More Fragments RE: Mauritanian raid in Mali

Mauritanian sources have disclosed the following information related to the raid in Mali on 17-19 September. What follows are bits of that information as well as thoughts on the situation in general, not refined but hopefully worth consideration: Read the rest of this entry »


Rise and Fall, Push and Pull (Pt. VIII)

In The Politics, Aristotle describes the ways constitutions are changed and regimes overthrown: Read the rest of this entry »


Updated Spreadsheet

Here is an updated/detailed version of the spreadsheet on the 21 AQIM members killed in the years/months before last weekend’s raid. It is still incomplete; the tribes of only a few are known (though one could make assumptions but it is better to give no categorization than an incorrect one, although based solely on names its likely that the majority of the men come from Marabout/religious tribes rather than warrior tribes the significance of which can be explained later/elsewhere), and the dates of birth are few, but based on the ages of other AQIM members (to be included in another chart hopefully next week) most of them are probably youths born in the middle or late 1980s. The oldest of yet from Mauritania were born in the late 1970s (like many of the Algerian leaders of the group); the bulk are born between 1980 and 1988 judging by this sample and by others recently available. As noted before, the greatest number are from Trarza and these men come almost exclusively from Ouad Naga (on the coast) and Boutilimit (in the interior), both large towns with populations over 10,000. Ethnically, they are predominantly Moors with a few Haratine. All of the suicide bombers are Haratine (some Haratine have remarked that this indicates the group is “racist” for giving the Haratine members these missions; in the group’s reckoning these are probably “honorable” tasks, but one must also consider how this plays with ordinary people, especially in a marginalized group; see the new pie chart below). Most of the men had no significant experience outside of Mauritania before joining AQIM. Many were quite common: there are youths who failed their baccs or police academy exams or were unemployed. The two who did go abroad made first contact with the jihadist tendency there and frequently joined AQIM on their return. One of those two even fought in Iraq. Read the rest of this entry »


UPDATE: Another Summary of the Hassi Sidi Events

AQIM claims to have defeated the Mauritanian Army in last weekend’s series of clashes in Mali. The Mauritanians, of course, deny any such defeat. AQIM claims to have killed close to 20 Mauritanian soldiers while the Mauritanian Ministry of Defense has announced only 6 of its own fatalities while killing 12 AQIM militants (AQIM acknowledges this) and taking 6 as prisoners. More contentious, perhaps, are AQIM’s claims to have spooked the Mauritanians so badly that they caused those they did not kill to flee, leaving their vehicles and equipment behind. AQIM’s version of “the Battle of Hassi Sidi,” complete with a summary has been posted online (there is no link here for the same reason as in the previous post on AQIM KIA; the information comes from the same forum). Highlights are below. Following this are some thoughts on a report that Mokhtar Belmokhtar was found dead in Mali. Read the rest of this entry »


Mauritania v AQIM in Mali: Summary of a report on part of the weekend raid

Taqadoumy has published an account of the events around the Mauritanian Army raid against AQIM in Mali this past weekend (though fighting continues). The account is interesting and worth Arabic-speakers reading. It is based on the testimony of an unnamed source (“from northern Mali”), possibly military (see below). For non-Arabic speakers a snap rendering of the highlights are below (hopefully they can be compared with other accounts soon; readers are encouraged to link or post similar information in the comments section): UPDATED Read the rest of this entry »


