A Dissent on Algeria/Libya
Posted: 31 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, Arabs, Geopolitics, Imazighen, Libya, Maghreb, Sahel 2 Comments »Great Moments in Transliteration: the Case of “Qadhafi”
Posted: 30 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Libya, Maghreb, Qadhafi Leave a comment »A follow up on the finacky post on transliterating Mu’amar al-Qadhafi’s name into English. Andrew Sullivan (Zack Beauchamp, rather), Issandr el-Amrani and Michael Collins Dunn have all posted on the issue, summarizing and explaining their (or others’) outlooks. Dunn’s post elicited a comment from David Mack, the State Department political officer who decided to use the quite utilitarian and most accurate transliteration — Qadhafi — for American reports.
Thank you, Mike, for transliterating the name in the manner you do. As a young political officer and translator/interpreter at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in September 1969, I decided on the “correct” transliteration. Doubling the dh consonant would have been more purist but really too fussy for the largely non-Arabist readers of US government reports. In those days, before more sophisticated word searches became possible, biographic files could be lost forever if they did not use a standard spelling. Pity the Arabists who obstinately tried to use a standard fusha transliteration from the written Arabic for Gamal Abdel Nasser or Habib Bourguiba.
A First Take on Algeria & Libya
Posted: 29 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, Arabs, Geopolitics, Gulf, Libya, Maghreb, Sahel 3 Comments »Note: Below is a snap analysis of Algeria’s positioning regarding the Libyan Civil War based on press and official statements as the situation appears to an outsider. As more information become available and the situation becomes more clear, addition posts will follow criticizing and building on this interpretation. This is not an attempt to layout a definitive analysis, a rationalization, justification, tiny-violin pity party, or defense of Algeria’s policy on Libya whatever more complete information reveals it to have been, if it is indeed anything more than what the Foreign Ministry has described. It should be considered with a grain of salt, of course.
Summary. The Algerian position on Libya has been the subject of considerable controversy. On the one hand Algiers has defined its official position as one of non-intervention and neutralism. On the other ranking members of the FLN made controversial comments in favor of Mu’amar al-Qadhafi in direct contradiction of this policy. Algeria voted against the Arab League resolution endorsing a no-fly-zone and criticized UNSC 1973 harshly. Recent announcements by Algeria’s preeminent representative to the United Nations that members of Mu’amar al-Qadhfi’s family entered Algeria on Monday 29 August force a careful consideration of Algeria’s stance during the Libyan crisis. It appears that from the beginning of the Libyan revolt, the Algerians assumed Qadhafi would hold onto power and if that he could not the situation would not be handled best by containing the situation but by relying on regional institutions, namely the African Union, to negotiate some settlement. Voting against the Arab League resolution endorsing a no-fly-zone and strongly criticizing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the Algerians failed to evolve a policy to cope with the NATO intervention and the brusk manner in which Britain, France and the United States — with important Gulf support — stepped over the BRICs and African Union efforts to avoid the “internationalization” of the Libyan crisis by relying on regional bodies. Much of Algeria’s behavior during the crisis — the inflammatory news reports on the proliferation of arms form Libya through the Sahel, the potential rise of Islamist fighters in the rebels’ ranks and comments by FLN officials criticizing the rebel Transitional National Council (TNC) and voicing support for Qadhafi — gave the alternating appearance of displeasure with the NATO intervention, fear of unrest in Libya spreading into ALgeria and even support for the Qadhafi regime as such. At present the Algerians appear to have relied on an inadequate analysis of both the regional and international climate as it related to Libya specifically and to have placed too much credit in the African Union as an institution while underestimating the relevance and interest of the Gulf countries in Maghrebine affairs. Through the crisis, Algiers has not shown signs of recovering from its early deficiencies and will now be forced to deal with the consequences on the political, diplomatic and propaganda fronts. Read the rest of this entry »
Who will miss the Brother Leader?
Posted: 28 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Libya, Maghreb, Mauritania, politics, Sahel 6 Comments »Below is a quick and dirty translation (forgive errors) of a communique from 23 August put out by the Sawab Party, a small Mauritanian Ba’thi party. It is notable because it represents one of the few political parties in Mauritania to have continuously shown support for Qadhafi. Together with a number of other small (some are tiny, actually) Arab nationalist and Islamist parties Sawab joined a pro-Qadhafi alliance of Mauritanian parties in 2009/2010, the Nationalist Islamic Action Front. Some of these parties did condemn violence against Libyan demonstrators early on and tended to also criticize al-Jazeera more harshly for “exaggerations” and treating Qadhafi’s government unfairly. Some went as far as to condemn Libyan protesters outrightly. But the outlook in this communique is not representative of the Mauritanian political class or opposition in general. Most major opposition parties ranging from Ahmed Ould Daddah’s RFD to Jamil Ould Mansour’s Tawassoul announced their “recognition” of the Transitional National Council as the legitimate government of Libya early in the summer and organized marches at the Libyan embassy in Nouakchott at the start of the Libyan uprising, even attempting to use it to rally their supporters against President Ould Abdel Aziz, who had been quite close to Qadhafi. Even if they opposed NATO’s involvement in the conflict, most Mauritanians seem to have been sympathetic to the rebel cause in Libya.
