An Arab Uprising List: History Would Be Useless If It Taught Us Nothing

Understanding the Arab uprisings takes more than day to day media reports or longer articles (or even, now, books) churched out in the heat of the struggle; it requires reflection on similar events elsewhere in history. Arab history and the histories of other peoples can help place these things in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in perspective.

Below is a list of books of interest in this respect. It is not meant to be complete or comprehensive. They are in no particular order (obviously this is not an alphabetic list or timeline); the books are organized relatively thematically: (1) Books dealing with the Arab region and Iran; (2) Books dealing with world history and social phenomena; (3) Books dealing with Arab history in general. All of them are books in English or in translation.

Not all of these books deal relate to or deal explicitly with the Arab region: some of them have to do with world and European history (the revolutions of 1848, to which the Arab uprisings are often compared). Some of them deal with Marxist and communist history and perspectives, systems theory, social collapse and related subject matter. These are taken from books read by this blogger over time (before the winter uprising in Tunisia) for classes or leisure or the like and which have been revisited in part or in full since January. Leon Trotsky wrote: “history would be useless if it taught us nothing.” The basic consensus seems to be that history is useful  and does have something to teach us. These books are not all equal in prose, analysis, narrative or any other respect; but they are all useful in one or another way in trying to gain a bigger perspective on what is happening in the Arab world at the moment and some it has influenced other parts of the world. More books will follow eventually, with perhaps some French or Arabic ones which have relevance.

The Peacocks

Une trentaine de familles vivent la même situation que celle de l’ex-village socialiste de Moretti. «Ma famille est établie ici depuis 1962 et nous n’avons toujours pas de papiers !», lâche M. Amarouche, agriculteur lui aussi. «On a fait des mains et des pieds pour être régularisés, en vain. Aujourd’hui, on est complètement bloqués.» Les habitants du domaine Mellal s’étonnent par ailleurs que certains parmi leurs proches voisins aient parfaitement leur acte de propriété «alors qu’ils sont venus après nous». Cela s’explique en vérité par le statut de l’assiette foncière sur laquelle ces habitations ont été élevées, nous explique-t-on à la mairie. La même litanie revient sur leurs lèvres : «Nous n’avons aucune commodité. Nous n’avons même pas d’adresse officielle et nous recevons notre courrier à l’ITCMI», dénoncent-ils. «Regardez cette cité», lance un jeune. «Constatez par vous-mêmes que la plupart des volets sont fermés. C’est que la moitié de ces appartements sont vides. Ils servent en réalité de résidences d’été à des ministres, des députés, des généraux et des chefs de parti. Eux, d’un claquement de doigts, ils obtiennent tout ce qu’ils veulent. Leur alimentation en électricité leur vient directement de Club des Pins. Houma ouled eddoula wahna ouled el harka !»

“Plages fermées, foncier convoité et bidonvilles: Résidences d’Etat : Côté cour, côté jardin,” Mustapha Benfodil, El Watan. 27 July, 2011.

In other words:

“الطاووس”

مدن بالطاعون تموت وأخرى يضربها الزلزال
ومجاعات وحروب في كل مكان ودمار
وحضارات وعصور تنهار
لكن الطاووس، بلا خجلٍ، يظهر عورته
للناس

 

Cities perish in plagues,

Others are shaken by earthquakes,

Everywhere there is starvation, war and destruction,

Civilizations and eras collapse,

But the peacock shamelessly

Displays his privates to the people.

“The Peacock” by Abdul Wahab al-Bayyati.

Jumping to Conclusions RE: Norway

There was much consternation when many international media outlets assumed the Norway terrorist attacks this weekend were perpetrated by al-Qa’eda, lone wolf “Muslim” terrorists or the like. Most considered this a reasonable possibility give the structure of the attack in the city of Oslo. Of course it was soon clear: the Norway attacks were carried out by a conservative, anti-Muslim, self-described Knight of Templar who happened to be a native Norwegian pumped up on anabolic steroids. The Islamist angle then became: a horrible idea.

Recent Reading: Some Good Books

The following is a list of books for which there is not enough time to review in detail but deserve praise. Some of them are in French. They are not ranked. Most were read in the last two or three months. A few notes on books that stuck out come after the list.

