Brainstorming the Geopolitics of AQIM’s Moorish Appeal

Some short weeks ago, the Wall Street Journal filed a report regarding the spread of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The report was timely, coming on the heels of Mauritania’s first suicide bombing and an uptick in the group’s attacks in Algeria and its activities elsewhere. The report noted that its newest recruits were coming especially from the peoples of northern Mali and Mauritania, people linked by their Arabic dialect (Hassaniya) and kinship. The report notes that AQIM is attempting to recruit both “the young Muslims of the region — white ones and black ones,” but seems to indicate that it is having greater success with the “white” Muslims from the Mauritanian Arabophone majority and the Arab minorities in Mali and Niger. See here for alle’s criticism and commentary on the WSJ piece.

While AQIM was founded on the infrastructure of the GSPC, an Algerian rebel group whose leadership hailed almost entirely from the northern, sedentary and urban metropole, its metamorphosis in the Sahara has meant that its most recent classes of foot-soldiers have been local to that region, thus complicating things not only for those interested in combating it, but also for its leadership. The situation raises important questions as to the extent and meaning of AQIM’s appeal to young Arabs in the Sahel, mostly of bidhani (lit. “white”; more eloquently called “Moorish” in English) stock. Before this can be addressed it must be said that while, like many nomadic and semi-nomadic populations (including their non-Arab Tuareg neighbors), the Arab bidhan have a traditional social division between “warrior” and “zawiyya,” or religious tribes, with the former traditionally responsible for the protection of the latter. While this means that there is a martial tradition among the tribes in the region, it does not mean that their traditional Islamic canon, based on the Maliki madhhab is at all proximate to the variety of Salafist-ideology carried by AQIM. While there is a history of the bidhan practicing martial jihad against other local Muslims and non-Muslims (mostly to the immediate south), the local mentality discourages violence against Muslim leaders and views outside ideologies and Arabs with, if not suspicion, then certainly with a grain of salt (or, perhaps more fittingly, “sand”). The tendency away from violence against Muslim rule (one might call it fitnaphobia) is stronger among Moors than Tuaregs for a whole complex of reasons that are best explored in another instance. Furthermore, the bidhan/Moorish groups outside of Mauritania must be viewed in the context of a minority population that, much like the Tuareg, views their sedentary, southern, Francophone and black central governments (e.g. Mali and Niger) with suspicion, as antagonistic elements threatening to their way of life as pastoralists. This has been a fundamental element in the tension between the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger and their central governments since independence till the present; it has also been a bone of contention with the Moorish communities, who have often held affections or sympathies with Mauritania, the Moorish dominated state presently suffering rule-by-general and a rather active AQIM infection. Analysis of AQIM’s appeal to these populations must necessarily, then, consider the place of historically pastoralist/semi-nomadic peoples in the political economy of the Sahel, an area where settled and roaming people are both by and large Muslim.

In any case, AQIM may appeal especially to the Moors of the Sahel for the following reasons, though this is surely not an exhaustive or perfect survey. The reasons are, as anywhere, complex, but are basically logistical, situational and fiscal in nature. [ This writing does not propose to assume that the Moorish communities in the Sahel are at all predisposed toward collaboration with AQIM on a communal or tribal basis any more than others. It intends to focus specifically on one element of the problem broadly, and if it seems the emphasis is too specific on the particular issue it is not to discount other important questions or challenges. ] Readers ought to keep in mind the dutiful and wonderfully useful analyses of AQIM’s appeal in the region here and here.

On Obama’s Ramadan message

President Obama’s Ramadan message was, as his remarks to the Muslim world often are, at best well choreographed and well composed and at worst thoroughly disingenuous and problematic. As a part of the White House’s outreach to the Muslim world, it not only cross referenced the Cairo speech, and the president’s commitment to “a new beginning between America and Muslims around the world”. While there is little to argue with in the core of that message, that relationships should be based on common interests and respect, the Obama administration has yet to put anything on display beyond respect for rulers in the Muslim world. After critical examination (and much of the reporting on it has been distinctly uncritical), the Ramadan message Mr. Obama delivers is hardly about Ramadan. Like other public diplomacy efforts by the Obama administration, the Ramadan message is one of studied and dutiful vagueness.

