Sunday Afternoon Thoughts: Arabic transliteration
Posted: 31 January, 2010 Filed under: Arab Americans, Arabs, culture, good times, idealism, language, school 3 Comments »“There are now standard and acceptable ways of transliterating Arabic letters in Latin script. I have not adopted any of these in their entirety. For a non-Arabist, it is not very helpful to be able to distinguish between the two types of h or s or t and readers who do know the language will in any case be aware of these.” (Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Consquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press. 2007. Pg. 9-10)
Transliteration often gets a note at the start of books dealing with Arabic subjects (or other areas where primary and major secondary sources are in non-Roman alphabets). In some books there are whole tables and/or two or three whole pages devoted to explaining how and why the author has rendered a phoneme in such and such a way. Highly specialized works frequently assume the reader’s familiarity with a particular system or give a fast explanation. Less specialized works assume the general reader’s disinterest or give a couple of paragraphs giving the overall idea of whatever system is used. In Watt’s Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh, 1968), for example, he explains:
The transliteration of Arabic words is essentially that of the second edition of The Encyclopaedia of Islam (London, 1960, continuing) with three modifications. Two of these are normal with most British Arabists, namely, q for k [with a dot below], and j for dj. The third is something of a novelty. It is the replacement of the ligature used to show when two consonants are to be sounded together by and apostrophe to show when they are to be sounded separately. This means that dh, gh, kh, sh, th (and in non-Arabic words ch and zh) and to be sounded together; where there is an apostrophe, as in ad’ham, they are to be sounded separately. The apostrophe in this usage represents no sound, but, since it only occurs between two consonants (of which the second is h), it cannot be confused with the apostrophe representing the glottal stop (hamza), which never occurs between two consonants. (pg. v-vi)
In another book of the same period, the explaination is even more brisk:
There remains a brief remark about the transliteration system of Arabic names. For reasons concerned mainly with printing difficulties, no diacritical marks appear with transliterated Arabic names. In other words, these names are spelled according to their Arabic pronunciation but without any diacritical marks. The hamza sign is ʼ and the ayn sign is ʿ ; however, they do not appear in an initial position. There should be no serious difficulties arising from this unavoidable system of transliteration. (Bishai, Wilson B. Islamic History of the Middle East: Backgrounds, Development, and Fall of the Arab Empire. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968. pg. viii)
John D. Ruedy spends more time on it the preface to (the first edition of) his excellent Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992 and 2005):
As anyone who has worked in Algerian history knows, the researcher is faced with daunting problems of transliteration. The terminology — names, places, institutions — comes from classical Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, and several Berber dialects. When they came to Europe and America, most of the names and terms arrived in French transliterations, which are not in themselves consistent from one area to another or even from one writer to another. I have decided that any attempt to impose total consistency would create more confusion than it would dissipate.
With regard to the names of Algerians before the twentieth century who did not speak or write French themselves, I have generally used a standard English transliteration of Arabic or Ottoman but without diacriticals. For well-known historical figures (e.g., Hussein Dey) and for modern Algerians, I have retained the French spelling. I have also retained the French transliteration of all place names, since this is the way readers will encounter them in almost every other source. The French colonists changed the names of many places during their 132-year occupation, and they also founded many towns and villages. After independence, however, Algerians changed them back or gave them new names. In the text, I use the name prevalent at the time under consideration. The appendix carries a name conversion chart. With regard to Ottoman and Arabic institutions and legal terminology, I have usually, though not invariably, employed English transliteration. (pg. xi-xii)
While introducing the third edition of A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Jamil Abdun-Nasr writes:
The problem of spelling place and personal names, with which I was confronted at the time of writing A History of the Maghrib, remains one for which no completely satisfactory solution can be found. This problem arose form the fact that writing of place and personal names in this region has been much influenced by peculiarities in the languages of its various conquerors. Recently the problem has been further complicated by the policy of the governments of the Maghribi countries since independence of using Arabic or Arabized names for places which have been widely known by European adaptations which sometimes bear little or no resemblance to these names. [...] However, in order not to confuse the reader unduly, the names by which important Maghribi towns are known to non-specialists have not been changed. Thus Casablanca has been preferred to al-Dar al-Baydaʼ, or Oran to Wahran, Algiers to al-Jazaʼir, Bizerte to Bin Zirt, and Tripoli to Tarablus al-Gharb. Arabic personal names have been transliterated systematically when they are not internationally known in a specific form when consistent transliteration does not lead to much confusion.
