Uprisings and western perspectives

Two complexes afflict western, especially American and French, policy in the Middle East and the Muslim countries generally: 1) the Tehran ’79 Syndrome; and 2) the Algiers ’92 Syndrome. In both cases Islamist factions effectively co-opted popular unrest in the first case turning a generalized revolt against a particular pro-western dictator into an “Islamic Revolution” that torpedoed a presidential re-election campaign and tanked a major American ally and in the second a predominantly Muslim polity held free elections in which an Islamist party won the overwhelming majority of votes and then devolved into a decade long Civil War. In the first case, the lesson was to stand by allies in times of crisis for strategic as well as domestic political reasons. No American president, especially no Democratic president, wants to end a first term like Jimmy Carter did. In the second, the lesson as that democratic processes in Muslim polities, especially in Arab ones, lead to Islamist victories which drastically increases the risk factor associated with political reform or popular protest. The emergency laws so popular in many Arab states (and which usually ban demonstrations or significantly the activities of political parties) therefore seem easily justifiable from the standpoint of western interests. In both cases, the country put at risk was a major oil or gas producer. Both countries were strategically positioned in terms of either Eurasian or European geopolitics, though one less than the other (Iran in relation to the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union; Algeria in terms of southern Europe, particularly in terms of immigration and Mediterranean shipping and energy). The Iranian problem cast its shadow over the Algerian one; and the Algerian experience has loomed over other Arab-Muslim experiments with democracy in America, Europe and the Arab countries. Iran looms more heavily in the American psyche — with the hostage crisis the Iranian revolution was an enormous humiliation and geopolitical shake up. The Algerian crisis was more serious in the French mind, but has been prominent in American analysis and thinking about Islamists and elections. It is key to notice that most American writing on Algeria is preoccupied with two phases of the country’s history and one dimension of its politics after 1980: the War of Independence, the 1990/1992 elections and coup and the role of Islamists until about 1999 when material dries up and becomes more narrowly specialized. This abridged and (over)simplified for brevity’s sake but the basic point is here (and this is meant to describe of all official or academic view points on the region).

Vague thoughts on the Arab Winter Uprisings

The Winter Uprisings in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Yemen have shaken western and Arab confidence in the sustainability of the current models of “competitive” authoritarianism. These were not bread riots; they were illustrations of political gangrene. Tunisia’s strong man fled his fort; the Mubarak family is said to have gone on holiday to London in light of massive protests over days (these cannot be call riots in the way the Algerian or Tunisian ones were at some stages; these are political protests, demonstrations of plain dissatisfaction); rumors are circulating rampantly that Algeria’s president will announce a cabinet reshuffle that may replace the prominent Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia (see here for background). It seems clear that the old calculations for political succession in the polities hit by the Winter Uprisings must be revised. Jamal Mubarak seems ever less likely of a candidate to succeed his father. Ahmed Ouyahia’s close association with the economic reforms and policies blamed for unrest this winter (and in the last two years one might add) have severely damaged his public credibility and viability as a presidential candidate for the time being. Tunisia’s interim government, previously made up of Ben Ali’s old friends, was forced to re-organize after popular protests questioned their legitimacy — and then set the security forces on demonstrators. The likelihood of Said Bouteflika becoming president was, in this blogger’s opinion, always low. After the regime squabbles following the 2009 presidential election, it seems much less likely that Algiers will follow Damascus’s lead. The Egyptian uprising puts the younger Mubarak’s political career in serious jeopardy. The first Arab regime where this winter’s events torpedoed a rising “star’s” political career was Tunisia: it may be said with some safety that Sakhr el-Materi will never be president of Tunisia without dear struggle.