He begins by stating that he extends well wishes on “on behalf of the American people, including Muslims in all fifty states”. So far so good. From here, the president speaks essentially to foreign Muslims, not American Muslims. He speaks of philanthropic activities in the United States, highlighting those of American Muslim organizations as well, noting that all religions encourage charitable giving. He then informs viewers of America’s effort to “engage Muslims and Muslim-majority nations on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect,” recalling the thrust of his Ankara and Cairo speeches.

A Man’s World? Mauritanian Islamists and female service

The Mauritanian government made history by appointing a woman, Naha Mint Hamdi Ould Mouknass, to the post of Foreign Minister. Ms. Bint Ould Mouknass is the first woman to hold the post in any Arabic-speaking country; she is joined by five other female appointees in General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz’s government.

Her background is straightforward enough. The eldest daughter a wealthy northern businessman-cum-Foreign Minister, from the Elguera’a tribe, she served as an MP from Nouadhibou on the Foreign Relations Commission. In the earlier part of the decade she was an advisor to Ould Taya. Circa 2000, she has been head of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (UDP), supporting Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdellahi in 2007 but following with the exodus of ex-supporters in June 2008, helping to accelerate the downfall of his government. THe UDP supported Gen. Ould Abdel Aziz in the most recent polls and her appointment can be seen as at least partially the result of this track record.

Her appointment is at once clever and utilitarian: Bint Mouknass’s appointment, like that of her predecessor, is an attempt to appeal to outside audiences with a fresh and “soft” face. The General is also offering spoils to his supporters (more on this later, but be aware that she is strongly favored by Libya). It also puts a wedge between the new government and the Islamist movement, whose policy it co-opted prior to (and during, mind you) the presidential election (e.g., Israel), it is thought to be politically beneficial to act contra the movement’s ideology, thereby clearly distinguishing himself from it, especially in light of his efforts to “fight terrorism,” though this was surely thought up well before last week’s suicide bombing (and likely without their possibility in mind).

Some will have none of it. The imam of Nouakchott’s number two mosque denounced her appointment by means of scripture and hadith. Imam Ahmedou Ould Habiboullah Ould Lemrabott described a woman’s proper place is “in the house, in service of her husband and family”. He spent fifty minutes on this, according to al-Akhbar. Taqadoumy also writes that Lemrabott quoted verses stating that women should not travel without their spouses or close male relatives, an invocation which would make Ms. Ould Moukness’s job rather difficult at even a theoretical level: She is after all, not married. (Taqadoumy also has the editorial from La Tribune‘s sharp editorial on the matter.)

What should be said is that Mauritanian Salafists — and it is safe to call Imam Lemrabott a Salafist — are none too pleased with the high relatively high ratio of women in the new government and are making a point of it. There is nuance, though. Abdellahi Ould Boyé, a more seasoned sheikh, president of the World Muslim Congress and former minister under Mokhtar Ould Daddah now living in Saudi Arabia, told ech-Chaab (a government paper) that appointing women to high posts in order to “appeal to others” or for any other reason beyond their personal qualifications is “hypocrisy” and in violation of the shari’ah. (“تعيين المرأة في بعض المناصب محاباة للغير وليس على أساس الكفاءة قد يكون نوعاً من الرياء في الديمقراطية”). Here Lemrabott’s criticism is not so conditional; He is opposed to women in office as a matter of principle. Note, though, that Lemrabott supported Ould Abdel Aziz after the coup and during the recent elections, imploring “Muslims” to vote for him. Lemrabott’s support for Ould Abdel Aziz is not peculiar; Islamists in Mauritania historically supported whomever was in control; It was only until the waning days of the Ould Taya regime that they found themselves in the “opposition” having till then been eager court theologians.