In transliteration I have followed a simplified system. Of the usual diacritical marks I have used only ʼ for the Arabic hamza and ʿ for the Arabic gutteral ‘ayn. The ˉ over a vowel to indicate that it is long I have used only when its omission would make it difficult even for Arabic-speaking persons to recognize in transliteration the assimlation of the definite article al- before the qamariyya letters. Hence Sayf al-Nasr, although his name would be pronounced by an Arabic speaker as Sayfu ʼn-Nasr. (pg. xi-xii)
Arabic transliteration can be controversial: the great debate over how to render the Libyan leader’s name seems to never end. Journalists love the subject; it fits into the popular narrative around the dictator’s personal eccentricities. It is as if to say: And if you thought his outfits weren’t weird enough, we can’t even figure out how to spell his name! It makes an exciting add-on for some; for those who have better Arabic it can actually be an interesting bit of human interest. The resolution sometimes turns out blaming Arabic for being so difficult, what, with all its grammar and peculiar sounds and stops. How utterly fascinating.
In Kennedy’s case this is an Arabist — not a journalist. He has written substantive books before. Not only the popular When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World: The Rise and Fall of Islam’s Greatest Dynasty (Da Capo, 2005), but also of The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphate: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (Longman: 1986; revised, 2004). In his other books there is hardly deep discussion of transliteration. But on page 6 of The Great Arab Conquests he writes: “Arabic sources use the term conquest (fath) to describe the taking over of the lands of the Byzantine and Persian empires.” He clarifies that fath (فتح) derives from the fth (ف ت ح) root; the root from which we get the title of the first sura of the Qur’an, (سورة الفاتحة) “the Opening.” Thus it has a special connotation in Arabic that conquest does not in modern English. Since Kennedy does not explain his transliteration, what stops the non-Arabist from reading his فتح (fath) as something where the t is actually a th (as in faith or the Arabic letter ث) rather than where the h (Arabic ح) is its own sound not linked to the t? None of that stops The Great Arab Conquests for being a great book for its own purposes, even if it does not bother with digraphs and macrons (or should it be macra?) and all that. In his other works he makes full use of these. There are many quick to moan about the irrelevance or stupidity of debates and discussions over transliteration — and they are usually right.
This blog hardly ever agonizes over transliteration; there are more important things to consider. What matters is that the word can be easily recognized and pronounced, not that it follows anybody’s rules. Especially in the Maghreb the problems associated with transliteration are manifest: the French (phonetic) system or some haphazard English-phonetic system used by journalists and scholars are often predominant. It is on occasion the case that two individuals with the same (Arabic) name spell them in wildly different ways using Latin letters. Two acquaintances are Abd el-Rahmans (عبد الرحمن). One spells it Abdelrahmane the other uses Abderrahman. Another, with the same name uses Abdalraham. These are minute differences, and they can produce their own results in certain circumstances. Use of one or the other spelling may put one in common with a completely different individual. There are Khalids and Khaleds; Mohameds and Muhammads; Belkasems and Belgacems and Belkacems; nowadays such confusion can be especially erroneous in a number of directions.
Imagine young people going to school in the United States or the United Kingdom writing their names with dots and macrons, somebody named Muḥammad asking his principal to make sure that his diploma had a dot below the h — ḥ. It always amuses to see these used in older books for personal names that do not otherwise make use of them; in the “Preface to the First Edition” of Philip Hitti’s History of the Arabs (as seen in the tenth edition), he acknowledges a former student named “Buṭrus ʿAbd-al-Malik” using a dot below the t to signify that it represents a ط rather than a ت (pg. xii). How this Buṭrus actually spelled his name is a mystery here — it is doubtful he used the ṭ. (Nowadays a capital T is used in technical texts; this is conventional for many of the “emphatic” letters.) In another of Hitti’s books (The Syrians in America, Gorgias: 2005, orig. published 1924) he notes in a footnote to Appendix A that “No uniform system of transliteration was used in the proper names of priests which occur in the Appendices. The names were rather spelled as the owners would spell them.” (pg. 125) Dots do not seem to have caught on among western Arabs, at least not in everyday usage. Individuals sometimes use the “modifier letter left hand ring” (ʿ) or other funny looking “apostrophes” for ayin (ﻉ) or ʼ for hamza (ء). As’ad Abukhalil, who pays close attention to transliteration, favors this, for instance. There seems to be no consensus around using “ou” or “oo” or “u” for waws (و) and dammas or how to represent shaddas. One can find Maqdisis who have something more Celtic-looking like MacDesey or the like. One becomes frustrated with the various ways ghayn (ﻍ) is represented: a kh or a gh or a g or something else with a dot or a macron or whatever. One sees multiple Arabic names with the same letters represented differently in the same article. This blog has alternated in usage, for the same individuals names; مختار is sometimes, carelessly, Moctar, Mokhtar, Moktar, etc. Some of those have been fixed, others have not. Muhammad for محمد is hardly used here — Mohamed is better, not for any real reason other than personal preference. This is really what it comes down to very often; utility and preference. Consistency matters, too.