Ahmed Ouyahia may be replaced as Prime Minister in the weeks ahead: some say the recently-appointed Minister of Energy, Youcef Yousfi might take the post others throw in Ahmed Benbitour (ex-PM in 1999 and a former finance minister) or Mouloud Hamrouche. These are personalities whose elevation to Prime Minister would serve the same purpose as Ouyahia’s: balancing the power of Bouteflika and ensuring collegiality in decision-making. There may be a cosmetic response to the Winter Uprisings from the men that lead the major political networks in Algeria. One should look carefully at the personalities that emerge in the next few weeks. Given the tendency of the main factions (those linked to military intelligence (DRS) and those linked to Bouteflika) to use popular crises as opportunities to undermine the reputation of one another, rather than focus on the resolution of socio-economic pressures (which are seen as sustainable in any case), cabinet reshuffles are unlikely to satisfy the demands of the Algerians planning protests in the capital or rioting in the towns and villages.

Re: Algerian leftists & the Winter Uprisings: or, the weakness of political parties

UPDATE: Below is an image mapping the genealogy of the Algerian parties mentioned in this post. Here is the PDF. An updated version will be posted on the “Charts” page.

The role of the Tunisian left in the winter uprising was critical. This has been widely noted. The communist tendencies are especially interesting to consider in relation to their Algerian cousins. The Tunisian parties have a broader base among students and workers than the leftist parties in Algeria do. While the Tunisian Communist Workers Party (PCOT) resisted co-optation by Ben Ali, the Algerian communists (PAGS and later Ettihadi) were supportive of and tolerated by the Algerian government. The major elements of the Algerian left took the government’s line during this winter’s uprisings directly contrasting with the Tunisian left’s decisive organizational function. The Algerian left ended up in the opposition from the 1990s but mostly because they were allied with factions of the regime’s anti-Islamist hardline in the Civil War or have become decorative elements parliament. PAGS (the Avant-Guard Socialist Party) was the successor of the colonial-era Algerian Communist Party, and was tolerated by the regime during the one-party days of the FLN. It had a reasonable following among young people and some working people in the 1960s and 1970s under Ben Bella and Boumediene; their toleration was in part the result of Boumediene’s efforts to keep good relations with the Soviet Union and partly because the communists had been supportive of the nationalist cause during the war and had a reasonable following on their own. It was dominated at first by pieds-noirs (with a large Muslim clique) until independence and ran the paper Alger Republicain and was influencial in Revolution Africain. It had sympathizers in the FLN, even among Maoists although their disposition was heavily urban-centric and neglected the peasantry handing this element’s potential to the FLN and the state.

PAGS lost its importance in the 1980s especially as the importance of ideology declined in Soviet-Algerian relations and Islamism became popular. PAGS had an easier time under Ben Bell than Boumediene: many of its members saw Boumediene as a reactionary given his criticism of Ben Bella’s socialist rhetoric and policies and his religious credentials (which he leveraged immediately after his coup to gain the support of religious people opposed to the March Decrees and Ben Bella’s “socialist” pretenses). The party thus benefited from Algeria’s position in the Cold War context as well as certain FLN figures’ sympathies. It was dealt a serious blow by the collapse of communism in the Eastern Bloc after 1989; this intensified ideological and practical divisions within the party. PAGS supported the 1992 coup and its leaders were openly critical of the FIS and the Islamist tendency generally. After 1992 it was known as Ettihadi and was headed by El-Hachemi Cherif — Islamist assassins attempted to kill him in the mid-1990s. Ettihadi dropped the explicitly communist line, probably in hopes of better integrating into a political environment where religion was more powerful than in the past. Another faction broke away and formed the Marxist-Lenninist Algerian Party for Democracy and Socialism (PADS). This party claims the legacy of the historic Algerian Communist Party. Cherif’s Ettihadi became the Democratic and Socialist Movement (MDS) in 1998/1999, which he headed until his death in 2005. One could find Cherif on al-Jazeera arguing with Algerian opposition figures about the conduct of the government during the Civil War — he became a defender of the official position on these issues. His presence in those kinds of conversations was outsized for the popularity of his party. The party kept to the eradicationist line with the Islamists and became progressively more obscure as time went on — also moved closer to the ideological center. MDS won one seat in parliament in the 2007 parliamentary elections. PADS remains active as an opposition party, though extremely small and probably more obscure than MDS (it is a member of the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties). Since Cherif’s death in 2004, the MDS has been split between two factions, one led by Ali Hocine and another by Ahmed Meliani. Louisa Hanoune’s role as the head of the Workers Party (PT) has been written about on this blog on many occasions. She is by far the most prominent personality on the left in Algeria today due to the size of her party and her strong personality.