The party has a minor following and its position on Libya is not, in general, popular among Mauritanians. Many Mauritanians, especially young people, especially young people looked at Qadhafi warily because of his very public support for Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz’s 2008 coup (he infamously told a stadium of Mauritanian politicians and citizens that there was “no difference between coups and elections” since both were politically disruptive; this ended up scuttling his ability mediate between the opposition and the junta). But one should remember that Qadhafi had supporters in many parts of Africa and the Sahel. In Mauritania, pro-Qadhafite political parties were not the only ones with links to the old Tripoli: Mauritanian ministers and parliamentarians even received Libyan largesse and spent significant time in Tripoli seeking money and support. It used to pay to be in the good graces of Qadhafi as it was once profitable to be a Saddamist. Nowadays those comrades will need to make new friends. Read the rest of this entry »
Q/G/Kh/Kadhafi, or, Qadhdhafi
Posted: 26 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, language, Libya, Maghreb 3 Comments »This blog has discussed Arabic transliteration before. In 2010:
This blog hardly ever agonizes over transliteration; there are more important things to consider. What matters is that the word can be easily recognized and pronounced, not that it follows anybody’s rules. Especially in the Maghreb the problems associated with transliteration are manifest: the French (phonetic) system or some haphazard English-phonetic system used by journalists and scholars are often predominant. It is on occasion the case that two individuals with the same (Arabic) name spell them in wildly different ways using Latin letters. Two acquaintances are Abd el-Rahmans (عبد الرحمن). One spells it Abdelrahmane the other usesAbderrahman. Another, with the same name uses Abdalraham. These are minute differences, and they can produce their own results in certain circumstances. Use of one or the other spelling may put one in common with a completely different individual. There are Khalids and Khaleds; Mohameds and Muhammads; Belkasems and Belgacems and Belkacems; nowadays such confusion can be especially erroneous in a number of directions.
Refer to this post for your blogger’s opinion on transliteration in general.
The case of the now gone Libyan leader’s name is irritating. It is a non-issue. There are more serious issues to discuss besides this mostly elite debate about how to spell his name, his wardrobe, the fact of his having lady guards and other inanities. Read the rest of this entry »
First thoughts on the fall of Qadhafi
Posted: 25 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Imazighen, Levant, Libya, Maghreb 3 Comments »Qadhafi has fallen. Some thoughts on the situation in Libya. Read the rest of this entry »
Frustrations re: Libya
Posted: 25 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Imazighen, Libya, Maghreb, US Leave a comment »Many American politicians and news pundits have been eager to take too much credit for the overthrow of Mu’amar al-Qadhafi. At Democracy in America:
all of this talk of winners and losers seems ridiculously premature, and embarrassingly insular, to your blogger (apologies to my colleague). While recent events appear to augur a promising future for Libya, it is way too soon to tell. “At such moments, any temptations toward euphoria have to be restrained by a recognition that future developments are unpredictable and potentially unpleasant,” says a very reasonable Jeff Weintraub. “Overthrowing oppressive and tyrannical regimes is often hard, but successfully reconstructing the societies that they’ve damaged, distorted, and poisoned by their rule is usually even harder.” And yet we get headlines like this from Steve Clemons: “Huge Win for Libyans, A Win for Obama, Challenges Next“. Challenges next? By that logic, Iraq was a win for George Bush, and we’ll consider those pesky challenges that followed separately. In reality, though, you cannot separate the aftermath from the overthrow. They are a result of the same policy, put in place to deal with a situation that in this case is not yet settled.
This points to some of the bigger problems in American political culture. Most elected officials seem to be in a constant campaign mode, counting each move in terms of election intervals. Long-term planning suffers; so does perspective. Go to war? The qualitative outcome of the Libyan crisis is less important to many than how it “plays” with the public — perviously rather poorly and perhaps now somewhat better. Politicians are opportunists by nature, of course. And being elected does neither requires nor necessarily reflects genius or strategic acumen. It takes only primitive cunning and organizational skill. An early interpretation of how the United States got involved in the Libyan conflict was that the president and defense establishment were suckered in by the French and British whose position was backed up by people with an ideological bias for intervention like Samantha Power and Susan Rice (the former earned a scathing profile in The National Interest). The important questions around the politics of the intervention are largely subsumed by petty bickering over who wins who loses – who will get a bump in the polls? Some people find this exciting or interesting.
