Creativity helped to gain some quick cash and to allow for cheap but short lived victories over what had rapidly become consensus in the relevant corners of the international community. Still, running off to Libya or Iran or other conspicuously disruptive elements only served to worsen the junta’s isolation. In the end, there could be no fast track to pacification for Ould Abdel Aziz and friends. Now that the negotiations are through, we can reflect that Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdellahi’s presidency really was over on 6 August; that the coup d’etat is going the way of American Express — widely known but less often accepted for its high price to the merchant or here the citizen; that the RFD’s shift away from the junta marked a turning point in this process; that it was rejected directly by all relevant actors, save of course China, and opposition to it met challengers only in the most predictably derisible of quarters, such as the stream of consciousness foreign policy of Libya. The French, via the Dakar settlement, are likely feeling more enfranchised in Mauritanian politics than they have in some months.
The campaign period is short, too short for a real battle between the various factions. There really are two sets in this process: those for Abdel Aziz and those against Abdel Aziz. The level of cooperation among the opposition parties looks at first to be high. Yet one must consider that the settlement has changed little substantively within the country. Ould Abdel Aziz stands a formidable presidential candidate, but less so than he did on the eve of the tin can elections he had plotted for 6 June. More credible candidates may make all the difference in lending legitimacy to the vote, as a similar set up did in 2007. The old rivalries of ambitious men are the same with mentalities perhaps more mature than previously. A better coordinated opposition could take these elections beyond their potential to repeat a tired cycle. This post includes broad analyses of four electoral factors, with more to come.