The PT was founded in 1990 gathering trade unionists, youth and middle class workers; it follows the Trotskyite line. Its origins are in the Organization of Socialist Workers (OST) which Hanoune also led in the 1980s when she worked underground. She was active in opposing the junta in the 1990s and sought out roles for herself and her party in negotiations with the FIS and the Islamist tendency generally. From 1997-2007 her party gained seats in every parliamentary election relatively steadily compared to other parties. Since 2007 especially the PT has been seen as house opposition, legitimizing the government’s rigged electoral processes through its participation in exchange for more seats and prominence, causing skepticism. Hanoune ran for president twice: in 2004 (she won less than 1% of the vote) and against in 2009 (she came in second place with 4.2% of the vote). She draws the attention of a reasonable number of left-leaning middle class women and many former government workers (her party has the highest proportion of female delegates in parliament). Her leadership style is often criticized as dictatorial (though party members claim to be satisfied with most of their political achievements). During the recent winter riots, she fell in line with the rest of the political class in blaming speculators for the price increases and condemning the youth demonstrations. Statements attributed to PADS and MDS have appeared on communist websites in light of the winter uprising in Algeria. Their online presence is very weak, though PADS publishes (or published) its own newspaper. Hanoune’s recent criticism of the regime has been more cautious than in the past; usually she or her party members will take an extreme line on some economic issue and then moderate their stance and rhetoric with time. But they routinely oppose privatizations and what they seen as immodest alterations to investment laws. Its base being small one often hears young people describe Hanoune’s outlook as being “from another era,” and like other politicians most people regard her participation in government as irrelevant (after all, she “has no problem with Bouteflika personally,” which distinguishes her from many Algerians to whom this sounds like “[t]he Stalin regime is accepted by the Russian masses.”). The PT’s agenda is focused on women’s emancipation in ways that no other opposition party is and it is one of the few that makes respect for worker’s rights a primary issue; on the other hand like Ettihadi and the MDS the PT is less assertive on secularism than other issues (it is seen as divisive). The party organized small protests to oppose the American invasion of Iraq in 2003; this produced a famous photograph of Hanoune being arrested by police. Hanoune can be an aggressive and powerful speaker though (there used to be a video on YouTube of her speaking at a rally in very fine Arabic, really riling up the audience; it seems to have been taken down though). One finds a more critical and systematic approach in pronouncements from PADS, though. None of these parties played the major role the Tunisian left was able to play this winter; party because the Tunisian regime repressed the Islamist tendency so aggressively and without ideological co-optation unlike the Algerian regime which repressed it but adopted parts of its narrative and following in order to de-legitimize and control it. The political class in general has adopted a far more accommodationist line on religion in Algeria in the last ten years and religion plays a very large role in national identity to begin with. Thus the political space for communists of any background is severely limited and the Algerian regime has been effective in killing the appeal of political parties by interacting with them (in Algerian politics anything the regime touches turns to coal in the eyes of the masses). [Edited] The protests around  22 January were pushed in some parts of the country by the right-wing, secularist (and Berberist) Rally for Culture and Democracy; older the social-demoratic (and also Berberist) Front of Socialist Forces (FFS; the party was founded by Hocine Ait Ahmed after independence and has a tradition of resistance based in Kabylia) was uninvolved; the many popular minor forces often appeal to religion and oppose socialism (and certainly communism) ideologically whether they be in the vein of Malek Bennabi or some sectionalist personality. The RCD has a stronger popular base in Kabylia than anywhere else and it made a similar compromise with the regime in 1992 in supporting the coup a way of holding back Islamists. The FFS was rejectionist and remains vocal in boycotting presidential elections and mobilizing protests. The parties were not the crucial element in the December and January riots and demonstrations though: young people have turned away from official institutions and are taking their social and political demands in their own hands without leaders, by and large. The weakness of the left in Algeria comes in part from this background, as does the weakness of official Islamist and “nationalist” parties (and the communist tendency in the Arab countries has its own special reasons for failure broadly, as As’ad AbuKhalil has written with somewhat controversially). Parties in Algeria often lack the popular legitimacy to have the kind of power they have had in Tunisia’s recent events.