In any case, this was not a widely popular excursion in the United States. The incentive to exaggerate the American role and to build a trumphant narrative is high on one side; the opposite push to down play its overall relevance and to point to the “lack of a strategy” for Libya on the other side will also grow. There are people who would like to become president at Barack Obama’s expense, of course.
The eagerness to declare the Libyan problem solved or over (which is somewhat waning) likely results from popular ignorance of Libya and the region generally, not simply among the public, but also in the political class. There were relatively few well known public personalities who could speak intelligently about Libya in America before the uprising there (with very notably, mainly academic exceptions). Now everyone from Wes Moore to Whoopi Goldberg has an opinion and a perspective on Libya and what might happen there. People with more perspective are more restrained in their acknowledgement of the role NATO played and ought to (or ought not to) play going forward and how helpful the kind of aggressive nannying advocated by some people might actually be:
I have “news.” Wars are messy, uncertain things. They “move” in fits and starts.
Qathafy’s government is finished. This has been a very successful effort. What sort of government will the Libyans make? It is not our business. The only demand we should have on the new Libyan government is that they do not harbor enemies of the NATO alliance. That includes us.
Do not give the Libyans money. We do not have it to give. Our instinct is to want to “control,” “reform,” and fund. No. Give them back their own money, the money that is now impounded all over the world and then get out of their way so that the petroleum industry can make the oil and gas flow for export again.
And then there are bigger concerns. For instance, Andrew Exum worries:
Many members of the Obama Administration, especially the veterans of the Kosovo Campaign, were more sanguine about the open-ended application of U.S. military power in Libya than I was. I am glad the Qadhdhafi regime has fallen, but I worry we have reinforced a precedent where we do not feel the need to carefully think through our strategic goals (to include our desired end states) and assumptions before going to war. Because giving the U.S. military unclear guidance to prosecute open-ended military interventions is a recipe for a serious crisis in civil-military relations, we might not want to do that next time.
Indeed.
Books on Mauritania
Posted: 24 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, books, history, Maghreb, Mauritania, Sahel 1 Comment »Below is a list of six books on Mauritania worth exploring. Some are in Arabic, others in French. Most were written in the last decade or so, though there are obvious outliers (i.e., the Paul Marty books, though Arabic translation was released very recently. These books, by the way, include very interesting “annexes” of treaties, maps and the like.) Though this reader has only read a few of them the whole way through (as of yet) each has value in understanding contemporary Mauritanian politics as Mauritanians look at them. For instance, the Ould Saleck book on the politics of the Haratine (Arabic-speaking Mauritanians descended from slaves) is quite valuable in understanding contemporary trends in religious and Arab nationalist thinking and politics in the country, as well as how various political parties address the question of slavery and how emerging Haratine leaders relate to all these trends. In any case, these are books worth looking at for those interested in Mauritania’s recent history and politics.
Eventually, a Mauritania bibliography may appear on this site for readers to download and so that information about that fantastic country can spread around, insha’Allah. This list was recently sent to a curious friend.
- Marty, Paul.
- Études sur l’Islam et les tribus maures: les Brakna. E. Leroux. 1921.
- Les tribus de la Haute Mauritanie. Comité de l’Afrique française. 1915.
- من عرب الصحراء الكبرى: القبائل البيضانية قي الحوض والساحل الموريتانيا وقصة احتلال فرنسا المنطقة. Translator: Weddady, Mohamed Mahmoud.
- Ould Hamody, Mohamed Said. Mauritanie, 1445-1975: Relations seculaires ave l’Europe. IMRS. 2004.
- Ould Ishedou, Mohamed. أزمة الحكم في موريتانيا. Dar al-Fakr. 2010.
- Ould Saleck, El-Arby. Les Haratines: Le paysage politique mauritanien. L’Harmattan. 2003.
- Ould Sheikhna, Sid ‘Amrou. من أعلان ومشاهير خمسينية الاستقلال. An-Nasher. 2010.
- Ould Sheikhna, Sid ‘Amrou. (موريتانيا المعاصرة: شهادات ووثائق، الجزء الأول )1957-1988 م. Dar al-Fakr. 2010.
UPDATE: Reader Erin Pettigrew writes:
Work by Ghislaine Lydon (“On Trans-Saharan Trails”) on the economic and legal history of the region, Ann McDougall on the salt trade, Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh’s thorough PhD dissertation, Pierre Bonte’s anthropological work, Zekeria ould Ahmed Salem (Political Science) and Yahya ould El Bara (legal history) should all be included on this list. They are at the forefront of good scholarship in French, English, and Arabic on Mauritania.