UPDATE: Brian Whitaker, of the Guardian and al-Bab, offers his thoughts; Whitaker’s blog also has a summary of transliteration schemes that makes for useful and interesting reading. He also gives examples of some recent blunders in transliteration from the UK and elsewhere, as well as Colonel Lawrence’s goofy response to demands that he correct inconsistencies in his transliteration of place and personal names. Whitaker wrote the fun article on Qadhdhafi‘s name (or Qadhafi or Qaddafi, as it is sometimes written here) referenced above.
Dialogue interview in Taqadoumy
Posted: 30 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, AQIM, Arabs, Islamism, Maghreb, Mali, Mauritania, Recently in Mauritania, religion, Sahel, terrorism 4 Comments »Taqadoumy has an interview with participants in the government’s Islamist prison dialogue. Here Ould Sidina outlines his views on the dialogue, his opinions about media coverage of the process and AQIM in general; he says: “I am not a spokesman for al-Qaeda, but a simple soldier.” His ilk will not “work for any government [referring to a question about his trouble with the Abdellahi government] this one or another so long as they do not govern by the laws of God.” He reports “no dissent” in AQIM’s ranks, though one wonders how true this can be and how knowledgable he can be after his time in prison. He rejects media reports that say he expressed willingness to go to northern Mali during the dialogue sessions. Read it all here (in Arabic).
Meanwhile, government officials are emphasizing that the process is not reconciliation or negotiation, but an “intellectual dialogue” and a “thoughtful conversation on certain ideas and concepts that need some degree of reflection, correction, and a fact-based discussion.” The whole process should also be looked at in a broader picture where President Ould Abdel Aziz is attempting to grow a base, and build pillars and sectors of support for his regime. The Islamist community is a primary target for this, especially in Tawassoul’s following and increasingly the Salafist tendency (in terms of efforts, though not necessarily results). His outreach to and use of Sheikh Dedew must be understood this way; Tawassoul’s cooperation with the government must also be seen in this context. The real issue here is not combating extremism or fighting terrorism per se, but establishing a system of reciprocity by setting up favors (which must naturally be returned) in the short-term and mechanisms of dependency in the medium/long-term. There are rumors that some prisoners may be released in the near future — a sign that there is an attempt to coopt such elements. At this stage that there are elements in government considering that option speaks to intent; if it plays out it speaks to an important choice in regards to house Ould Abdel Aziz will deal with the Islamist movement. His over all approach is a departure from the military’s past to be sure.
Reading Munqidh in English
Posted: 30 January, 2010 Filed under: Arabs, books, culture, history, Syria Leave a comment »There are two really useful English translations of Ussama ibn Munqidh’s memoirs: Paul M. Cobb’s The Book of Contemplation: Islam and the Crusades (Penguin, 2008) and Philip K. Hitti’s An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah Ibn-Munqidh (Columbia University Press, 2000). They are both substantial in their own ways, though they cover mostly the same materials. There is greater precision in Hitti’s translation, whereas in Cobb’s there is somewhat more readability for the twenty-first century reader. Hitti’s employment of terms is at times either highly technical or archaic by today’s standards. The reader can learn new words and expressions from Hitti, where in Cobb’s there are instances that sound like literal translations of Arabic expressions. (Hitti’s first appeared in the 1920′s to be fair to him and to Cobb; Hitti was also a native Arabic-speaker.) This is also present in Hitti’s and in his case but for whatever reason they are less awkward. In Cobb’s translation there is less zest; Hitti’s writing, be it in translations or in his own narratives, always carries an exciting tone. Cobb’s is somewhat better organized than Hitti’s; it is neater and can be used more readily for quick selections. There is more mastery in Hitti’s but somewhat more utility in Cobb’s. Cobb covers slightly more territory than Hitti (though not by much) — his is somewhere in the area and Hitti’s is a little more than half of that (though more in older additions, and page length is not the best way to gauge that) –which gives the book more general application. Penguin Classics made no mistake with Cobb, though contemporary expectations for what is readable appear to hold back what is really trying to come out from the Arabic (This also seems to be in other Penguin Classics translations; the Akhmatova collection, though this reader has no Russian, other translations indicate that there might be more energy in the original word than on the page). Hitti’s translation is far better in substance than Cobb’s — there is greater clarity in his word choice, and it is clear that the purpose is the presentation of the story and the beauty (and sense) of the language as dual purposes, rather than the one before or over the other. This is adab afterall, not meant to be laborious or dry. The Book of Contemplation comes more readily to general readers, and because there is hardly anything else like it on the general market (one sometimes gets lucky and finds Hitti’s on the bookshelf instead). People studying Arabic should find the originals (there are some sites online with selections, and some books, hard to purchase but less difficult to come across in most major academic libraries with Arabic books) and read both. Those not so thoroughly invested should pick out either one while keeping in mind that the real (translated) classic is An Arab-Syrian Gentleman in the Period of the Crusades.