Repressed during the last twenty years, the PCOT’s activists were arrested and hunted throughout and it build a respectable base of support given its circumstances. It kept ideological consistency and popular legitimacy. The Algerian parties compromised with the junta and then Bouteflika for survival. At one time PAGS had a significant following among young people; its successors have had less luck among Algerian youth. Hamma Hammami, the leader of the PCOT, was arrested by the Tunisian regime and had sympathizers among the people who demanded his release; if the head of PADS or MDS were arrested in Algeria even politically astute people would likely ask: “What is PADS? What is MDS?”

Kaplan: Slammed

Michael Collins Dunn, editor of the Middle East Journal, slams Robert D. Kaplan’s recent piece on Tunisia (addressed here and by Brian Whitaker):

[ . . .] Kaplan has written some good books, though his Middle East track record is not all I might wish for. This time, I think he gets it wrong.

[. . .]

[B]ear in mind my doctorate is in history, and I did a bit of work on the early Islamic Maghreb, not to mention having a reasonable knowledge of Classical Antiquity. In other words, don’t start arguing about Carthage and Roman Africa unless you want a fight. Or a rant.

It is a biting critique that should be read in full. 

A new role for the Tunisian army?

“Our revolution is your revolution,” the military leader, Gen. Rachid Ammar, yelled through a megaphone to more than 1,000 demonstrators in a square near his office, according to several witnesses. “The army will protect the revolution.”

“Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’” New York Times.

Issandr el-Amrani of the Arabist writes, from Tunisia:

This sends the message that a) no one in the interim government has the credibility to take charge of this kind of communication and b) that Ammar is the current strongman, the only person with credibility to address and calm angry crowds. It’s a short hop from that to the idea that he should be the head of the transitional government, although at least for appearances’ sake it might be better to remain in the background. But it remains a real possibility, considering that today he appears as the only person with the credibility to block criticism — there simply is no other politician that would have the same instant authority, since he is seen as the man who deposed Ben Ali.

[. . .]

One possibility is that Ammar is going ahead of UGTT / popular expectations by taking up the role of defender of the revolution — thus responding to one of the main fears of the opposition and at least part of the UGTT, which is that the RCD will crawl back in place. I’m not sure what the link is right now, but I am putting today’s speech and the revolutionary rhetoric alongside last night’s arrest of Hannibal TV director Larbi Nasra (who has apparently now been released) and the bizarre charges against him — that he was conspiring against the revolution and committed “high treason.” Remember that no one, not even Ben Ali or his relatives currently under house arrests, have been charged with treason or anything else. Of course that could simply be a big gaffe by Najib Chebbi, the minister who mentioned the high treason charges. The current government, again, really seems to have a PR problem — the wisest one so far, indeed, appears to be Slim Amamou whose Twitter feed satisfies a natural curiosity but has been gaffe-free (most probably he’s not in the loop.)

This is a point of risk that deserves serious attention. The public perception of the army as a mediating force and one with both moral credibility and revolutionary legitimacy is potentially destabilizing. As Issandr writes (and this blog has written previously) the current government’s lack of legitimacy and charisma create an opportunity (or temptation) for the armed forces to enter politics in a way that could lead to continued authoritarianism (as it has in virtually every other Arab polity where the military is politicized). In times of crisis people often rally around what are seen as defensive and stabilizing forces such as military and religious figures. Because Gen. Ammar played such a key role in managing the fallout of the uprising it is understandable that some Tunisians would look to him as a solution to the current political crisis, an outsider that could help clean out regime rot.