Follow Up
Posted: 24 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, culture, Imazighen, Maghreb 1 Comment »Many readers hopped on the mention of shari’ah as the “ the principal source of legislation” in Article 1 of the draft constitution proposed by Libya’s Transitional National Council. In view of other Arab constitutions (including Libya’s previous one), which mention shari’ah as a source, reference or inspiration for (as well as other things), this does not seem particularly noteworthy. It makes sense that an overwhelmingly Muslim and relatively conservative society would include such language in a key national document. The rest of the constitution stuck this reader as more interesting — it has many interesting and progressive promises in the section on the people’s rights. Apprehension is understandable, though, from the perspective of those allergic to religion used for crass and shallow identity politics and skeptical of its ability to facilitate a desirable regime that respect universal rights. In any case it might be more useful (though simplistic) to look at the issue this way:
(1) Libyans are heavily religious and the TNC’s stronghold in Benghazi has a strong association with political religion. (2) Ethnic and regional differences are likely to become contested issues in the transitional period and appealing to what most Libyans have in common (the country and their religion). This is not dissimilar to the manner in which religious identity was used during the Algerian Revolution, to bridge the ethnic, cultural and social gaps between Algerians, particularly Berbers and Arabs.
It is likely that the Libyans will dispute sections of their constitution. Though neither Arab nor Berber identity is mentioned in the document, if the Algerian and Moroccan experiences show anything, it is that one can write down as much as he likes in a constitution, national charter or statute and still not have any useful official employment of or proliferation of Berber or Arabic. In any case, Libyans have many more pedestrian and serious things to worry about in the interim than
After the Jamahiriya: TNC Draft Constitution
Posted: 20 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Imazighen, Libya, Maghreb, Muslims, politics, Qadhafi 14 Comments »
Brian Whitaker notes that the draft interim constitution released by Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) includes no reference to Libya as an “Arab state”. Article 1 of the document reads as follows:
Calling it the Arab Spring or something else
Posted: 19 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Geopolitics, Levant, Maghreb, politics, Third World, US 3 Comments »From two very different perspectives in two very different pieces. Read the rest of this entry »
Complaints about Polls and Politics in Tunisia
Posted: 19 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, Imazighen, Islamism, Maghreb, politics, Tunisia Leave a comment »From Jeune Afrique:
« Nous devons suspendre la publication des sondages politiques jusqu’au vote de l’assemblée constituante », assène Rida Kéfi, membre de l’Instance nationale de réforme de l’information et de la communication (INRIC).
« Nous devons suspendre la publication des sondages politiques jusqu’au vote de l’assemblée constituante », assène Rida Kéfi, membre de l’Instance nationale de réforme de l’information et de la communication (INRIC). Sans historique d’élections libres, sans références, nous n’avons aucun moyen de redresser les résultats ».
[. . .]
Manque de crédibilité
Malgré cet argument purement économique, les critiques se multiplient (comme en France) à l’encontre des instituts de sondage, dont les méthodologies sont jugées opaques. Notification aléatoire du commanditaire, échantillonnages peu représentatifs, questionnaires orientés… La liste des griefs est longue.
« Plusieurs experts estiment que les échantillonnages de certains sondages ne sont pas crédibles », affirme ainsi Rida Kéfi. Les critères comme l’appartenance sociale ou géographiques ne sont pas pris en compte cars ils ne sont pas recensés dans les statistiques officielles, poursuit-il. Quant à la marge d’erreur des sondages, elle est selon lui trop souvent minimisée par les instituts.
Ali Ben Yehia, directeur du bureau d’études ID Claire, récuse ces arguments, préférant insister sur les similitudes existant entre politique et business. « L’analyse est différente entre les sondages d’opinions et les études marketing, dit-il, mais les techniques, les moyens et les équipes terrain sont les mêmes ». Ben Yehia rejette également les accusations de clientélisme avec certains partis politiques friands de sondages : « procès d’intention », estime-t-il.
Pratiques douteuses
Ben Yehia reconnait toutefois l’existence de « un ou deux instituts ayant des connivences avec certains partis », sans plus de précision. Son concurrent, Hichem Guerfali, avoue quant à lui que le milieu doit faire face à certaines pratiques douteuses. « Les instituts sont tentés de modifier les résultats moyennant promesses aux partis », affirme-t-il. Une pratique qui, selon le journaliste Imed Bahri, vient de l’absence d’un cadre légal. « Tant qu’il n’y aura pas d’encadrement, il n’y aura aucun moyen de vérifier et on continuera à s’interroger sur l’argent qu’il y a autour de ces études », estime-t-il.
Autre problème posé par la nouvelle utilisation des sondages en politique : les abus auxquels se livrent les médias. « On assiste à une surenchère dans la presse depuis la révolution », s’insurge Rida Kéfi. « Les journalistes ne savent pas utiliser les sondages », déplore de son côté le représentant de l’instance de réforme des médias, qui a commencé à dispenser des formations à l’analyse des sondages. Mais jusqu’à présent, les journalistes ont été très peu nombreux à y assister.
