The New York Review of Books. 31 August. Read the rest of this entry »
Read These
Posted: 7 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Maghreb, Sahel 4 Comments »“Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania,” Cedric Jourde, Africa Security Brief, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, No. 15 September 2011.
“Flush with Victory,” The Economist ”Newsbook”.
“The Decade-Long Diversion,” Paul Pillar, The National Interest.
“The Grand (Hip-Hop) Chessboard: Race, Rap and Raison d’Etat,” Hishaam Aidi, MERIP, Fall 2011.
“La Libye a fait du Sahel “une poudrière,” Beatrice Khadige, Les Echos.
“Who is in charge? Algerian power structures and their resilience to change,” ISabelle Werenfels, Sciences Po, Ceri CNRS.
Something like Hogra
Posted: 5 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, Arabs, Hogra, Imazighen, Libya, Maghreb, politics, Sahel 1 Comment »A reader sent an email asking about the politics of decentralization and administrative problems in Kabylia and who these things influence the Berber identity movement. The response involved some discussion of hogra – contempt from officials, the police and the bureaucracy. That whole attitude that We, this narrow set of technocrats, officers and elderly men, know best and letting the half-educated masses have at these Very Important Problems would lead to sheer collapse. The We built the nation and we can fix the nation or These children don’t know what’s best for them attitudes one sees among many many older official Algerians. And it gets mixed up and passed through with all the other tendencies one finds in Franco-Arab bureaucracies. And it occurs within elites, too, as the competing versions of the meeting before the resignation of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid in 1992, between General Khaled Nezzar and the President. Some say Chadli, who is often thought of as dimwitted, was “convinced” to step down after a long discussion by Nezzar. Another more dramatic version says the General came to blows with the President (himself an Army colonel), with the idea here being that Chadli had a scheme to use the upcoming election to bolster his own position by empowering the FLN and weakening the military, choking him against a wall til he agreed to go along with the coup, “for the good of the country.” Read the rest of this entry »
Thinking about Algeria and Libya
Posted: 5 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, Libya, Maghreb, Sahel 16 Comments »At the moment, with much incomplete information, it is important to consider Algeria’s conduct during the Libyan crisis at two levels: (1) the strategic and motivational level; and (2) the operational and practical level. This is to say: why would or why did the Algerians provide support to Qadhafi during the conflict at the structural, political, economic or cultural levels — and whether any such “support” was official and formal or unofficial and informal or a mix of both — and then consider the means by which they did this (if indeed they did do this) from within the network of elites and institutions in the country’s diplomatic, military, intelligence, criminal and other informal circles.
The Algerian role during the Libyan crisis has not received heavy attention from those outside of the conflict or the politics around it. It is likely that the subject will receive increasing attention in Algerian, Libyan and pan-Arab media and that much of this will be conveyed to the liking of the handlers of the information rather than the raw and dry facts themselves. Once more information is available and some time has passed it may be possible to form a really informed and worthwhile analysis independent of political interests and popular sentiments. The questions below attempt to help direct an analysis of the situation from the standpoint of an outside observer. At this stage, though, one can only wonder and postulate about the various elements involved in this extremely complex problem. There are so many questions and means of asking about them: let us count the ways. There are plenty more, for sure. Read the rest of this entry »
China and Libya and Algeria
Posted: 4 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, China, Libya, Maghreb 6 Comments »From the Globe and Mail, 3 September:
The documents suggest that Beijing and other governments may have played a double game in the Libyan war, claiming neutrality but covertly helping the dictator. The papers do not confirm whether any military assistance was delivered, but senior leaders of the new transitional government in Tripoli say the documents reinforce their suspicions about the recent actions of China, Algeria and South Africa. Those countries may now suffer a disadvantage as Libya’s new rulers divide the spoils from their vast energy resources, and select foreign firms for the country’s reconstruction.
Omar Hariri, chief of the transitional council’s military committee, reviewed the documents and concluded that they explain the presence of brand-new weapons his men encountered on the battlefield. He expressed outrage that the Chinese were negotiating an arms deal even while his forces suffered heavy casualties in the slow grind toward Tripoli.