Whatever Ammar’s ambitions are politically the claim that the army will “protect the revolution” is significant: it could be an attempt to reassure a public afraid that conservative forces will co-opt their movement by reiterating the army’s role and it could be an active attempt to feed on Ammar’s newfound popularity with an eye toward a more (or increasingly) active political role. In the process, Ammar is linking the army and himself to a political current, staking out a role for the army that did not exist before. Once the military begins to participate in politics it will difficult to stop; the Algerians, Libyans, Egyptians and Syrians have all learned this with some regret. If Tunisia’s experiment proves durable it may be due to the “protection” of an army that was able to leverage popular demand with its own power to intimidate members of the old regime into accepting political outcomes in this interim period. At the same time Gen. Ammar’s statement might foreshadow a less fortunate path for Tunisia’s transition into the unknown. The general remains relatively obscure figure (outside of Tunisia) and more research will perhaps shed some light on his overall disposition. Issandr’s future dispatches will help fill the gaps. More thoughts on this to come.

RE: “Is Algeria Next?”

David Kenner has an interesting posting at Foreign Policy on the “long-term viability of Algerian strongman Abdelaziz Bouteflika,” based on Wikileaks cables. American diplomats identified key risks to Tunisia’s stability in leaked State Department cables, Kenner writes, and the cables on Algeria may be similarly predictive or useful in some other way. “Is Algeria next?” It identifies the harraga phenomenon and conversations between American officials and Said Sadi. In answering Kenner’s question these are valid points of reference. As someone put it on Twitter recently, “impossible is not Algerian”; Algeria’s long-term stability is very uncertain and it seems increasingly likely that discontent with the country’s managed crisis will produce some kind of political rearrangement in the near future. The harraga issue deserves comment as is shared between Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya and because it is interesting to think out politically in terms of Kenner’s overall question, which is important and reasonable (especially as most commentary has focused on Egypt as the next candidate for popular destabilization). The Sadi conversation needs to be put into political context.

Kaplan on Tunisia, or, defending autocratic stability

Robert D. Kaplan, author of many books including one dealing with Tunisia, has written a controversial piece on that country in the New York Times. Brian Whitaker has rightly taken issue with many of its claims some of which will be addressed in this post. Many Arab readers have expressed displeasure with it on Twitter and to this blogger by email and in conversation. It thus warrants comment.

As Whitaker points out, the thrust of the piece is that Arab autocracy is in many ways quite good for western security and for Israel. Kaplan’s piece argues additionally that the Tunisian uprising is likely to stay local for “pivotal reasons,” such as Tunisia not being an Arab country after all. This argument is bogus for reasons to be discussed below. For the purposes of this blog, it is the most problematic contention of all. Kaplan utterly misinterprets or misrepresents the remote history of Tunisia, ignoring its importance as the administrative and political capital of the Arab west during conquests and the importance of the Ottoman period in establishing continuity in the legitimacy of the state’s present boundaries. Previously this blogger wrote: “Be wary of bad ideas leveraged by the Tunisian example for political points in the US.” Kaplan uses the Tunisian example much this way though he is merely re-enforcing the conventional wisdom.

Kaplan’s argument about Tunisia’s particularities is summarized something like this: Tunisia’s cosmopolitan and settled past set it apart from other Arab polities. There is some truth in this but Kaplan’s way of writing makes it difficult to see how this is relevant today. Furthermore he jumbles the way any of this actually relates to modern Tunisia. It reminds the reader of Christopher Hitchens’s article on Tunisia from 2007.  