This is an interesting problem. A number of polls have come out of Tunisia in recent months, most showing that the largest part of the public is undecided in its opinion of the various political parties and factions emerging there. Usually they show that an-Nahdha has the largest support among those with their minds made up and show a smattering of center- and far-left parties with various slivers of support (and the numbers vary widely). Virtually all of these polls show a great deal of political polarization in their samples. The methodology is sometimes murky and one wonders who is bankrolling the project and why. Polls are instruments of politics at every level, especially in hotly contested environments.
A Tunisian wrote to this blogger, angrily, complaining that al-Jazeera’s poll from a few months ago was “free propaganda for an-Nahda and the Islamists”, noting the party’s supposed links to Qatar and alleging selection bias and a range of other complaints (some of them strongly classist and prejudicial in tone). There can be no doubt that an-Nahda has strong and obvious support inside Tunisia; one wonders how much outside perceptions of this are amplified by media coverage, potentially exaggerated polls, and so on. (As far as outside observers go the party probably also benefits from the mere fact of its Islamism, which is a favorite subject for Francophone and Anglophone observers for structural and political reasons that have relatively little to do with Tunisia’s situation.) It is an interesting question. Still more interesting is how divisive such polls actually are given Tunisia’s very really class and cultural divisions between, for example, the rural south and northern cities, secularists and Islamists (or even merely observant Muslims; one recalls stories of young women forced out of schools for wearing hijab, for instance), leftists and centrists, the poor and the rest and so on. The supposed trouble posed by polls is probably symptomatic of these broader troubles.
A moratorium on polls sounds like a rash, if not problematic, response and would frustrate the growth of a sometimes dubious and sometimes necessary features of modern democracies, the political services community and consultants, the partisan and third party hangers on (“communications specialists,” etc). In any case, this is a strong reminder that one should always look any poll critically, especially in particularly fluid environments. Professional standards and the like evolve with time, experience, outside criticism, even market pressures. The controversy over polls, though, is a more favorable one to have than, say, an environment where there are no polls or the only polls allowed are those showing 99% favorability of the RCD. Or might be until polls actually are banned.
Bohn’s Interview with El General
Posted: 17 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, culture, Maghreb, music, Tunisia 3 Comments »At Foreign Policy‘s Mideast Channel, Lauren E. Bohn has an interview with the Tunisian hip hop artist El General (also known as Hamada Ben Amor) whose song “Rayes Lebled” landed him in jail during the January uprising and became an anthem for revolutionaries in Tunisia and the region. Not long ago, this blogger complained about Robin Wright’s essentialist approach to hip hop in the Arab countries in her lackluster new book, Rock the Casbah (Issandr El Amrani complains that the review forgot to mock the title; but how easy would it be to make fun of its goofy title when its chapters have titles like “Extreme Makeover” and “The Scent of Jasmine”?) Even the short introduction to Bohn’s interview with Ben Amor is more edifying than Wright’s chapter on the subject. (Note: After this post goes up, this may sounds like hyperbole.) Today there is a lot of Arab hip hop that testifies to the brilliant internationalism of hip hop and how art as a people’s propaganda, far more overtly than its contemporary American or European cousins. The interview brings this out well.
Ben Amor has much to say and readers should look at the interview. Interestingly, but not really surprisingly he cites Tupac Shakur and the Algerian rapper (little known in the English speaking world, unfortunately) Lotfi Double Kanon as major influences. He rejects a catch all sort of self-identification. One can be more than one “thing” at once; one can be unique and have more a few things in common with those “different” from one’s self. One have beliefs and convictions in common with others and still carry on his his own way. Read the rest of this entry »
El Amrani on the Tea Party & Casserolestan
Posted: 17 August, 2011 Filed under: Mormons, politics, US 1 Comment »Issandr El Amrani has a column at The National on the rise of the Tea Party in the Republican primary campaign and what it might mean for America’s middle east policy. The whole thing is worth reading. Read the rest of this entry »
The Economist on Berbers and Resistance
Posted: 16 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Imazighen, Maghreb, Sahel 2 Comments »Michael Collins Dunn directs attention to a series of articles on Berbers (Imazighen) during the uprisings sweeping the Arab region. The Berbers (or Imazighen; singular, Amazigh) are of course the indigenous people of northwest Africa, most heavily concentrated in Morocco and Algeria but with other major populations in Libya and Mali and Niger (and smaller ones in Egypt, Tunisia and Mauritania). Though North Africa is generally considered a part of the Arab region and its people overwhelmingly speak dialects of Arabic, Berber languages are spoken in nearly all of them and Berbers have been active participants in the protest movements and uprisings in all of them; the protest movements in the Maghreb are neither narrowly “Arab” nor “Berber” in character or composition.