O. Abdel Aziz in Tehran: More thoughts
Posted: 29 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, balance of power, France, Francophonie, Iran, Maghreb, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Muslims, Non-Allied, politics, Sahel, Third World 6 Comments »
Mauritanians place a high value on pragmatism. The Essentialist would have it that they are “by nature” pragmatists; the country’s politics and foreign policy would support the claim. When Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz traveled to Iran and met with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei predicted the destruction of Israel and described a united Muslim effort against it, one would assume that in sitting so closely to so polarizing a leader the Mauritanian President was getting something substantial in return. Ould Abdel Aziz has used anti-Israel language to great effect since seizing power in 2008; this was justified as a means of gaining financial support from wealthier “radical” states — Libya and Iran especially — because western governments cut aid in protest of his coup. Since the 2009 election, though, Ould Abdel Aziz has been rehabilitated by Mauritania’s major partners, notably France. He was given classical treatment during his visit to Paris last autumn. But he has consistently moved to engage and bring in other actors into his patch of Francophonie; not just Libya, but Venezuela and Iran as well. The French are not happy about his visit to Tehran; there is a rumor among some diplomatic circles that Ould Abdel Aziz received a bitter message from the French, so worrisome that he departed more hastily than planned. Knowledgeable people believe that the process leading up to that visit, with all the Francafrique cash-flow it entailed (which is too much to get into here) convinced Ould Abdel Aziz that he could buy off the French and carry on however he would like; the French do not seem to be one of mind with him there.
Three agreements were signed at Tehran, all related to development or finance; notably a guarantee of 500 taxis and 250 buses (to help reduce urban congestion). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will visit Nouakchott sometime in the near future. The pragmatists would seem to be utterly unimpressed. Ould Abdel Aziz has been an annoyance to many in Washington, not simply for his coup, but for his anti-Israeli rhetoric and action. But because this is a small country largely irrelevant in the actual goings on of the Palestinian issue, it is not difficult to shrug it off and offer a little less money to its government. The whole thing carries the double mantle of Islamic solidarity and south-south cooperation. It forces more consideration. Read the rest of this entry »
O. Abdel Aziz in Tehran
Posted: 26 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Iran, Israel, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Palestine, Third World, Turkey 5 Comments »
Gen. Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz has made some headlines by visiting Turkey and Iran this week. The Iranian visit is more important. Its context is Ould Abdel Aziz’s cultivation of the Axis of Bombast during his time as junta head, especially after his harrowing use of the Gaza crisis to break Mauritania’s ties to Israel and thereby win himself kudos at a popular level. His rise to power had already alienated many western aid-givers, and he went especially cash strapped after expelling the Israel Ambassador; but it was all in the plan, as Libya and Iran (and Qatar, too) were ready to pick up that slack and buy some influence in Nouakchott toward their own purposes. All that is colored in terms of Islamic solidarity and south-south cooperation. The Iranian Foreign Minister visited Nouakchott last year; many find the whole thing curious, if not suspicious. It more the latter than the former but here it is considered generally. Read the rest of this entry »
On disappointment: Reacting to the Overrated
Posted: 23 January, 2010 Filed under: balance of power, Geopolitics, Obama, politics, US 6 Comments »
Reading Stephen Walt’s argument for why George Mitchell should resign as the President’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, one is forced to wonder about the broad causes for the administration’s ineffectiveness and failures in the area of foreign policy. Walt’s suggests that Mitchell would do his personal reputation some good by stepping down; “he is wasting his time” in the Middle East. The Obama administration, he argues, has lost its nerve on too many occasions for its “policy” on Palestine to have much credibility or influence. If Mitchell were to follow Walt’s advise it would do serious damage to the president’s international prestige; it is an intellectually stimulating point, but its value stays there. The problem is not George Mitchell, as Walt writes, the problem is the President’s foreign policy. This provides a decent basis to marinate on some broad problems inherent to and influencing Barack Obama’s foreign policy in general. Walt’s dissatisfaction is thus: Read the rest of this entry »
Dialogue in Mauritania: Clean from the purpose of the things themselves
Posted: 18 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, AQIM, Islamism, Jamil Mansour, Maghreb, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Muslim Brotherhood, Recently in Mauritania, Sahel, terrorism, Third World 18 Comments »
The release of the Mauritanian businessmen arrested on corruption charges from the Ould Taya years was mediated by Sheikh Mohamed Hassan Ould Dedew. Well known as the spiritual leader of much of the country’s Islamist movement, Dedew’s mediation is now said by reliable sources to have been sought on the recommendation of Sudanese President Omar Hasan al-Bashir. Al-Bashir is believed to have encouraged Gen. Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz to call in Dedew during his visit to Nouakchott in late December, when the two signed fourteen cooperation agreements. These sources have it that Ould Abdel Aziz sought al-Bashir’s advice in how to get out of the bind created by the affair’s public outcry. Al-Bashir is said to have both made the suggestion and then contacted Dedew for Ould Abdel Aziz. The motivation on al-Bashir’s part is believed to be heavily ideological — an example of Islamist solidarity across borders. There is more Ould Abdel Aziz’s outreach to Islamist elements than ideology, though.