Second thoughts on the overthrow of Ben Ali

The Tunisian uprising has been called the Jasmine Revolution, the Tunisian Revolution as well as a number of other things. The Tunisians did not accomplish a “true” revolution in an academic sense, at least not yet; what took place in the last month resembled a “color revolution” more than anything else, displacing a dictator while leaving his regime largely in place though sapped of its political and moral legitimacy. Though the state remains in the hands of the old regime, by and large, its leadership has been at the mercy of the population, reshuffling its membership and resigning RCD membership as the crowds shout. Popular forces have gained power unseen in an Arab polity before. Yet the uprising has been remarkably civil and Tunisian authorities, though conspicuously brutal in the course of the revolt, showed a lack of resolve that one might not expect to see repeated in other Arab states. A journalist emailed this blogger with question: What are your thoughts on the Tunisian revolution, where is it headed and what kind of democratic developments do you think are possible? The answer is: Too soon to tell (regardless of how much is written here or elsewhere).

This blogger has thus avoided extensive commentary on the events until further reflection is possible. A few secondary thoughts since the first post, though:

Mauritania: O. Dahoud and youth rumbling

Yacoub Ould Dahoud, the Mauritanian self-immolator, has passed away in Morocco where is his family sent him for medical treatment. The Mauritanian President was forced to comment publicly and assure his audience that events in Mauritania were “different from what is happening in other countries.” Sympathetic Mauritanians are flocking to the Nouakchott airport to greet his remains, causing nervousness in the government. Young people and police clashed over food prices in the capital at the end of the week. The government appears spooked by Ould Dahoud’s self-immolation both because it was so conspicuous and because his suicide note, circulating on the Internet, is an aggressive attack on the legitimacy of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz’s presidency. The regime is understandably sensitive over challenges to its legitimacy given the background of the 2008 coup and the circumstances around the 2009 elections in civil and political society. At the same time fear of a second Tunisia is spreading among Arab leaders, especially those where copycats self-immolations on the line of Mohamed Bouazizi have taken place. This is definitely an issue to watch.

UPDATE: Nasser Weddady’s post on Ould Dahoud translates his suicide note in full and highlights the point on tribalism made on this blog earlier. As noted in the previous post here, it makes no reference to any tribal grievance contrary to reports in the media and from government officials claiming that Ould Dahoud was motivated by a sense that his tribe was mistreated by the government (allegedly a response to the president’s anti-corruption campaign). The note is distinctly political and Ould Dahoud’s background does not suggest a personal, material grievance with regime beyond the political ones listed. Those who commit suicide are usually abnormal in some way; the bulk of the evidence shows Ould Dahoud’s suicide was a deliberately political statement about the state of affairs in Mauritania and that it was probably inspired by Mohamed Bouazizi. This perception is strengthened by the fact that Ould Dahoud came from a well off family and was known as a pro-democracy activist among his peers, according to Mauritanian sources. In any event, his act has been lionized and received well by a certain set of young Mauritanians although those of different political persuasions have had different responses. One notices on Facebook, for example, that those who are supportive of the president tend to comment more critically (if not maliciously) on the event where as those whose profile pictures show a photograph of the burning man and agree with his manifesto tend to be sympathetic to opposition parties and personalities almost uniformly.