This view is quite controversial in Mauritania, where women have seats reserved in parliament and women are traditionally strong figures in society, often carrying on with greater social freedoms than their northern and eastern Arab sisters. Tawassoul (the Mauritanian Muslim Brotherhood) has little to say, and one might assume their agreement as a result (despite the prominence of women in their campaign advertisements). It further represents a rejection of all six female ministers on the part of what might be called “movement Islamists” (as opposed to political or government Islamists (e.g. Tawassoul), to borrow framing from the American context), to set themselves apart from Gen. Ould Abdel Aziz’s government on less moveable theological grounds than was the case with their anti-Israel positioning.

 

Post-bombing thoughts

With respect to General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz’s recent appeals to Western governments regarding fighting terrorism in Mauritania, the following should be recognized; all while noting American efforts at military cooperation with Libya, Ould Abdel Aziz’s meetings with the Iranian Foreign Minister and the region’s indigenous power relationships. It must be said, though, most Mauritanians are more concerned with the make up of the new government than anything else.

Mauritania bombing update

Some updates on the attack in Mauritania. All things are pointing to AQIM, and it indicates a greater level of integration of the Mauritanian branch with the GSPC mainframe. It also shows the danger of the Mali camps and how poorly prepared the Mauritanian security forces have been for this kind of challenge.

Suicide bombing in Mauritania

Yesterday a suicide bombing — Mauritania’s first — seriously injured one Mauritanian and wounded two Frenchmen in Nouakchott. The attacker detonated at the foot of the “corner of death,” a spot known for traffic accidents, an uphill turn heading toward the French Embassy, but  closer to the UAE and Libyan ones. His target was the French Embassy, and the two wounded Frenchmen were embassy security. The culprit, Ahmedou Ould Sidi Ould Vyh al-Barka, hailed from Arafat (though it is disputed at this point whether he is from Arafat near Nouakchott or Arafat near Boutlimit) and was 22. He had no record with the security forces. Al-Akhbar has published images of his remains along with a story about the damage done. On the ground, it is said that it took authorities half an hour to respond, with neighbors and other locals meandering through and contaminating the site. On al-Arabiyya, Aljazeera and France24 reports one can see locals easily strolling through the crime scene between barricades. No group has yet claimed responsibility.

Politically, the attack is something that President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz will want to use to his benefit. His election was hotly disputed and there is some skepticism around the legitimacy and legality of his rule in Washington, Europe and parts of the AU. Certainly, his toughest critics are at home, where oppositionists accuse him of setting up a dictatorship. In his terse remarks at his inauguration last week, he renewed his vow to combat terrorism. This line of speech is aimed at winning the support of Western governments, paranoid about the spread of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and worried that poor, hungry and Muslim Mauritania might find itself in a heap of trouble if that organization were to gain serious ground. So here is his opportunity to curry the favor of such governments: a suicide bombing, hardly minutes from both the French and American embassies. Surely Mauritania requires the support of all nations in combating terrorism and extremism. The French, understandably and predictably, have extended their hand to the government, reaffirming their support for Ould Abdel Aziz.

The French Secretary of State for Cooperation said it was unclear that the attack is linked to AQIM or that the Embassy was actually the target; instead he believes it may have been related to last month’s election result. He added that “of course, France welcomed the results, so we cannot deny that France is a target.”

The Secretary has a point. The transcripts of interrogations of Mauritanian AQIM operatives indicate in multiple places that the Mauritanian branch explicitly rejects the use of suicide bombing as a matter of principle, because it holds the potential to kill too many civilian Muslims. In their view, the tactic would alienate AQIM from Mauritanian Muslims. Thus, the organization has made  a very concerted effort to attack only non-Muslim foreigners and the security forces. Yesterday’s attack marks the first use of suicide bombing in Mauritania.

