Burkina Faso in regional politics

The Economist has an interesting and useful profile of Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré in its most recent edition. It inspires some lazy commentary here.

Readers should note Burkina Faso’s important role in hostage negotiations between western and regional governments and AQIM. This is a testiment to the degree to which Compaoré has, through fair and fowl means, turned his country into a quiet superpower in northwest Africa over 23 years. Compaoré’s power brokering often works in conjunction with other African strongmen. He is held in high regard by the Algerian leadership and keeps close contacts with Qadhafi while remaining on good terms with Morocco. His dealings in Guinean and Togolese politics often make use of his North African connections. As an experienced operator he survives because he can quickly identify and adapt to changes in power relationships. And once he has mastered the general trend, he proceeds with attention to detail and logistics.

Notes RE: The Mauritanian Baʿth

What follows is a series of notes on the general outline of the history of the Baʿthist tendency in Mauritania. The information below has been gathered from primary and secondary sources, especially conversations and documents. Apologies for the lack of specific citations for each item; some of these are the result of problems transferring footnotes or internet links that have been consulted but are now dead and some are from conversations with individuals who cannot be identified. It is imperfectly semi-chronological because it is pieced together from notes taken at various times over relatively long periods. Updates and clarifications will follow.

Guest Post: Alle on Gdeim Izzeik and the Western Sahara

As a rule, this blogger tries to comment on the Western Sahara only minimally, mostly for lack of deep personal interest and partly because of its contentious nature. And yet it is a key issue in regional politics and is all too often neglected in the popular mind outside of the region — even as tensions and worrying trends seem to rise — as the Arabist noted last week.

The following is a guest post by Alle, a long-time friend of the blog, comments haunt and veteran Sahara watcher of Western Sahara Info and Maghreb Politics Review fame (both now defunct). He prepared this quick (though not short) analysis for TMND. The views below are his alone.

Mauritanians back to Mali

Mauritanian troops and aircraft are deploying back into Mali, in anticipation of an AQIM attack. News reports say that air and ground forces are moving out from Nema, with reinforcements as well. The operation comes after the government announced its intention to wage a “pre-emptive” war on AQIM last week. This is as the Malian Chief of Staff Gen. Gabriel Poudiougou is in Noukachott discussing coordination on counter-terrorism. Given recent tension between these countries and Algeria, especially over previous operations similar to this one, one can speculate that the Algerians are looking at this with pursed lips, even if one could reasonably look at this as Mali acting in its legitimate role as a part of the Tamanrasset process (Mali currently holds the rotating chair of that questionable body, but the failure of that process to increase trust and cooperation across the board strengthens an assumption that the Algerians will be irritated regardless; though this blog tries to avoid fortune telling). These measures could also be related to the French hostages currently held by AQIM; if they are accompanied by French troops, as in the past, the impact on overall regional cooperation would be impacted in important ways, especially if the Algerians have not been consulted. Little has been said in the Algerian press on either count as of yet.

Updates to come.

UPDATE: A little background on the deployment from Mauritanian sources: The Mauritanians attempted to reach a deal with AQIM, via various intermediaries, that looked like this: 1) the Mauritanians would release the Aleg killers under a presidential amnesty (they would also renounce terrorism) and see that AQIM got its ransom money (both AQIM’s terms); 2) AQIM would release the remaining hostages; 3) as a good faith measure, the Mauritanians withdrew their forces from the areas around Gao and Tassilit (where Mauritanian troops have been operating on a semi-permanent basis). It was set to go ahead, but Bin Laden’s dispatch from 26 October hardened attitudes and the deal was cut off. More to come.