Algerian cabinet reshuffle, 29 May: I

For now, look to the TMND Twitter feed (see side bar and here) for analysis of the 25 May Algerian cabinet reshuffle which put Chakib Khelil and a few other Algerian Ministers out of work, while moving others. This is most likely intended to project the image that president Bouteflika is concerned about and taking action over corruption within the ministries. Most changes were cosmetic and had been predicted in rumors for weeks: while high profile figures were moved, lesser men with heavy and well known issues with corruption have stayed on. The most important shifts are at the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Energy and Mines. While English-language media is focused on Khelil’s removal and its importance in terms of the feud between Bouteflika and the intelligence services over “corruption,” his departure is less interesting than Nouredine Yazid Zerhouni’s appointment as Deputy Prime Minister from his long-time posting at the tremendously consequential Ministry of the Interior. Zerhouni is followed up at the Interior Ministry by Daho Ould Kablia, who takes a promotion from a deputy position there. Ould Kablia (a MALG alumni like Zerhouni) is a trusted ally of Zerhouni and Bouteflika. Many believe Zerhouni will now serve to watch over Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and help to insulate president Boueflika from any possible subterfuge at the top. In other words, he is sandbagging for the medium term. Add to this the fact that Bouteflika has been absent from several important international and national functions (Ali Tounsi’s funeral, the Washington nuclear summit, official Mawlid celebrations, the hydrocarbons nationalization anniversary ceremonies and so on) and many contingencies and thoughts germinate. More on this later.

More Fast Thoughts

Nouakchott seems to be awash with rumors of a deal with France regarding a possible prisoner exchange. According to knowledgeable sources in and outside of Mauritania, rumors that Joyandet’s visit to Nouakchott would be used to press the Mauritanians to  to meet AQIM’s demands over a Frenchman kidnapped in Niger are credible. These sources say that a prisoner swap was at the top of the agenda at Alan Joyandet’s meeting with president Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and that the two reached some kind of an understanding on this early. It is said that this came with assurances of French solid support (including financial aid) for Ould Abdel Aziz pending his compliance with this request. Ould Abdel Aziz would release (presumably) Salafist prisoners and AQIM would release the French citizen currently held. Additionally, other sources say that Ould Abdel Aziz planned to leverage his relations with Mohamed Hassan Ould Dedew to manage Islamist opinion regarding last week’s verdicts. He was initially embarrassed by Ould Dedew’s comments but after the Aleg 3 may be more comfortable.

The French also registered their opposition to the death penalty, which may help the government in maneuvering away from Sidi Ould Sidina, Mohamed Ould Chabarnou and Maarouf Ould Hiba’s death sentences; executions are highly impolitic in Mauritania, as they risk upsetting tribal relations. Given that at least one of the killers comes from a large tribe, and that all three have launched appeals, it is seems possible for their sentences to be commuted in the future. But, as many in the media have noted, the episode is the first of its kind in Mauritania and many things are in play.

Ould Abdel Aziz’s visit to Khartoum for the inauguration of Omar al-Bashir was a demonstration of support and gratitude (for al-Bashir’s advice and backing earlier). He is now preparing for a visit Paris (as well as Nice, for independence celebrations). Also abroad this week was General Mohamed Ould Ghazouani (the second most powerful figure in the regime) has been in discussions with French and Chinese officials. His mission to Beijing includes military and economic issues (with emphasis on the economic side; think fish). The outcome of both Paris visits will be especially relevant, as will be the results of the Brussels donors meeting. The economic situation (especially in agriculture) will make this summer a rough one and the government knows that it will need as much help as it can get. Workers’ strikes are threatened, staged or obstructed almost weekly (more on that later) and the opposition has capitalized on several of them thus far. More are likely to come as the summer progresses.

UPDATE: Ould Abdel Aziz’s original plan was to travel directly from Khartoum to Paris; he re-routed his travel arrangements so that he could head to Paris from Nouakchott. According to local sources this was a quick and abrupt return and its purpose is still obscure.