The move certainly raised Dedew’s profile in official circles, and cast him as a power broker; this works to the benefit of both the General and the Shiekh. It was also designed to smooth out relations between the government and Islamist circles; co-opting or exploiting the Islamist agenda and personages has been a constant thread in Ould Abdel Aziz’s political calculus since 2008. This is seen in his use of the anti-Israel card during the Gaza Crisis, the reciprocal courting of Tawassoul and the government following the elections and other episodes. Dedew, due to his power in the Salafist movement, is useful to Ould Abdel Aziz for propaganda reasons and for setting up and extending “good will gestures” to potentially or already violent Islamists. This is special part of a broader process by which Ould Abdel Aziz has moved to gain allies by stroking egos or spreading around money. Dedew was rewarded for his work with a dinner and three hour meeting with Ould Abdel Aziz, also attended by the businessmen; they “agreed to put the past behind them and work toward building a new Mauritania.” Read the rest of this entry »
“You have failed”
Posted: 12 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, AQIM, Free Hanevy, Maghreb, Mauritania, politics, Recently in Mauritania, reform, Sahel, Third World 7 Comments »
Mohamed Mustafa Badr al-Din, MP for the Union of Forces for Progress (UFP), sits in the opposition camp. He recently laid out a laundry list of the Ould Abdel Aziz government’s “failures” in a speech before PM Moulay Mohamed Ould Laghdaf, critiquing the government at practically every level of its stated agenda From Ould Abdel Aziz’s self-proclaimed “presidency of the poor” to combating terrorism to $50 million missing “without justification” from the Central Bank, Badr al-Din slams his General’s record. It gives a flavor of the way that many in the opposition at large (and others who are simply fed up with the current situation) prioritize and are looking at the situation, of course with the UFP’s and Badr al-Din’s own particularism and interests, too.
Choice selections, quickly translated with minor liberties: Read the rest of this entry »
On America’s Muslim problem: I
Posted: 10 January, 2010 Filed under: American Muslims, bigotry, history, Muslims, Obama, US, Western Muslims 4 Comments »
Not something you see today.
Following President Obama’s famed Cairo speech, there were those who were excited, those who were nettled and those who were simply unimpressed. Among the nettled were some American conservatives — of the Wingnut, moderate and innovative sorts — who objected to the the speech’s content and tone on a number of grounds. Most notable were those around it form a part of an “apology tour” or that it was too harsh on the Israelis. Another objection was that Obama took too conciliatory a tone with American Muslims, especially his remark that Islam has “always been a part of America’s story.” Those came from the right but they spoke to something much bigger. Read the rest of this entry »
The Venture of Marty Peretz’s bigotry: Arabs, Muslims, Berbers and more
Posted: 8 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Arabs, bigotry, Imazighen, Islam, Islamism, Muslims 6 Comments »[Readers be warned, this post contains subject matter already discussed elsewhere and is of no particular relevance to this blog's usual content. ]
Matthew Yglesias and Johnathan Chait are in a tiff about comments made by the editor-in-chief of the New Republic, Marty Peretz. Peretz’s track record of making ill-informed, nonsensical and often bigoted commentary about Muslims, Arabs and other exotic peoples is long. He caught more heat earlier this year for making racist comments about Latinos and Hispanics, but usually gets less flack on his rather regular pronouncements on Arab and Muslim topics. Yglesias takes the following paragraph from a recent Peretz blog post as insinuating that Americans need “more anti-Muslim sentiment”: Read the rest of this entry »
All Things Considered: Mauritania’s anti-Terror Law
Posted: 8 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, AQIM, Maghreb, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Recently in Mauritania, Sahel, terrorism, Third World 4 Comments »Infected with D'Evils?