RE: Mauritanian raid against AQIM

Mauritania is on high alert after a major military operation against AQIM near (and across) the country’s border with Mali. The Mauritanians are said to have “enveloped” a column of twenty AQIM vehicles on its way to Mali through the desert near Hassi Sidi close to the Malian border late last night (others say Areich Hindi in Mali).¹ Early reports had the objective as the capture of two (unnamed) AQIM commanders. The Mauritanians managed to killed at least 12 AQIM fighters while suffering as many as fifteen deaths of their own. Reuters is quoting security officials as saying “The operation was launched because the opportunity presented itself. It was not planned long in advance.” Mauritanian reports have said that President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz himself directed the five hour battle from army head quarters in Nouakchott. Later reports have it that Deputy Chief of Staff Mohamed Ould Mohamed Znagui ran the operation on the ground. It was reported in Mauritanian newspapers that France and the United States provided intelligence and logistical support for the raid; France has denied involvement in the Hassi Sidi operation. Another engagement is said to have taken place following the Hassi Sidi fight, in towns nearer to Timbuktu, Mali (80 km away) and launched northeast from Nema. The Mauritanians bombed AQIM positions as the fighting reached a lull during the early morning hours, after which fighting resumed (it is unclear what equipment was used for this; probably helicopters, possibly of Chinese origin or possibly fixed wing craft from elsewhere). The Mauritanians are reported to have used “heavy weapons” though news reports did not specify what this means (in Mauritania heavy weapons could be high caliber machine guns or possibly artillery). Military planes are reported to have landed at Timbuktu to retrieve the military dead.

The raid has left tensions high in Mauritania especially because it comes on the heels of two recent events: the discovery of an active AQIM cell in the capital and the arrest of two of its members (milkmen), one of whom escaped from custody; and the recent kidnaping in Niger. Adding to popular anxiety is the fact that the AQIM brigade fighting the army (the “Yahiya Abu Hamam Brigade”) is close to 80% Mauritanian (local media reports frequently say “more than 70%” security sources put the figure higher). Many worry that the large numbers of combatants killed on both sides could have negative implications at a tribal level. The army has sent reinforcements to the east, via Nema (the target of August’s suicide-bombing attempt), a build up unseen in recent Mauritanian history. Al-Akhbar is reporting that thirty military vehicles were seen advancing from Nema to the front on the Malian border and that the military aircraft that landed in the town yesterday included “a large number of French troops.” Sources say two modules were used in the raid, meaning about 300-400 soldiers all together of whom 100-120 were combatants.

Like previous raids, this one has caused some controversy in the region. Algerian sources have fed information about the raid to AFP commenting on the large number of Mauritanian casualties and terming calling the operation a “failure.” Mauritanian security officials fired back, praising the Malians for at least not protesting the raid and opening their airfields to Mauritanian transport planes while analysts asking “is this our war alone, and what do our neighbors want? And where do all the conventions and agreements stop at photo-ops and newspaper articles?” The tension comes from Algerian perceptions of Mauritanian (and Malian) incompetence and possibly from other political motivations in the deep state or related to recent prisoner amnesties. While Mauritania-Malian relations are on a relative ups (the Mauritanians finally sent their ambassador back to Bamako last week) dynamics in the relationships between the three “front” line states — Algeria, Mauritania and Mali — again seem to be hindering effectiveness and unity. Mauritanian officials were especially incensed that the Algerian source released information about the high number of deaths in the military (15) while the Ministry of Defense had still only made 6 public.

After reports of the fighting surfaced, France issued a travel warning to its citizens in the country covering the east and northeastern parts of the country, vital to both tourism and mining. Mauritanians concerned with uranium and gold mining (projects still in their preliminary stages) expressed a worry that the warning would do grievous harm to their work. And this illustrates the real danger of groups such as AQIM: the damage they do to the image of these very poor countries, scaring of the foreigners with whom locals do so much business with to the point of dependency, thus sucking much needed cash out of the economy unpredictably.

Expect updates as more information becomes available.

UPDATE I: Conversations with Mauritanian politicos and high-ranking members of the opposition shed light on two concerns.

First is with respect to outrage among some opposition forces over the presence of French troops in Mauritania. These sources complain that the parliament has not been consulted on major cross-border raids or on the presence of a secret French base in northern Mauritania widely believed to be located in Atar. These opposition personalities link the ruling party’s statements urging the opposition not to “avoid political rhetoric” (i.e., raise the foreign bases issue) the recent military operation (the government made a similar statement following the 22 July raid) to the large numbers of French intelligence and security personel in Nouakchott and the large towns and the high likelihood (in their opinion) that Atar is hosting a French base. The government continuously denies reports that the French have any military presence in Mauritania.

