Last week reader sent an email asking a number of questions about the impact of the Arab uprisings on the Arab region in terms of the foreign policy of the countries in the region, from the perspective of some one who generally focuses on the Maghreb. Another reader emailed and asked for thoughts on Libya specifically. This is the response to both, not totally coherent (these are areas of generally peripheral interest/knowledge for this blogger) but here is a summary and then a very general thought dump on: Libya, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and regional Islamist movements (some of it is a bit dated, since it was written a week ago). Take it all with a grain of salt.
SUMMARY, SHORT TERM. The Arab uprisings have seriously altered the region’s geopolitical setting. The uprisings have raised the political stakes for Arab governments and publics. Arab elites will face new challenges from emergent counter-elites and political forces. More open domestic political environments in Egypt and Tunisia are very likely to lead to more diverse political scenes in general, and especially within the regional Islamist tendencies. The Gulf states will seek additional security partners to help avoid additional upheaval as seen in Bahrain and will attempt to leverage their economic, religious and cultural influence to moderate and “balance” the political outcomes of uprisings and political processes elsewhere in the region while accentuating a sectarian (Sunni-Shi’i) narrative regarding unrest in the Gulf to gain reassurance from traditional western allies regarding internal security and Iran. The outlook, posture and position of key regional stakeholders has been complicated and rearranged and actors like Turkey and Iran face significant opportunities and challenges and they will be forced to rethink and reconfigure their approaches to exerting public and official influence in the Arab region. Continue reading