Fisher’s Comparisons RE: the Ikhwan

Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood and an-Nahda are often well organized and popular. They enjoy numerous advantages over secular parties in being able to tap into religious networks and other, secular parties have often been crippled and divided by years of successful politicking at the hands of repressive regimes. Conventional wisdom says Islamist parties will out do all others in free elections in Tunisia or Egypt, or even most Arab countries. This is not certain, but it is likely. Other scenarios are possible, if not probable as well.

The obsession with religious parties is at times almost humorous. In popular outlets, sensationalism and exaggeration are the rule, this is especially true. This being said, Max Fisher writes:

Studies VI: What’s in a Name?

This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interesting) leftist parties as possible.

The Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT) has been covered on this blog before as well as its party congress which took place this weekend. During one of the sessions, the party’s leaders (Hamma Hammami and others) considered changing the party’s name to leave out الشيوعي ”Communist”. Various Tunisian commentators have noted that while the party has a strong core and enjoys relatively strong credibility with certain parts of the public the PCOT nevertheless suffers from its identification with communism. Many Tunisians associate communism with obsolescence, authoritarianism and atheism; the last problem is particularly relevant in that it exposes the party to particular attacks when faced with other parties coming from the Islamist tendency and other leftist parties not identified with the same label who are not seen as being hostile to religion. Tunisian news reports noted that the issue came up on the second day of the congress and that no decision was reached as to whether or not to change the party’s name.

Studies V: PCOT on Foreign Affairs (II)

This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interesting) leftist parties as possible.

Below are translations of communiques and articles from the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT) dealing with international and foreign issues. Two are articles dealing with macro-political/economic issues — the global financial crisis and global warming and its impact on poverty — from 2009 and 2010. One deals with the problem of anti-immigrant (and anti-Muslim) sentiment in Europe, mostly in relation to the economic down turn and the exploitative character of capitalism, as the party sees it. Another is a communique mourning the death of Pascale Fantodji, a Beninois communist leder, from 2010.

These documents were selected because: (1) they illustrate, in part, the party’s ideological and cultural posture at the international level; (2) they deal with relatively contemporary problems in global political economy and thus show how the party applies its political outlook to the world around it in relatively abstract terms as opposed to strictly concrete, practical or tactical terms; (3) these communiques help in understanding the party’s own self image as not just as an internationally-oriented revolutionary party and thus assist in informing readers about some of the frames and its motivation with respect to and approach to particular political questions inside Tunisia and the Arab countries. The authors of these documents, like many leftists, view the global financial crisis as evidence of a crisis of capitalism that confirms the outline of Marxist thought. They view increasing European hostility towards immigrants, Muslims especially, at least in part as a function of capitalist exploitation of the working class and calls for a ”progressive anti-racist front” to advocate for the rights of workers in Europe and elsewhere. (This communique is especially relevant given the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July, carried out by an individual committed to the anti-immigrant/Muslim tendency in Europe and acting on what he saw as the logical conclusion of that movement, based on the “Eurabian thesis”.) The communique regarding Fantodji is included to show its links with other African communist movements. Other documents dealing with foreign affairs/international issues will follow in later posts.

Weekend Reading

Here are links to three interesting articles relevant to some of the issues covered on this blog recently.

الماركسية ودور اليسار في الثورات العربية “Marxism and the role of the left in the Arab revolutions”; al-Akhbar.

الانتفاضات العربية وأولويات اليسار ”Arab uprisings and the priorities of the left“; Al-Akhbar.

خلافات الحزب ‘الحاكم’ في الجزائر تصل حد التهديد بخوض الانتخابات بقوائم مستقلة “Differences in the Algerian ‘ruling’ party to the extent of threats of running on separate electoral lists”; al-Quds al-’Arabi.

Studies IV: PCOT Party Congress

This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interesting) leftist parties as possible.

Recent posts have focused on translations of the communiques, tracts and documents of Arab, mainly Tunisian (so far), leftist parties as part of a post series hoping to raise awareness and consciousness of the contemporary Arab left on key political questions among English-speakers. This post includes some images and a summary of reports on the first session of the party congress of one of the parties given particular attention in the first stages of this post series (“Studies”): the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party (PCOT).

Studies III: PCOT and Women’s Issues (I)

This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interest) leftist parties as possible.