The attack and its vicinity.

Not everyone has been eager to accept the new government, suicide bombings and al-Qaeda or not. Former French Ambassador to Nouakchott, Bertrand Fessard de Foucault, wrote an essay titled simply “I am ashamed,” cataloguing the rather dingy color of France’s involvement in Mauritanian affairs of late. Viollette Daguerre,  head of the same Arab human rights organization that came down harshly on just about everyone immediately after the election, issued another report slamming France and others for turning the blind eye to violations of the political processes. Hanafi Ould Daha, jailed editor of the popular internet newspaper Taqadoumy, was prevented from reading his opening remarks at trial. He is charged with using the website for slander. It is biting, written in real bedouin style, talking up free speech and slamming his jailers — putschists, generals and even the court. Its text is on Taqadoumy. Mauritanians take these things quite seriously.

Responses to articles on the attack in the Arabic internet media are telling. A response to an initial report on the attack exclaimed “rid us of the General and then we will call you a shahid (martyr)!” Others decry the attacker’s stupidity, mocking his Haratine origins. The Mauritanians are angry, as they have been in the wake of just about every terrorist attack over the last however many years. As much as there is disgust and frustration with the bombing, much of that is channeled back at the regime. While the bombing is the biggest Mauritanian “story” to catch western media attention since the election Mauritanians are more concerned with other troubles related to legitimacy and creeping despotism.

Algerians and Chinese: Chinatown show down

Algeria and China have quite fine relations. To say “Algeria and China” is to say the governments of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and the People’s Republic of China enjoy long and friendly relations. The PRC was the first country to recognize independent Algeria. Quite a few Algerian military officers, engineers and others were educated in the PRC. Chinese television once broadcast programs on the Algerian “people’s revolution”. Algerian communists counted many, many Maoists in their ranks in the 1960′s and 1970′s, and the Chinese Embassy is historically one of the more important in Algiers. Any Algerian who has done his national service has held a Chinese made rifle and served in a military modeled after the People’s Liberation Army.

Still, as is the case in any relationship, there is tension. Algerians have not taken well to the large numbers of Chinese that have arrived in Algeria over the last decade, mostly to build the housing units and infrastructure projects president Bouteflika promised Algerians in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Algerians want those jobs. But they’ve gone to Chinese firms on Chinese terms. So the flare ups in Sino-Algerian relations recently have been the result of domestic politics; in other words, areas the two governments historically have ignored in their dealings with one another. But now, rebells in Algeria are setting upon Chinese interests based on the conduct of a Chinese rebellion; and ordinary Algerians are roughing up Chinese nationals, brought to the country as a result of this otherwise long and happy relationship. While these things will mean little for Sino-Algerian relations on the whole (neither government places enough care on such affairs for them to be so significant as, say, the racial violence against Algerians in France in the 1970′s was to Franco-Algerian relations), it is important that they be laid out.

Mauritania and American priorities

Many members of the Mauritanian opposition  and operatives clamor that the American position towards the new government is among the most crucial of those yet out: the French, Spanish, Moroccan, and most other responses were predictable. The Americans, having somewhat less at stake, could go in any direction. The American Embassy in Nouakchott released a statement “taking note” of the Constitutional Council’s decision to recognize Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz as the winner of the 18 July election, and mentioning the Dakar Agreement as having brought the country back to a “national consensus on the return to constitutional order”. Mauritanians in the opposition are reading it carefully, even if it is not exactly what they had hoped to read. At one level there is an over estimation both of American capacity to carry on with the rejectionist line as European, Arab and other allies have chosen to move on. At another, there is also a similar overestimation of the relevance of the American position and to a lesser extent of the American desire to have any particular involvement in Mauritanian domestic politics. But to whatever extent the American position has been over estimated, misrepresented, misinterpreted or whatever else, it remains the case that for nearly a year, the Mauritanian opposition in general saw themselves as being in some form of common cause with the United States.