“I’m almost certain that these guns arrived and were used against our people,” Mr. Hariri said.
Senior rebel officials confirmed the authenticity of the four-page memo, written in formal style on the green eagle letterhead used by a government department known as the Supply Authority, which deals with procurement. The Globe and Mail found identical letterhead in the Tripoli offices of that department. The memo was discovered in a pile of trash sitting at the curb in a neighbourhood known as Bab Akkarah, where several of Col. Gadhafi’s most loyal supporters had lavish homes.
The document reports in detail about a trip by Col. Gadhafi’s security officials from Tripoli to Beijing. They arrived on July 16, and in the following days they met with officials from three state-controlled weapons manufacturers: China North Industries Corp. (Norinco); the China National Precision Machinery Import & Export Corp. (CPMIC); and China XinXing Import & Export Corp. The Chinese companies offered the entire contents of their stockpiles for sale, and promised to manufacture more supplies if necessary.
The hosts thanked the Libyans for their discretion, emphasized the need for confidentiality, and recommended delivery via third parties.
“The companies suggest that they make the contracts with either Algeria or South Africa, because those countries previously worked with China,” the memo says.
The Chinese companies also noted that many of the items the Libyan delegation requested were already held in the arsenals of the Algerian military, and could be transported immediately across the border; the Chinese said they could replenish the Algerian stocks afterward. The memo also indicated that Algeria had not yet consented to such an arrangement, and proposed further talks at the branch offices of the Chinese companies in Algiers.
The Economist on Algeria and Libya
Posted: 1 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, Arabs, gas, Geopolitics, Imazighen, Libya, Maghreb, Sahel 4 Comments »The Economist of 3 September has two terrific articles on Algeria and Libya and Libyan oil.
There will be consequences for Algeria’s behavior during the Libyan crisis, although there are signs Algiers is attempting to move away from its sallow neutralism (more on that later).
Algeria’s government is looking especially sheepish. Despite its own revolutionary pedigree and a history of strained relations with Colonel Qaddafi, it voted against the crucial Arab League resolution in March that endorsed NATO’s action in support of Libya’s rebels. It has yet to recognise the Transitional National Council as Libya’s government. Throughout the conflict, unsubstantiated rumours suggested that Algeria supplied the colonel with fuel, arms and transport for foreign mercenaries. When the rebels captured Tripoli, some of them ransacked the Algerian embassy. Others announced that a city square named for Algeria’s revolution would be known as Abu Dhabi Square, in gratitude for the Gulf emirate’s aid.
And:
sustaining long-term production or increasing it to 3m b/d, a target mooted by members of the national council, will need the oil majors to be involved. Several are keen. On August 29th Eni signed an agreement with the national council to supply it with fuel to be paid for in crude. A French trade mission, including Total (as well as a big arms-maker, EADS), is poised to come. British firms have been cagier. The council says it will honour pre-war contracts, but the new Libyan authorities privately admit that firms from countries that helped them in the war will have priority. By contrast, investors from countries friendly to the colonel, such as Algeria’s Sonatrach, may be less fortunate.
North Africa Books
Posted: 1 September, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, books, history, Imazighen, Maghreb, Sahel 7 Comments »Below is a list of books dealing with the remote and recent history of the Maghreb. All are in English. Your blogger has read or used all of them at some stage or another and believes they will be of some use in understanding recent events. These will also help readers find interesting anecdotes and facts from recent history in the region.
The list covers (1) Maghrebi history in general; (2) edited editions on the Maghreb in general; (3) Libya; (4) the ancient history of North Africa, mainly in the Roman period. There are not sections on Tunisia, Morocco or Algeria specifically; lists on these countries are soon in coming. This list does not repeat books on previous reading lists, such as the one on Arab uprisings from last month. The section on ancient history has little to do with contemporary issues but the books there are interesting and satisfy this blogger’s interest in Roman history, kindled in Latin class years ago. Read the rest of this entry »


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