The western front in the Libyan struggle involves the Berbers of the Jebel Nafusa region; these fighters have garnered much media attention for their exploits against Qadhafi forces and for vigorously re-asserting their identity in the process. Libya’s Berbers have perhaps faced the most aggressive and deliberate campaign by any government in the region to deny and drown out their languages and culture. In any even, the article on the issue from this week’s Economist is the best general introduction to the subject from a regional perspective in some time. The Economist writes:
“There is a Berber renaissance taking place across north Africa,” enthuses Mounir Kejji, a Moroccan Berber campaigner. In his country a new constitution, endorsed in a referendum on July 1st, officially recognises the Berber language for the first time, though parliament will decide what this means in practice; Arab nationalists and many Islamists have long demanded that Arabic be the sole language of administration and state education.
The authoritarian Arab nationalist regimes that dominated the region used to accuse the Berbers of threatening national cohesion. Now, shaken and in some cases overthrown, they have seen Berber activism take on a new lease of life. Even where they are a minority of only a few thousand, as in Egypt and Tunisia, Berbers have been able for the first time to form community associations.
Libya’s rebellion is fiercest in the Nafusa Mountains, a Berber heartland long neglected by the government. Colonel Qaddafi has refused to acknowledge Berber culture for most of his reign, describing it as “colonialism’s poison” intended to divide the country. Only in 2006, apparently after his son Seif al-Islam intervened, did he lift a ban on the use of Berber names.
Berbers make up about 5% of Libya’s 6m-7m people, though some activists put the figure higher. In recent weeks they have set up a radio station. The rebel-controlled Libya TV, based in Qatar, now broadcasts in Tamazight, the Berber tongue, for two hours a day. In June, says Mr Kejji, a delegation of Libyan Berbers affiliated to the rebels’ Transitional National Council put a linguistic query to their Moroccan counterparts: how should they write “army”and “national security” in Tamazight, so that Libyan uniforms could have a badge in their own language alongside Arabic?
A written script for the various Berber dialects was created only in the 20th century. Algeria’s Kabyles, a Berber people said to number 4m, have usually preferred the Latin alphabet, whereas a Tuareg alphabet, called Tifinagh, is now officially used in Morocco and has been adopted by Libyan Berbers who were banned from using it under the colonel. (The Tuareg are nomadic Berber pastoralists living mainly in southern Algeria, eastern Mali and western Niger.)
All important and interesting questions. Aside from the fact some of these terms do not exist in modern Berber languages (one suspects on a hunch that they may exist in more archaic forms, though; this is not too great a problem in any case since many langages have faced similar questions with success, including Arabic and Farsi (an exciting idea: a manual for, say, a service rifle or tank translated from Arabic or Russian or English into Tamazight; more exciting would be a textbook for maths or biology or a history of the Qadhafi regime)) there is also the problem proposed by the fact that in Morocco and Algeria (and Libya, too) there are multiple Berber langages (aside from dialects), not just script or alphabetic choices as the article seems to assert. Taqbayit and Tarifit and Techelhit and Siwi are quite different indeed. This is ultimately the greatest challenge when it comes to “officialization” in a country like Algeria or Morocco. Which is why the Economist‘s take is quite sensible, in the end:
The Berber revival has rekindled enthusiasm for pan-Berber solidarity. “There’s an awareness among Berbers across north Africa of that element of their identity which they share,” says Hugh Roberts, an expert on the Maghreb. But each country in the region, he says, has its own particularities. The dream of creating a community of 20m-plus people (estimates of the total vary widely), stretching from Egypt’s western desert to the Atlantic, would be stymied by the multiplicity of Berber dialects and by the variety of political circumstances. “A single Berber identity exists only virtually—on the internet and among diaspora intellectuals,” says Mr Roberts.
There is also the problem of the other tens of millions of people living between the “Western desert to the Atlantic,” who do not think of themselves as Berbers (but who are often sympathetic to their struggle), diversity ultimately being the largest stumbling block for any type of grandiose identity politics. Pan-Berber particularism or separatism of that sort is any case rare. Most Berber activists are concerned with preserving and promoting linguistic and cultural heritage, expanding human rights, rural interests and other more secular concerns that Berbers (and Arabs) struggle with in North Africa. Imazighen are an important variable in political change in the Maghreb. The Arab Reform Bulletin features an interesting article looking at the issue of Amazigh identity in Morocco following that country’s referendum, though its presentation of the Amazigh identity issue in Algeria is too simplistic and essentializing (though it is correct in describing the country’s language policy as “second rate formalization” for sure).
Minority Questions
Posted: 13 August, 2011 Filed under: Islamism, Levant, politics, religion, Syria 2 Comments »Piotr Zalewski’s piece on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Foreign Policy leaves the reader with questions. The piece changes in the Syrian Brotherhood’s attitude toward religion and politics since its violent encounters with the Syrian regime in the 1970s and 1980s; the Syrian Brothers, he quotes one as saying, “have faced a revolution in our thoughts.” Zalewski describes this process broadly; he touches on very few specific questions and relies primarily (though not wholly) on interviews with Syrian Brotherhood members in the diaspora, in Turkey or Europe. The bulk of the article is concerned with explaining the influence of Turkey’s AK party as a “model” for Syrian Islamists. The party’s worldview has been influenced heavily by generational shifts and the success of Turkish Islamists. But the piece suffers heavily from avoiding a discussion of specific changes in the party’stance on specific questions.