Following up on the previous post on Mauritania, the text and language of the new anti-terrorism law bears examination. In n the previous post it is alleged that Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz is using the pretext of terrorism (and other troubles) to strengthen his hold on power and consolidate what he has already got. The vague and expansive nature of what is “defined” as terrorism under the new provisions illustrates this. Its blatantly self-serving language, too, gets to the point. In Article I it is said that “…The State, as the embodiment of the national entity, bears the full responsibility of contributing effort of the international community in combating all forms of terrorism …” (إن الدولة، بوصفها تجسيدا للكيان الوطني، تتحمل كامل المسؤولية في الإسهام في مجهود المجتمع الدولي في مجال مكافحة كل أشكال الإرهاب) This would be reassuring were the rest of the law to provide for protections of constitutional or human rights. Instead, it sits as a sparkling rhinestone designed to foreign governments the impression that the government takes terrorism as a serious issue, and thus warrants their patronage. Read the rest of this entry »
لا لحجب الإنترنت بالجزائر – Non à la censure de l’Internet en Algérie – No to Internet Censorship in Algeria.
Posted: 6 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Algeria, Arabs, blog, Bouteflika, Hogra, Recently in Algeria, tech, Third World 1 Comment »I encourage readers to read and sign the petition against internet censorship in Algeria. Below is information for Algerians and sympathizers on how to stand up to the Algerian authorities’ move against freedom of expression and speech. Please pass it on to friends and others interested: Read the rest of this entry »
The politics of anti-terrorism in Mauritania
Posted: 6 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Ahmed Ould Daddah, AQIM, Islamism, Maghreb, Mali, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Recently in Mauritania, Sahel, terrorism, Third World 13 Comments »
All for show
Alex Thurston the vigorous author of the Sahel Blog wrote an important post yesterday on “Popular and Opposition Perspectives on Counterterrorism in the Sahel”. He writes that in both Mali and Mauritania, the areas of greatest worry where violence from groups like AQIM are concerned, there is skepticism about both foreign and domestic counterterrorism efforts. Here, popular refers to the view of ordinary Malians that AQIM violence could increase rather than diminish if American “support” were conspicuous in the form of bases or troops. One should quickly agree that a heavy American military presence would be stupid and counter productive (and “heavy” in the Sahel should be considered relative to elsewhere). Additionally, he quotes Ahmed Ould Daddah, head of Mauritania’s main opposition party, the RFD on the recent revisions to the anti-terrorism law passed by a parliament dominated by acolytes of Gen. Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Ould Daddah says it “contains articles contradictory to the shari’a, to morality, and to Islamic values as well as principles of democracy and liberty.” Strong words. Many others in the opposition agree with him as well. These are not “appeasers” or Droukdel enthusiasts. But like many Mauritanians, he knows that the government’s talk about fighting terrorism is a way of consolidating power and using the parliament to give a glossy sheen to an incompetent leader unserious about terrorism, or much else apart from sitting in office. Read the rest of this entry »
Hanevy: Prisoner of Conscience to Detainee
Posted: 4 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Maghreb, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Recently in Mauritania, Sahel 2 Comments »On Hanevy Ould Dahah [errors are original; "Hanafi" and "Hanevi" are interchangeable transliterations from the Arabic, the latter being the Hassaniya pronunciation]:
The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ANHRI, warned of the serious health condition of the Mauritanian Hanafi Oueld Dah , being on a hunger strike since 28/12/2009 after the court had rejected his release procedures though his term ended on 24/1/2009. Oueld Dah was sentenced to six months in prison in a lawsuit filed by a former presidential candidate as a result of an article that Oueld Dah had wrote.
After having completed his term, there is no legal justification for holding Oueld Dah prisoner , which is a notable threat to freedom of expression and journalists’ safety.
The judge ,Ahmed Fal, rejected an appeal to release Oueld Dah, claiming that service terms issue was prosecutors’ or prisons directors’ responsibility and that Hanafi’s file was not at the court of appeal, thereby the court was incompetent regarding release orders!!
The defense team submitted an appeal mentioning that Hanafi has served his term and paid the fine and all other court expenses, but the judge rejected the appeal.
Moreover, the Mauritanians journalist union had made great efforts to release Oueld Dah, editor of ,Takadomi, e-paper who served his term 10 days ago and has not been released yet. Prime defense team member , Ibrahim Oueld Abeti mentioned the possibility of escalating the issue and prosecuting the Mauritanian government at the International Committee for Human Rights and the African Court for Human Rights as well as all those responsible for the continued detention of Oueld Dah.