A Self-Immolation in Mauritania

The story of the Tunisian Revolution has swept the Arab region, and so has the legend of  Mohamed Bouazizi. Thus far, four Algerians and an Egyptian and a Mauritanian each have lit them selves on fire in protests meant to recall Bouazizi, the young man whose self-immolation inspired the Sidi Bouzid uprising. Bouazizi was twenty-six years old and unemployed. Yacoub Ould Dahoud, the Mauritanian who imitated Bouazizi’s act more recently was a forty-year old from a well off family. He lit himself up in front of the Presidential Palace. A Reuters report claims his grievance was “alleged government mistreatment of his tribe.” Ould Dahoud’s long Facebook message posted before the deed makes no reference or claim about his tribe being wronged (it begins “[. . ] no to the rule of tribalism … no to the return of patronage.”). He was not protesting his economic condition. He was making a blatant political statement: “a simple citizen demands legitimate rights.” Ould Dahoud wrote: “Enough corruption! Enough injustice in Mauritania! For fifty years we have suffered from corruption and injustice.” His statement, quoted and paraphrased extensively here, includes jabs at the army, the political elite demanding “the ouster from power of the clique of spoilers from the army” and “a cancelation of all duties and taxes on rice, wheat, [cooking] oil, sugar, dairy and monitoring of the outrageous profits from them” and demanded that anti-slavery activists be released from jail. His final statement even included a proposal for a constitutional amendments that would ban “current or former” military officers from running or being elected president, among other things. His message implored France: ”respect the right of the Mauritanian people to self-determination”. Ould Dahoud addressed his pleas to President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz: “if you do not accept these demands, you will face the wrath of the People who will come out just like they came out against Ben Ali.” His cause was for ‘our children to live in a country with social justice, freedom and democracy.”

This is as activist as one can get. Unlike the copy-cat self-immolations in Algeria (and Bouazizi’s original) there was no apparent spark in his personal life and he was older and better off than several of the other men. Little is known about Ould Dahoud personally, though Mauritanians that crossed paths with him at various stages describe him as “a democrat,” by disposition. It appears he intended to mimic Bouazizi’s “spark” to revolution. His self-immolation will shock many in Mauritania but a Facebook page has already been set up called “Solidarity with Yakoub Ould Dahoud who burned himself for Mauritania,” with enthusiastic users changing their profile pictures to an image of the man burning on the street. It seems clear that the event has the regime nonplussed, which had a rough time getting outsiders to accept its legitimacy. That some news sites and agencies have buried the story somewhat is not an accident.

First thoughts on the overthrow of Ben Ali

In light of the overthrow of Zine el-Abdine Ben Ali this blogger was inspired to write a long and interested post on the meaning of the Tunisian rebellion. Then he got the flu. Readers will have likely gathered the general outline of events from Ben Ali’s departure from Tunis to Saudi Arabia (with loads of gold, no less), the set up of the Ghannouchi government and fast replacement by that of Fouad Mebazaa. Here are a few general thoughts on the nature of the current political arrangement, the police and militia problem, the role of the armed forces and the some general thoughts on the uprising itself. None of this is concerned with the impact of social media or WikiLeaks the impact of which has been exaggerated to no end by big media outlets and others (this is dealt with best by Issandr at the Arabist). Some parts of it were written at various parts of the weekend but were not posted due to inconsistent consciousness. As always, none of it is complete or total, and deeper and perhaps more interesting insight can be found variously by the Arabist, Nawaat, A Tunisian Girl, Brian Whitaker and others. This BloggingHeads episode between Issandr and Shadi Hamid will brief many better than much of which is in the Washington Post on the issue. (Just saying: Be wary of bad ideas leveraged by the Tunisian example for political points in the US.)

More on Algeria’s riots

Photo credi: Amekinfo, Flickr

Hugh Roberts, one of the best analysts writing about Algeria in English period. He is one of the few Algeria watchers whose insight spans both the pre and post-1988, bringing insight into the background and substance of Algerian politics whenever he writes. Those interested in contemporary Algerian politics must find his various working papers and reports (from LSE and ICG especially) and the collection of essays in The Battlefield (Verso, 2002) and read them, multiple times. He is due to release a new book sometime in the near future on Kabyle politics, which promises help deepen our understanding of Algeria’s political culture(s). A lecture on Algerian riots may be heard here. A longer paper on Algerian riots, especially in view of 1988, can be read here in PDF form. His piece for Foreign Policy‘s Middle East Channel should be read in full:

Some thoughts on political responses to the Algerian riots

This post is a summary of political responses to the Algerian riots from parties and personalities. While public figures have differed in the nuances of what they have had to say the majority of them have been explicitly in urging dialogue and calm; virtually none have sought to egg the youth rioters on or claim leadership over them. While many recognize the overtly political dimensions of the riots most participating in parliament or other government functions have sought to refit the public narrative back toward economic or social issues that can be dealt with through changes or adjustments in policy under the existing regime. Even those assigning blame to systemic factors avoid blaming the President or specific individuals. Most with stakes in the current system have shifted blame to some kind of manipulation by economic actors or the exaggerations of outsiders. Bold condemnations of corruption and mismanagement have not meant calls for regime change or changes in the political order as a whole. Most political parties have put out communiques and their leaders have commented on the unrest itself, especially those in the opposition. The three ruling parties – the FLN, RND and MSP – have done the same though the FLN and RND have been less vocal as parties than all the others. The President and Prime Minister have been quiet.

There seems to be an onward trend in the tumult. Rioting has spread into the deep south, Bechar and Ouargla. The rioting has targeted banks, schools, post offices, foreign car dealerships, local government buildings, gas stations, shopping malls, the Ministry of Education and other locations not directly related to the high cost of sugar, olive oil or flour. 23,000 liters of oil have been looted in Setif, though with similar reports elsewhere. Youth have burst into hotels to loot “computers and even couches”. Videos of rioting in Bab el-Oued can be seen here. Young men have been arrested in the tens in various parts of the country, with the Interior Ministry reporting over 1,000 arrests in total. Contacts in Algiers say the rioting has been contained inside various neighborhoods while those in Setif and eastern Algeria say that when they have gotten underway, the riots have swept through large parts of towns and cities.  Paratroopers and other elite army units have been reported on the highway out of Benaknoun, perhaps in anticipation of more serious disturbances. Thus far the government and security services appear to be wary of a heavy response, hoping the riots will lose momentum without the explicit support of the opposition and seemingly no leadership of their own. The comments of various political and bureaucratic leaders seem to indicate a fear that things could fall out of their control if they react too aggressively. During previous incidents on this scale, former Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni was known for making inflammatory and callus remarks about youths. Though Ould Kablia and Djiar’s comments have been out of touch they have been less combative than in the past. Three Algerians died in Tipaza, Boumerdes and M’Sila. Hundreds of people have been injured. But the police appear relatively more disciplined than in previous instances of similar unrest. There have not been reports of indiscriminate beatings or shooting — at least not yet. Algerians report night raids aimed at picking up “trouble makers” and those suspected of organizing protests or whipping up riots. Though there is an obvious political line flowing from the riots these have yet to be harnessed by any visible political force.

More on Riots, Protests in North Africa: Notes

Algeria and Tunisia have seen wide scale youth rioting in the last three weeks. Algeria’s picked up particularly in the last three days as consumer prices have skyrocketed, especially for foods like sugar, cooking oil, flour and related items. Previous riots had erupted over the well known housing shortage east of the capital. This post consists of a series of random thoughts on the Algerian and Tunisian riots. That they have occurred so close to each other is probably more circumstantial — the Algerian riots are the result of poor policies and market troubles that happened to occur at the same time the Tunisian uprising has. But there is some inter-textuality between them in that Algerians have made appeals of solidarity with the Tunisians even if the bulk of what is happening in Algeria seems idiosyncratic. Furthermore, the regime response seems to bear the Tunisian upheaval in mind by trying to block news about them; additionally, that news on satellite television has covered the Tunisian event probably has had some impact in emboldening determined rioters. Newspapers in Algeria have focused on local events, though, rather than those in Jordan, Egypt or Tunisia especially in the last week, though they initially gave some prominent coverage to the Sidi Bouzid events.

Note that: 1) this post uses riots and protests somewhat interchangeably, which is likely inappropriate but is probably sufficient for now and; 2) while it is not comprehensive or totally coherent it is long and made up of various notes taken down over the last two weeks. Point one is about Tunisia; 2-3 about the background on which youth rioting takes place in Algeria; 4-5 look at a few Anglophone assessments of the Sidi Bouzid events and the aftermath in terms of both Tunisia and Algeria.