For example: It would make sense to consider the Brotherhood’s position on the rights of religious minorities in the Brotherhood’s Syria. Given the strong sectarian element in Syria’s politics and the deep (and sometimes irrational) fear many Syrian minorities have at the prospect of the Ba’th regime falling and leading to even the possibility of “domination” by the Sunni majority (by means of the Brotherhood, for example) it is just as relevant to explore the Brotherhood’s “evolution” in this context as well as its view of the female dress code or the “light” role of ideology in general. Should a non-Muslim have the right to be the head of state (recall the Brotherhood’s campaign against the this provision in Syria’s proposed 1973 constitution)? Should Islam be the state religion? What do Brotherhood members when they refer to free “practice” of religion? How are their positions on these questions different from what they were in the 1970s and 1980s? How does the Brotherhood’s sectarianism relate to the sectarianism elsewhere in Syrian society?
Studies VIII: The 14 January Front
Posted: 12 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, lumpenproletariat, Maghreb, politics, Tunisia Leave a comment »This page includes a series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interesting) leftist parties as possible.
Below is an English translation of the founding statement of the 14 January Front (an alternative English translation can be read here), a coalition of Tunisian leftist parties formed after the overthrow of Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali (14 January was the day Ben Ali stepped down from office). The statement lays out the groups’ intentions to continue demonstrations until the “objectives of the revolution” are met, including the removal of Ben Ali-era officials and the overthrow of the interim Ghannouchi government. It appeals to the Tunisian people to continue protesting — “especially in the street” — to keep the interim authorities on their toes and politics in a constant state of play, lest elements of the old regime move things revert back to the way they were before the uprising. It is a strong representation of the arguments for “continuing” or “permanent revolution” made by many on the Tunisian left. This is a tendency also found among Egyptian leftists (reflecting the prominence of Trotskyist thought among many contemporary Arab leftwing factions; although, the Egyptian left is more overtly bourgeois in orientation than the Tunisian hard left (as seen in the 14 January Front and among older members of Ettajdid) and has stronger social democratic inclinations ideologically). Fundamentally, there is little trust that centrist Tunisian or Egyptian bourgeois democrats can be trusted to carry out revolutionary objectives and a belief that working class people must set and drive revolutionary objectives. Furthermore, the rhetoric of Arab revolutionaries of all orientations, but especially leftist ones, tends to call out for other Arab societies to join them in revolt. Contrary to some of the early writing in western presses about the limited objectives of Arab uprisings (notably with respect to Palestine) the chants and the statements of the groups and individuals partaking in uprisings this year frequently make reference to one another and call on other Arabs to sustain pressure for change in the region by rising up – the Arab uprisings do not accept a concept of “revolution in one country” (even the Stalinists among them). As Hossam Hamalawy told NPR recently: ”You cannot build a democracy in a country where you are surrounded by a sea or an ocean of dictatorships”.
On this tendency Marx set out on the subject (see here) arguing that the working class is tasked with organizing autonomously (hence, for example, the foundation of the Egyptian Workers Democratic Party (WDP), which describes itself as the country’s first party for workers) and pressing for driving “the proposals of the democrats to their logical extreme”:
[t]hey [revolutionaries] must drive the proposals of the democrats to their logical extreme (the democrats will in any case act in a reformist and not a revolutionary manner) and transform these proposals into direct attacks on private property. If, for instance, the petty bourgeoisie propose the purchase of the railways and factories, the workers must demand that these railways and factories simply be confiscated by the state without compensation as the property of reactionaries. [...] The demands of the workers will thus have to be adjusted according to the measures and concessions of the democrats.[. . .]
Although the German workers cannot come to power and achieve the realization of their class interests without passing through a protracted revolutionary development, this time they can at least be certain that the first act of the approaching revolutionary drama will coincide with the direct victory of their own class in France and will thereby be accelerated. But they themselves must contribute most to their final victory, by informing themselves of their own class interests, by taking up their independent political position as soon as possible, by not allowing themselves to be misled by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeoisie into doubting for one minute the necessity of an independently organized party of the proletariat. Their battle-cry must be: The Permanent Revolution.