Oueld Dah defense team has issued a statement accusing the prosecutor of holding Hanfi’s file without reason. The statement mentioned that the prosecutor would not forward the file to court of appeal, despite the many correspondences, notes and calls asking the prosecutor to deliver the file to court .
More evidence of the rampant and growing gangsterism of Nouakchott’s latest mafiosi government.
Breaking news: businessmen released
Posted: 3 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Maghreb, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Recently in Mauritania, Sahel, Third World 2 Comments »Direct from Nouakchott: The businessmen held on corruption charges are said to have been released (Mohamed Ould Noueighidh, Ould Abdallahi and Abdou Ould Maham). These were those associated with the Ould Nagi case, belonging to the Smasside tribe. Revolving door justice? Or something else? More to come.
Update: Taqadoumy confirms the previous report above. According to a source quoted in Taqadoumy‘s report, the men will pay a “small percentage of the funds [which they embezzled] to help save face for Ould Abdel Aziz.” Al-Akhbar reports that “hundreds demonstrators” gathered outside of the prison where the men were held, greeting them on release. The paper (as well as Taqadoumy) further reports that Sheikh Mohamed Hassan Ould Deddew negotiated with Gen. Ould Abdel Aziz for the businessmen’s release. Al-Akhbar also has stories on the investigation’s halt, as well as multiple stories on Hanevi Ould Daha, the detained editor of Taqadoumy.
The release is a blow to Ould Abdel Aziz’s anti-corruption campaign and credibility; it exposes the entire ordeal for the political charade it was. It also speaks to the influence of Sheikh Deddew as a moral and political figure, ready for action and use in politics, and public life at large. His role as a negotiator will make for interesting investigation when more information become available. Again, more to come.
MP Noma bint Mogaya censored for denouncing Ould Abdel Aziz
Posted: 2 January, 2010 Filed under: Africa, Maghreb, Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Recently in Mauritania, Sahel, women and politics 8 Comments »Mauritanian MP Noma bint Mogaya had an outburst against the Ould Abdel Aziz government recently, calling pro-Ould Abdel Aziz MPs hypocrites, rounding off with a long Qur’anic quotation. Her remarks were censored on state television. (In Arabic, will attempt a translate parts of it if time allows, later. Readers are welcome to their translations in the comments box, too.)
Note: The references to corruption are meant to refer to Ould Abdel Aziz’s relationship with Mohamed Bouamatou, one of Mauritania’s wealthiest men. It should be understood in the context of the false anti-corruption activities of the current government, causing much indignation and irritation in the country. No instance is more exemplary than the case of Ould Nagi, et al. Earlier this fall, when the government made much about the arrest of a series of bankers — including the former governor of the Central Bank of Mauritania (BCM), Sid’El Moctar Ould Nagi — for “economic crimes” this was to direct attention away from Bouamatou who has been charged with using usury to bankrupt the national airliner, as well as other firms. He was one of Ould Abdel Aziz’s greatest campaign donors and remains among his closest allies. The so-called “Ould Nagi” affair resulted in the ex-head of the central bank being forced to return $95 million in embezzled funds. The CEOs of several other banks were also implicated in the ring of corruption. The cynical say that the funds brought back to the public by the arrest of these fiends hardly approaches the potential gains that would be made if the government were to investigate and hold to account members of the president’s own entourage, by which practically everyone means Bouamatou. Bouamatou, it is said has aggressively working to expand his own business empire in the last two years, frequently by questionable means and at the expense of large existing institutions.
The Ould Nagi case, then, is quite cosmetic, especially given that the funds in question were embezzeled in 2001 and 2002. Ould Abdel Aziz has gone a binge for sacking members of government for corruption or incompetence, causing a grave sense of insecurity and paranoia in the ranks. After the December kidnappings, he moved to sack military men for slipping up on the anti-terror front. The result has been increasing dissatisfaction in the barracks. The “Ould Nagi Pandora’s Box” appears to have set ill at east both those with dirty records and accounts with the opposition.
Update: For the non-Arabic-speakers: Nasser at Dekhnstan has an English transcription of the video. His post includes notes on Mogaya’s repeated references to Gen. Ould Abdel Aziz’s Moroccan family connections and calling him out on practically any issue one can think of. Readers will also enjoy her lines smashing the myth of Ould Abdel Aziz as “the president of the poor,” a label shown to be spurious earlier this autumn by Ould Abdel Aziz’s own inattention.