Fast Thoughts

The three men sentenced to death for the Aleg killings were all operatives; of the three, Mohamed Ould Chabarnou is the most ideologically inclined from an intellectual perspective. Mohamed Ould Lemine al-Majlissi, who was sentenced to three years in prison and a fine, however, is of greater significance. Recall that Sidi Ould Sidina regarded al-Majlissi as a do-nothing (one of the qa’idoun, the sitters; i.e., a lot of talk and no action) and that al-Majlissi saw Ould Sidina as being “unbalanced” (al-Majlissi has tried to separate himself from physical acts of violence, though he does condone it against apostates and non-Muslims). Al-Majlissi nevertheless admitted to acting as a preacher and recruiter for AQIM in Mauritania. He traveled through the country-side, convincing young men to travel to the AQIM camps in northern Mali and on to Iraq. He never trained in the camps or picked up arms himself, though he did cooperate and organize with the organization (he was charged as an accomplice). His short sentence owes to his shrewd methodology.

The three sentenced to death will appeal the court’s decision. They claim they were tortured and while they plead not guilty they admitted to be waging jihad against foreigners and apostates (see this video). Others tried last week registered similar concerns. That leaders in the Salafist movement have also raised these grievances has embarrassed the regime and irritated foreign governments; the government has tried to leverage the religious movement over the last year, using it as an ally against traditional opposition groups it has excluded from government (the government being that of Mohamed “I will not form a unity government” Ould Abdel Aziz). The trials have the potential to harm the deepening relationship between the leadership of the Islamist tendency and the regime by alienating the movement’s grass roots who were in eager attendance at this week’s proceedings.

The Salafist subculture is regarded with suspicion by most Mauritanians. It has grown in recent years but remains marginal. A large part of this sub-culture (one might even call it a counter-culture) was present at this week and last week’s trials often cheering on the defendants. One could observe Moorish and black Africans in the crowds, though Moors predominated. The Salafist and Ikhwani tendencies (which while both Islamist are distinct and often at odds with one another) have both traditionally relied on Moorish followings. The Ikhwani end (represented in Tawassoul) has tended to be especially Moorish and relatively reliant on its leader’s tribal followings. The Salafists have had somewhat more success with the black African population but not by much. Both are reliant on social networks that a primarily Arab, some of which have carried over from the old Baʿthist movement (more on that later). The newer generation of its leadership has formed separate networks among young people (at home and abroad). Both cliques are small, well organized, politically ambitious and have much potential for expansion.

Still more to come…

Quickly on the Aleg 3 verdicts

The three Mauritanians charged with, among other things, terrorism, premeditated murder and rebellion in the case of the Aleg tourist killings have all been sentenced to death (others received prison terms or were acquitted). It is possible for the sentences to be commuted to life in prison; executions are commonly commuted in Mauritania for tribal and political considerations. Whether their sentences are commuted or not will depend on similar calculations, though sources believe the men will be executed. Accounts of the trial have family members of the accused in loud disapproval. The accused shouted defiant slogans on their way out of court as well. Practically every account noted a heavy security presence. Sahara Media reports that Mohamed Ould Chabarnou led the prisoners in Salat al-ʿAsr in confinement. Ould Chabarnou’s comments were defiant, maintaining that “we will continue war against the French” and “to France and America: between you and us is the sword!” According to al-Akhbar a black banner reading “There is no God but God” was raised in the court room. Whether the sentences are commuted or not will give some indication as to the positioning of the government towards the Islamist movement. Comments from both Jamil Ould Mansour, head of Tawassoul, and Sheikh Mohamed Hassan Ould Dedew will give a relatively more explicit indication. Worry about AQIM retaliation is on the minds of many; in the government there is concern that the proceedings may have alienated the Islamist movement and that its friends there may have irritated western governments in their commentary. Ould Dedew’s comments regarding last week’s verdicts irritated some in diplomatic circles and the Americans and French will be watching this file especially closely going ahead.

More to come.

Trials and Visits

Here are some highlights and thoughts from the last week in Mauritania (another post on issues beyond what is below is coming down the pipeline):

Five of nineteen Mauritanians on trial for terrorism charges were sentenced this week. Among the nineteen are Sidi Ould Sidina, Mohamed Ould Chabarnou and Maarouf Ould Hiba who stand accused of murdering four French tourists at Aleg in 2007 who will go on trial on Sunday. The men are discussed here, here and here. In addition, one of the group’s prominent ideologues, Brahim Ould Ely (“Saharaoui”) was sentenced to ten years in prison. Others managed lesser terms and hard labor. One was acquitted. The sentences are relatively light, though some feel the process was unfair or in the words of Sheikh Mohamed Hassan Ould Dedew, “unjust” and “contrary to the President and the atmosphere of dialogue”. Aqlame published an article on 18 May declaring that “Dialogue is Futile,” writing that “has the government has backtracked on its approach to dialogue” and questioning the government’s involvement with the “global war on terrorism”. It concludes by worrying that the government is “returning to the first position of taking any open confrontation with al-Qaeda, relying on force alone to achieve victory.” Depending on Ould Sidina, Chabarnou and Ould Hiba’s sentences, it will be more clear as to where the government stance with regards to these criticisms and its relationship to the Islamist tendency (which it has been cultivating since last winter).