Second is Algeria’s negative reaction to the raid. Similar sources to those above link this to the participation of foreign forces in raids which Algeria sees as going against the regional cooperation and the command structures set up at Tamanrasset. The Algerians increasingly see the Mauritanians as acting as a platform for French action — the opposite of the object of Algerian policy in the region (which has been to move outside powers out in favor of African (e.g., Algerian) security alliances).

Read the rest of this entry »


A Cabinet by the Numbers (Pt. II)

Below are three new graphs dealing with different aspects of the most recent Algerian cabinet (and the 38 ministers in it). A previous post dealt with the same subject before the May cabinet reshuffle. Read the rest of this entry »


RE: Mauritanian AQIM Members, General Information

Below are five graphs showing basic information about the twenty-one Mauritanian members of AQIM known to have been killed in action; the information is pulled from the forums. One of the men traveled to Iraq before dying in a skirmish in Tunisia; others became political and religiously conscious while studying in Tunisia or Jordan. More information (i.e., charts/spreadsheets and graphs) will be added to this post over the next week. In the meantime, the graphs below should provide food for thought. UPDATED Read the rest of this entry »


RE: Mauritania prisoner release

The video above credits the pardoning and release of thirty-five Salfist prisoners (many convicted on terrorism charges) in Mauritania during ʿEid ul-Fitr to the tirless work of “moderate ʿulema,” though it names none of those religious leaders. Among those released was a fellow by the name of al-Majlissi, with whom readers will be familiar. It must be understood that this is the result of maneuvering by Sheikh Mohamed Hassan Ould Dedew and Imam Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott between the Islamist tendency at large and with the Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz government, a process that has been roughly a year in the making — if not longer.

In fairness, there are men that have been detained on spurious grounds and treated poorly (to say the least) only for their associations with others. There are, on the other hand, men whose activities have been in themselves criminal or have aided in criminality and these men need to be subject to the appropriate, legal consequences. This is not to say that due process is especially well respected in Mauritania or that the conditions of men in prison is up to international standards (whatever those might be) — in fact many prisoners complain of abuse and are held extrajudicially (Islamist and otherwise). One cannot help but be puzzled, though, with the release of these men, many of whom were (and likely remain) efficient recruiters and supporters for what has become AQIM.

It is puzzling because it conflicts with the strong-man-tough-on-terror image that Ould Abdel Aziz has consciously cultivated for himself since his seizure of power in 2008. Indeed, there is some hypocrisy in this being done by a government that recalled its ambassador over a Malian prisoner exchange and that has fumed when its eastern neighbor released far fewer men with similar backgrounds. The move has severely angered France which has been a major back of Ould Abdel Aziz as a terrorist smasher for over a year. Read the rest of this entry »


Saha ʿEidkoum


Algeria Graphs: Women in Parliament & Relationships II

Below are two graphs using the data on the 2007-2012 Algerian People’s National Assembly (APN) originally represented in the charts in this previous posting. Following these are two graphics dealing with relationships within the Algerian regime. Read the rest of this entry »


Anti-Corruption & Politics

Several events occurred in Mauritania over the last month that are worth recounting partially and in the context of the current government’s style of rule (which is not especially different from those of the past).

1. Human rights minister fired. Mauritania’s, Human Rights Minister, Mohamed Lamine Ould Daddah was dismissed and promptly replaced by Mohamed Abdellahi Ould Khatr. The Minister is accused of embezzling something like $1 million from his ministry, which the government would like him to return. Interestingly, informed sources relate that much of that money was used to fund Ould Abdel Aziz’s presidential campaign. Ould Dadde was at one time the head of one of Mauritania’s most important (and secretive) opposition groups, but took to spying on his partners for the regime and was rewarded with dominion over the Human Rights Ministry. Unfortunately for him, though, it seems his graft became conspicuous too quickly and at the wrong time: the president is on a personal mission against corruption and the targets tend to be those low in the pecking order and outside of his inner circles. Additionally, it is important to note that Ould Dadde has close to no tribal backing whatever, meaning he was practically expendable. Had he come from a larger, more powerful tribe his firing would have been more difficult. It is often the case that ministers or commissioners from larger tribes can get away with more corruption than those from smaller ones. In cases such as Ould Dadde’s, removal on grounds of embezzlement of a man from tiny or political inconsequential tribe comes with low risk and medium returns for a leader looking to make a point.