Thoughts on Obama and human rights
Posted: 1 January, 2010 Filed under: Afghanistan, balance of power, Europe, Obama, US 1 Comment »This week the Wall Street Journal carried an op-ed by Fouad Ajami, appraising Barack Obama’s first year foreign policy. It was a predictable line: the administration is inept abroad, its commitment to human rights and democracy promotion non-existent and so on and so forth. Despots do not fear president Obama and democrats and reformers are unsure of his fidelity to their causes. There are a series of hyperbolic pronouncements on a series of international issues where the administration has been less than obvious in its “support” for democratization or has shown greater concern for power politics than relations with lesser states (Iran and the missile shield issue being good examples). The false notion of a “Cairo promise” or “Cairo agenda” however one might term the belief that the administration planned to operated its policy in the Arab world with any attention to the concerns of its people beyond the Palestinian problem based on the language in the Cairo speech has now been eviscerated. Human rights is on the “back burner” in the Obama administration, if one listens to Elliot Abrams who wrote that the administration has “no human rights policy” this summer. Or Newsweek, which published a piece by James P. Rubin enumerating the areas where the administration has looked the other way on matters related to “democratic values”. He wrote: “The point is not that the new administration has made a practical calculation in some of these tough calls. The problem is that it’s done so in all of them.” Certainly some looking to free Hanevi Ould Dahah would agree with that at least in spirit. Where Ajami writes “no blogger in Cairo or Damascus or Tehran [. . .] expects Mr. Obama to ride to the rescue,” they might agree and add “no journalist in Nouakchott.” Not so long ago Secretary of State Clinton admitted that the Cairo rhetoric was … rhetoric.
But where Ajami is not so hack is his discussion of the broad expectations many American (and foreign) liberals held about Obama the candidate that have, in the eyes of many, all but evaporated. Ajami writes about “that patina of cosmopolitanism in President Obama’s background concealed the isolationism of the liberal coalition that brought him to power.” Here, too, is a great exaggeration. But “liberal orientalism” is not a poor way of describing the cynicism about foreign affairs that have taken over important segments of the American left in the wake of the Bush disaster. Whether Obama’s false cosmopolitanism and imaginary diplomatic credentials were actually part of a Democratic conspiracy to mask “isolationism” is deeply implausible. The notion that by his very “face” president Obama would persuade men way from terrorism is manifestly false; and that the president, because of his ethnicity, holds some magic sense of what beats in the hearts of Africans or Arabs or Indonesians or Venezuelans or any other set of foreigners was and is also rigorously questionable. So for Ajami to write the following in reflection of a year of Obama is not troublesome: ”It was easy, that delirium with Mr. Obama: It made no moral demands on those eager to partake of it.
It was also false, in many lands.” He is also right to mock the notions of “postracism” — or postracialism as it was often called — that many have read into president Obama’s candidacy and “meaning” for American and world society (a wildly ridiculous delusion will hopefully weaken over time). Ajami has Americans “smaller” and more “cynical” after a year of Obama. “Liberal orientalism,” though, has not prevented the administration’s foreign policy from having been conducted with aptitude in many places. As Rubin wrote, though, it leaves one to question the “principle of the thing” where the Middle East and North Africa is concerned. It hard to see what good can be done by a “liberal orientalism” that abandons in whole or in part long standing commitments to basic human rights issues in foreign policy, in an excessive way out of fear that the United States has lost its moral authority. To speak of “apology tours” would exaggerate that tendency, but obviously wavering confidence does no superpower any good, and even less for those who live in places where human rights are hardly observed. Leaving behind a policy based on a half-witted idea of democratic peace theory is one thing; abandoning the word “democracy” or muggy human rights issues all together is quite another. Especially when abdications at the highest levels come along with ones where the political and economic costs are practically nil.
It is easy to exaggerate the impact of the issuance of statements “welcoming” the release of a dissident, which at the same praise the “true generosity” of the government in question, or admissions of “disgust” at the excesses of a boy-commander-cum-coup-leader. It is also easy to overstate the extent to which much else would have impact on their respective targets, without meaningful action. In some respects the administration, on specific matters, has done the best it can. In others it has done nothing of the sort, or raised its voice or moved to prudent action in the face of abuses. Human rights and democracy are not big picture issues for the administration, which is more concerned with managing broader issues between governments. Earlier in the year some saw the president’s speechifying as going over the heads or shoulders of rulers and speaking directly to their people. It more the case that his popular speeches did deliberately appeal to the masses, but this was mainly to reassure preexisting good will, as a pat on the head or a hand on the shoulder, rather than to actually implore youths to change the world, let alone their governments. His silk words tamed the masses, so as to let business as usual go on with a happier distraction. The president often uses a quote that says: “the arch of the universe is long but it bends toward freedom.” Venerable words are rarely exploited by the powerful with such conviction.


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