In news related to AQIM, France is widely believed to be pressuring Mauritania into releasing prisoners to get the terrorist group to release a Frenchmen kidnapped in Niger . This is said to be one of the main purposes of Alan Joyandet’s (the French Minister of Cooperation and Francophonie) visit to Mauritania earlier in the week. The French would like the Mauritanians to do a deal similar to Mali’s earlier this year.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the famous tele-Sheikh, is visiting Mauritania this week. He is the guest of Sheikh Dedew, which greatly increases Dedew’s credibility within the religious movement and beyond. It also distracts some attention from the The pair have made and will make several appearances together, including one at the Olympic stadium in Nouakchott. Qaradawi’s remarks one such event touched on a variety of subjects including economic development, “the force of Islamic civilization,” the importance of the Muslim diaspora (specifically mentioning China), the need for Muslim unity, Qur’an recitation competitions and so on. He was met by President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz on arrival, and praised the president for shutting down the Israeli embassy and his “interest in social justice and the poor”. The video of this reception can be seen below.

General Mohamed Ould Ghazouani hosted a dinner for Qaradawi. Ould Ghazouani is one of the main centers of power in the regime (easily the second most powerful officer) and the dinner represents the government’s attempt to establish and maintain bona fides with the religious tendency. Like much of the population, Ould Ghazouani’s tribe, many members of which are important patrons of the religious movement, was excited for the occasion. Qaradawi enjoys a wide following in Mauritania. Ould Abdel Aziz’s and Ould Ghazouani’s public associations with him are designed to improve the regime’s standing with the religious movement and the population at large by projecting an image of piety and populism.

Islamist performance

Charles Kurzman and Iqbal Naqvi have an article in the Journal of Democracy (April 2010, Vol. 21, No. 2) titled “Do Muslims Vote Islamic?” The central question is: “If Muslim majority countries hold free and fair (or at least competitive) elections, should we expect Islamic parties to dominate such contests?” Citing the usual past cases in which Islamist parties swept the vote (Algeria 1991, Hamas 2006, etc.), the authors contest the idea that free elections in Muslim polities will yield Islamist victories. They draw the following conclusions from 160 elections in which Islamists participated:

Rise and Fall, Push and Pull (Pt. II)

It is written:

[. . .] group feeling gives protection and makes possible mutual defence, the pressing of claims, and every other kind of social activity. By dint of their nature, human beings need someone to act as a restraining influence and mediator in every social organization, in order to keep its members from (fighting) with each other. That person must, by necessity, have superiority over the others in the matter of group feeling. If not, his power cannot be effective. Such superiority is royal authority. It is more than leadership. Leadership means being a chieftain, and the leader is obeyed, but he has no power to force other to accept his rulings. Royal authority means superiority and the power to rule by force.

[. . .]

Even if an individual tribe has different “houses” and many diverse group feelings, still, there must exist a group feeling that is stronger than all the other group feelings combined, that is superior to them all and makes them subservient, and in which all the diverse group feelings coalesce, as it were, to become one greater group feeling. Otherwise, splits would occur and lead to dissension and strife. “If God did not keep human beings apart, the earth would perish.”

Rise and Fall, Push and Pull

Glory is like a circle in the water,
Which never ceaseth to enlarge itself,
Till by broad spreading it disperses to naught.

The Decadent City

It is written that tribal and nomadic peoples carry more group feeling (ʿaṣabiyya) than atomized sedentary types. In the towns, men grew weak and corrupt. They became complacent and decadent, falling as easy prey for more robust and virile nomads. The nomads overturn the urban centers, pillaging and occupying them. From the moment the nomads set down in the cities and occupy the seats of power, they begin a slow decline. Some are better at maintaining group feeling over longer periods than others and some cycles are longer or shorter than others. But however long it takes, the process is essentially the same: increasing complexity at the center and constant or increasing cohesiveness among those at the periphery produce a new regime and ruling class.