In any case, the 14 January Front’s statement is widely available on the Internet on various party sites, forums and Facebook pages (it has its own website: http://front14janvier.net/). Since its formation, the front has gone through many changes of course and by now its collective strength has heavily eroded. It nevertheless remains a key element in understanding the evolution of the Tunisian left’s political development after the fall of Ben Ali. Understanding its objective also helps contextualize the ongoing protests by those described as the “far left”. Read the rest of this entry »
A Visit to Thala, Tunisia
Posted: 10 August, 2011 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, lumpenproletariat, Maghreb, politics, Tunisia 1 Comment »Below is an exclusive video report from Thala in Kasserine province in Tunisia emailed to TMND by E. Byrne and loaded to the TMND Vimeo account with permission.
Studies VII: The PCOT & Religion and the State (II)
Posted: 10 August, 2011 Filed under: Arabs, Islamism, Maghreb, politics, religion, Tunisia 1 Comment »This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interesting) leftist parties as possible.
Below is a translation of an essay (“Marxism and the relationship between religion and state: State secularism”) included in a pamphlet released by the Tunisian Communist Workers Party titled في اللائكية ”On Secularism”. The essay is itself an excerpt from a longer piece dealing with similar issues. The title of the pamphlet and this essay use the term اللائكية (al-la’ikiyya) derived from laïcité/laïque rather than علمانية (al-’ilmaniyya), the the standard Arabic term for secularism. This has been discussed earlier in this series. The essay lays out the author’s view of the corrosive influence of religious and religious partisans on science, freedom of conscience, women, class and the most effective means of dealing with the religious problem from a leftist perspective. It makes a strong effort to avoid targeting Islam as a religion and to cast its criticism of religious politics firmly in the realm of materialist political discourse, criticizing “Islamism” and “Islamists” as a system of political philosophy and explicitly admits that the party and the left cannot attempt to ban or eradicate religion from society. The essay also lays out the party’s view of what the Marxist take on religion in Tunisia ought to be.Below is a translation of an essay (“Marxism and the relationship between religion and state: State secularism”) included in a pamphlet released by the Tunisian Communist Workers Party titled في اللائكية ”On Secularism”. The essay is itself an excerpt from a longer piece dealing with similar issues. The title of the pamphlet and this essay use the term اللائكية (al-la’ikiyya) derived from laïcité/laïque rather than علمانية (al-’ilmaniyya), the the standard Arabic term for secularism. The implications of this have been discussed earlier in this series. Most of the essays/polemics in “On Secularism” are aggressive and loud critiques of Islamist political thought and leaders like Rachid Ghannouchi. More than one of the essays come from the late 1980s but others are not dated, like “Marxism and the relationship between religion and the state”.
The essay lays out the author’s view of the corrosive influence of religious and religious partisans on science, freedom of conscience, women, class and the most effective means of dealing with the religious problem from a leftist perspective. It makes a strong effort to avoid targeting Islam as a religion and to cast its criticism of religious politics firmly in the realm of materialist political discourse (drawing heavily on Leninist themes), criticizing “Islamism” and “Islamists” as a system of political philosophy and activism, explicitly admitting that the party and the left cannot attempt to ban or eradicate religion from society. The author clearly hopes to avoid conflating opposition to Islamist politics to Islam as practiced by ordinary people (which might alienate potential followers) while at the same time arguing for open-mindedness on religious thought (note that the essay mentions the right to atheism, for example). The forceful arguments on education and minority rights are notable as well. These come in support of the piece’s three main problems with religious government (its negative impact on”scientific renaissance, its suppression of free thought and its restrictions on political freedom). “Marxism and the relationship between religion and the state” was selected for translation because it represents a relatively brief and straightforward introduction to the party’s ideological and practical stance on religion and politics, in the general sense. It does not deal specifically with Tunisian rivals of the PCOT or secularism in general by name; it discusses the subject in social and historical terms. Thus it gives readers a general idea of the party’s overall stance which is fleshed out further in other (longer) and more specific essays. Additionally it reveals important elements of the party’s attitude toward education in general. (The article includes footnotes which are not included here but will be in a later format.)
“Smile”
Posted: 9 August, 2011 Filed under: Arabs, culture, poetry, Syria Leave a comment »Below is a [very] liberal translation of the poem ابتسم ”Smile” by the Syro-Lebanese (and eventually American, via Egypt) poet Ilya Abu Madi (1890-1957). Abu Madi is especially well known among older Arabs in the diaspora; he was a mahjar poet in the al-Rabitah group with Jubran Khalil Jubran and Mikha’il Nu’aymah (more on Nu’aymah later) in the nineteen teens and nineteen twenties. He mixed traditional and modern styles very heavily, sometimes to a fault. Abu Madi wrote many of great poems in America (and also some patriotic but unfortunately quite racist against blacks, adopting American stylings; but he never adopted the obnoxious Phoenician tendencies of some Lebanese poets at the time). His poems often use images and themes from nature. In any case, ابتسم “Smile” is a popular poem that encourages optimism and perspective in the face of adversity. Unlike previous posts, the original Arabic is not included in the post for the sake of space. The Arabic can be seen here. Read the rest of this entry »
Recent Comments