2. Changes in embassy accountants. In a display of force designed to illustrate the president’s commitment to combating corruption, the government replaced a whole slew of accountants in Mauritania’s foreign missions . Sources close to and in the Foreign Ministry have communicated that this is meant to send a message to the public and to ambassadors and others with sticky fingers to control themselves. The objective here, as with Ould Daddah’s dismissal, is to make a loud public stance against systematic official corruption at as low a cost as possible. Corruption is thoroughgoing in Mauritania’s public and private sectors; it is likely that measures targeted at middle management and in everyday instances of corruption may have some impact in addressing the problem. It is also likely that anti-corruption measures will continue to be undertaken for appearances or revenge while ignoring the big fish — and usually without long-term planning.

Embassy accountants are employees of the Mauritanian Ministry of Finance and are responsible for managing budgets and accounts; an ambassador cannot initiate any initiative at all — including paying employees — without the compliance of his (or her) accountant. It is a commonplace for ambassadors and their accountants to enter various get-rich-quick schemes. An ambassador and an accountant will, for instance, connive a story to justify withholding employees’ pay checks for months at a time while these monies sit in an account somewhere earning interest. At the right time, the money will be withdrawn and disbursed to the embassy’s employees while the ambassador and his accountant split the interest between themselves. Similarly, an embassy may acquire imaginary friends (usually fictitious local help) whose salaries subsidize the higher ups’ luxury fittings.

3. The old game. Anti-corruption campaigns in Mauritania have often been components in broader political crackdowns or retributions. They often come as outbursts —  a president, cameras and aides and all, appears at a schoolhouse or post station or mine demanding to know where some missing centime has gone and quickly using his executive authority to humiliate and then dismiss some minor civil servant. These kinds of surprise visits were common among ambitious leaders in the early 1980s in Mauritania. The affect is to give the common people a happier view of the presidency, and sure up its charismatic authority; its broader affect is to embarrass frequently corrupt state employees only so long as the president and his cameras are in town. As soon as the presidential motorcade is in the distance and the cameras are turned off, the stealing and the nepotism and the tribalism continues much as it did before. These are not institutional reforms demanding accountability; they are stunts designed to strengthen whichever faction is dominant at the time. This is especially the case in the current situation given Ould Abdel Aziz’s style of leadership which lends itself to just the kind of emotional and short sighted caprice that makes even reasonable initiatives short-lived and problematic. These measures resemble those of previous, short-lived, governments in Mauritania dominated by men with strong personalities but lacking the stamina, vision and skill to institutionalize their intentions.

4. The green line. Early in August, President Ould Abdel Aziz, amid massive flooding, took to the outskirts of Nouakchott to break ground at a project aimed at holding off the affects of desertification by planting a green line of vegetation around the city — the One Million Tree Initiative. This is a fine idea from which Mauritania(ns) can surely benefit. Military aircraft dropped seed from the air and a large ceremony gathered for the event. Ould Abdel Aziz is said to have felt very strongly about the symbolism and the impact of the ceremony: the president hoped to make a grand showing of Mauritanians hard at work for the betterment of the nation under the hot August sun, most of them fasting for Ramadan — miserable, God-fearing but determined but ready to struggle for the public good. All seemed to go well; people, many reportedly against their will, were bused in to swell the mass and get down to business and a large number of ministers and officials made appearances. Yet when the president’s entourage left the scene the whole rest of the crowd did as well, leaving behind a meagre group insufficient to continue work on the project. Sources close to Ould Abdel Aziz say the president threw a fitful tantrum after realizing that the crowd had gathered solely to please him and not to do any work on the much needed green line. However strongly Ould Abdel Aziz believes in his own causes, politics (his and others’) naturally complicates things; there is the issue of interest and sincerity in the official class and political culture at large. For these reasons, no government action (anywhere, including Mauritania)  should be taken at face value; political events occur and are played deliberately by men.


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