The following are three translations of articles published by the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party’s (PCOT) organs on women’s issues. They were selected because they reflect the general tone of the party’s publications on women’s questions. The first comes from before the January 2011 uprising and frames women’s emancipation in terms of Marxist ideology; the second and third come from after the overthrow of Ben Ali, one is a communique marking International Women’s Day and the other is a “tribute to working women where ever they are”and describes the party’s view on the marginalization of women and its severity. All three are essentially polemics. The articles here are brief; translations of excerpts from the party’s longer ideological tracts will follow later on.

Thoughts RE: Arab Uprising & Ramadan 2011

Ramadan begins on 1 August and will last through 29 August. The Islamic holy month of Ramadan will coincide with a variety of ongoing uprisings in the Arab world. It is worth considering how this might be significant in political terms since it seems to so obvious that this Ramadan is likely to be especially eventful. The Islamic holiday’s overlap with several ongoing and developing uprisings in the Arab countries is highly likely to increase openings for popular activism, especially by sectarian and Islamist factions. Additionally, Ramadan will provide opposition elements with greater opportunities for organizing and protest as large numbers of people gather at mosques and communal festivities in the open air in major cities. In counties with ongoing uprisings, such as Yemen and Syria, there is a high probability that Islamist groupings will become bolder and more confident during Ramadan, taking advantage of opportunities to use religious festivals and sermons to rally their followers against their regime and factional enemies. At the least, Ramadan could intensify already common post-Friday afternoon prayers demonstrations and nighttime protests that have become more and more common in several Arab countries.

Studies II: Religion, Politics & Leftists, Tunisia (I)

This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interest) leftist parties as possible.

The following is a series of communiques from Tunisian left/center left political parties translated from Arabic. The purpose of this set of translations is to flesh out some of the discourses about competition with Islamist factions on the Tunisian left; naturally this post cannot reflect the totality of that discourse.

The communiques here were selected because: (1) they all deal with either physical or rhetorical/ideological competition between individual left or center-left parties which are generally secular in orientation and Islamist parties (an-Nahdha) or factions (groups of Salafis, religious activists, etc.); (2) each reflects the increasing polarization between secular (or semi-secular) and religious factions in Tunisia and the efforts taken by the secular parties to respond to this tension and deal with similar questions and incidents; and (3) each in its own way reflects the kinds of ideological and tactical challenges faced by Tunisian left-wing and secular parties when faced by competition from religious opponents and those parties’ style of response to these attacks and criticisms based on religious grounds. Common threads include: the use of mosques as political bully pulpits; accusations of atheism or apostasy as a means of discrediting communists and leftists; the use of violence by supporters of religious groups against communists and leftists; the position of Islamists toward freedom of thought, political tolerance and labor rights, along with other issues. Translations of communiques and tracts dealing with religious issues in more depth will come in later posts in this series. These particular communiques are relatively recent (from early/mid-June-early July) and reflect an increase in tension among various Tunisian political factions (coming in the same period as recent demonstrations, clashes with security forces and deepening suspicion between “the street” and the transitional authorities; translations dealing with these other questions are soon to follow as well). In the meantime these brief translations will introduce the subject in general in this series.

The communiques here come from: (1) The Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party (PCOT); (2) The Progressive Democratic Party (PDP); (3) The NationalDemocratic Action Party (PTPD); and (4) The Ettajdid Movement (Mouvement Ettajdid). Short summaries on each of these parties can be found here. The PCOT has been discussed in this series before, here. The PDP is a center-left/social democratic party headed by Maya Jribi and Ahmed Najib Chebbi. The PDP was founded in 1983 as the Progressive Social Rally, drawing from a Marxist backdrop and revising its name and ideological framework in 2000, move toward a more centrist position. It became was active against censorship and other violations by the Ben Ali government. It publishes a newspaper called al-Mawkif. It tends to poll second after an-Nahdha in opinion polls. It participated in legislative elections under the Ben Ali regime until 2004 and has a relatively middle class base of support. The PTPD is a small Marxist party, founded in 2005 and led by Abderrazak Hammami. It publishes a newspaper called Al-Iraada and was legalized only after the January uprising. Ettajdid is the former Tunisian Communist Party (PCT), reformed and now in a social democratic orientation. It publishes the Attariq al-Jadida newspaper. It was legal under Ben Ali and fielded candidates in the 2005 and 2009 elections and tends toward an aggressive stance on the separation of religion and politics. 

