Algeria in all its parts
The degree to which regionalism, real or imagined, factors into Algerian political calculus is interesting. Many Algerians (and outside observers) discount regionalist tendencies in the leadership caste. The war generation tended to de-emphasize regional, ethnic and even religious differences to build consensus and nationalism. There are, nevertheless, tendencies for men from particular areas to have say over the nation as a whole, not as a result of deliberate conspiracies but more because of circumstances. The urban areas were historically centers of political power that struggled to control the tribal and nomadic populations on the periphery. The French were the first to make Algiers indisputable center of political power Algeria (the Ottomans never really got it). But that was European power and when the Europeans left at independence, rural people took their place (Algiers was a majority European before 1962). The result is that Algiers tends not produce leadership clans or political factions; instead political factions with their origins outside the capital, in eastern Algeria, western Algeria or Kabylia, tend to impose themselves on Algiers. Though Algeria is a unitary (if highly complex) state, its capital is the locus of institutional powers that are filled from other parts of the country. Algiers does not dominate Algerian politics. Algerian politics dominates Algiers.
Regionalism and political clannishness are a result of this background; a variety of political cliques developed during the War of Independence and the nation-building process afterward. Men who served in the war-time maquis or ALN clustered together, often according to which wilaya they fought in or what FLN/ALN base they served on outside (or inside) the country. Other alliances were the result of education or personal friendships. As the military became increasingly professionalized, men who were sent abroad for training, to the Soviet Union, Jordan, Egypt, France or China, made good with each other. In the technocratic fields men were tied together by schooling, hometowns, departments or simple corruption. Whether men were urban or rural helped to color the type of bonds and clannishness that developed.
Today networks of corruption bind various “clans” of the national elite, whether in SONATRACH or the ministries or the military. Many retired military men have since gone into the privatized industries, import-export and so on. Many have friends in France or elsewhere in Europe. In the energy sector many have relationships as a result of studying in Europe or North America (even Russia) or because they embezzled money with colleagues. Changes in economic policy or public exposure can be a weapon. The result is a tendency toward secrecy (already in place among many during the wars) and mutual “respect for honor” (code for not talking about other people’s misdeeds). A few observations about the regionalized view of these “clans,” which have their own internal réseaux (شلة) within them that are too cloudy to get into in a blog post, may be in order. This post is not complete as an appraisal of existing political “clans” by any means and does not aim to be. Continue reading
This sh*t is wicked on these mean streets