Studies I: PCOT on Foreign Affairs (I)

This post is a part of a new series of posts which will consist of translations and excerpts from the communiques, statements, pamphlets and other literature from left-wing political parties in the Arab world, especially Tunisia (others as well, Egypt, Algeria and Mauritania in particular). The selections will focus on foreign policy, women’s issues, relations with other political factions (mainly Islamists and other leftist tendencies), ideology, rhetoric and general worldview. The purpose of this series is to put into English elements of the contemporary Arab political discourse which are generally neglected in western and English-language reportage and analysis while the of Islamist tendency receives extensive, if not excessive coverage. The translations in this series should not be taken as this blogger endorsing or promoting the content of particular materials: the objective is to increase access to and understanding of the contemporary Arab left by making its perspectives known, especially in areas of interest and relevance to English-speakers. This series will include both leftist and Arab nationalist [party] documents, statements, communiques, articles and so on. The series will attempt to touch on as many of the main (and interest) leftist parties as possible.

The following post contains translations of tree communiques and articles dealing with uprisings in the Arab region from the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (Parti communiste des ouvriers tunisiens/حزب العمال الشيوعي التونسي‎, or PCOT; its website is malfunctioning as of early afternoon, 13 July). The PCOT is a hard left party, led by Hamma Hammami and belonging to the International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations (Unity & Struggle). It is a Marxist-Leninist party with Hoxhaist and Stalinist tendencies (see later postings) and considers itself to be a revolutionary party. It is stridently pro-Palestinian and against normalization with Israel. It was founded in 1986 and has an active presence among youth and students. The party operated continuously through the Ben Ali period and its members and leaders were persecuted like many other Tunisian oppositionists. The PCOT was legalized after the January 2011 uprising. It has allied with other leftwing parties and supported the decision to postpone constituent assembly election until October, believing this would give the left more time to organize and prepare (the Islamist party an-Nahdha is considered the frontrunner out does most other parties in the polls). The PCOT came in fourth in a Sigma poll in May (9.2%) and third in an al-Jazeera poll this month (5%; conducted in late May/early June). (Note the wide discrepancy between the polls. Also see The Economist‘s analysis of the situation here which is less triumphant in an-Nahda’s favor and which gives more attention to the fact that most voters are undecided and that a large coalition of secular factions has formed in an effort to counter an-Nahdha.) The PCOT represents one of the strongest currents on the far left side of the Tunisian political spectrum. Though it takes support from a small minority, its activists and members have been heavily involved in demonstrations during and after the uprising that overthrew Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.

The three communiqués here deal with foreign affairs in the Arab region. One deals with Palestine, another with the UN/NATO intervention in Libya and a third with the Syrian uprising. These are selected for the following reasons: (1) they deal directly with timely issues related to the “Arab spring” from the perspective of a political party which was heavily involved in the Tunisian uprising; (2) they are representative of the general tone of the party’s attitudes on Arab uprisings and external intervention and interference; (3) they are written by diverse segments of the party’s organs and membership. Future translations from the PCOT will deal with (1) more foreign affairs issues inside and outside the Arab region; (2) religious and women’s issues and (3) general ideology.

AQIM on Mauritania/Mali Fighting

AQIM released a communique (text here) claiming to have killed “more than one hundred and ten apostates” in various recent attacks in Algeria and Mauritania. It consists most of a list (bullet points) of attacks and engagements involving its fighters in recents months and weeks, the vast majority of which took place in Algeria; one bullet point is devoted to activity in Mauritania.

The bullet point dealing with Mauritania/Mali describes AQIM’s version of events in Mali (at the Wagadou Forest) and at Bassiknou. It reads as a refutation of media and official accounts of the battles which may regarded as both significant routes by the Mauritanian (and Malian) armed forces and significant improvements in Mauritanian performance against AQIM since their major defeat at the hands of AQIM in September 2010. It describes the failed Bassiknou raid, led by Mauritanian Khaled al-Chinquitti (Khalid al-Shinqiti) (more on him here and below) only briefly. It dwells more on the battle at the Wagadou Forest, focusing on weapons and other materiel the group claims to have taken from its Mauritanian Army opponents (of which there was apparently either too much to carry because the supplies were so plentiful or because they faced heavy losses/shortages in terms of trucks). As might be expected it downplays AQIM’s losses in men and materiel (it makes no mention of air strikes or bombing from the Mauritanian Air Force) and leaves out details; it also includes no body counts for the Mauritanian side. It also makes no mention of the Malian Army. Its tone is triumphant though bitter and defensive lacks detail in contrast with previous communiqués following contact with the Mauritanian Army. It reads as a refutation of media and official reports on the engagements in Mali and Mauritania. Here is a short summary:

Thurston on AQIM Confrontations; Profile of a Mauritanian AQIM Fighter

1. Alex Thurston, friend of the blog and author of the indispensable Sahel Blog, writes of the recent battles between AQIM and the Mauritanian and Malian armed forces:

First, both incidents have given rise to massive speculation and rumor (for those who read French, see the Malian news aggregation site Maliweb for daily examples) about the nature of the battles and the precise contributions of Mauritanian and Malian forces.

Second, it is possible that there is an escalation in the intensity of the fighting – yesterday’s battle featured, on the Mauritanian side, use of aircraft, and the character of the fighting this summer feels fiercer to me than other recent incidents, such as a clash between Mauritanian forces and AQIM in January/February of this year (on the other hand, the attack on Lemgheiti, Mauritania, by AQIM’s predecessor organization in 2005 was at least as intense as yesterday’s attack).

Finally, observers, both in the region and in Western powers, are watching carefully to see whether AQIM’s capabilities have increased due to alleged influxes of Libyan weapons, and whether Sahelian militaries are getting closer to neutralizing AQIM. TheChristian Science Monitor quotes an unnamed Western official in Mali questioning whether the political will exists in Sahelian capitals to prosecute the fight against AQIM to the full extent. That may be the case. Yet it seems that Mauritania and Mali – as well as AQIM – are gearing up for sustained military conflict.

Nouakchott’s posture has historically been somewhat more aggressive than Bamako’s, which had been a source of tension between the two countries on AQIM. The Malians were originally hesitant for a number of reasons including on the one hand fear that their fight against AQIM triggering wider internal conflict, especially with the Arab (Moorish) and Tuareg communities in the north where AQIM has attempted to graft itself into (with some limited success) and a lack of desire to poke at overlapping smuggling networks (which include AQIM, local populations, members of the security forces, etc.) that are likely to include members of the armed forces and government in Bamako. Pressure toward greater cooperation and firmness from Europe, America and Algeria have likely been key drivers in recent cooperation. Recent offensives appear significantly more successful than those in 2010 and from a western perspective are probably preferable to the largely reactive posture taking through 2009.

2. A piece of interesting information: Al-Akhbar has a report on one of the leaders of the Tuesday attack, a al-Mimoun Ould Aminou [translit.?]. Ould Aminou was “left Mauritania in 2004 before finishing university to join the camps of the armed group in northern Mali. According to al-Akhbar’s source, Ould Aminou was born in the nineteen eighties in Taganit. It describes his “radicalization” and how it created friction between him and his parents and family. The report says Ould Aminou appeared in several AQIM videos after heading to the camps. He was allegedly close to the men who carried out the attack in Tavregh Zeina and AQIM’s Nema suicide attacker (from last year). He goes by “Khaled al-Chinquitti” (Khalid al-Shinqiti) and helped lead the raid on Tuesday “in order to prove the maturity of the Mauritanians in the armed group (AQIM)”. Others killed included Anas al-Jazairi (the Mauritanians claim he was a major leader) and Abdelhalim al-Azaouadi (al-Azawadi). Taqadoumy reports that the Mauritanian Army was tipped off to Tuesday’s attack by French intelligence. (More on the raid in a post later today.)

Round Up RE: AQIM/Army Skirmish at Bassiknou, Mauritania

Here is a quick round up of stories and reports from the Mauritanian media on the brief AQIM attack on a Mauritanian Army base near Bassiknou on Tuesday. The attack appears to have failed, and the Army claims to have killed ten and twenty (depending on the report) AQIM men being killed by the Mauritanian Army, nine taken prisoner by the Mauritanian Army. It is the first clash between Mauritanian forces and AQIM since the fighting at Wagadou Forest last week. As always readers are encouraged to post their information and thoughts in the comments section.

UPDATE: See Alex Thurston’s analysis of recent clashes between AQIM and the Mauritanian/Malian armed forces.