Algeria’s growing clout?

GENEVA, July 27 (Reuters) – The United Nations decided on Monday to bar an Arab human rights group for a year after Algeria argued that it brought in a “known terrorist” to speak on its behalf at a meeting in Geneva.

The decision was taken without a vote, despite reservations voiced by Western countries, at the 54-member Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in what an official of the barred grouping said was a move to silence its voice.

The action against the Paris-based Arab Commission for Human Rights — which has been fiercely critical of Israel but also of what it argues is growing oppression in Arab countries — deprives it of the right to speak in U.N. bodies.

[ . . . ]

The Arab Commission, founded in 1998 and run by 15 human rights lawyers who mainly live in Arab countries although some are based in Western Europe, will now be barred from the Human Rights Council, its main U.N. focus.

In a complaint to the NGO Committee, Algeria said the group violated rules last year by putting up as a speaker Swiss-based lawyer Rachid Mesli, against whom Algiers has issued an arrest warrant as a member of an “armed terrorist group”.

Hani said Mesli was a lawyer who fled Algeria after being prosecuted for defending members of the now defunct Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which fought the state in the 1990s.

“Arab human rights group barred for year by UN,” Robert Evans, 27 July, 2009.

This is evidence of one of Bouteflika’s campaign promises from 1999, as well as 2004 and 2009: the restoration of Algeria’s international prestige and clout. On one level this represents not only its ability to play the “war on terrorism” chip — which Bouteflika has refined to a level his immediate predecessors could not even during the bloodiest days of the Civil War. It also is indicative of the way many “Non-Allied” governments view NGOs and especially the activists among them: as threats to their internal stability and the integrity of the order from which their authority is derived. Whatever the legitimacy of these organizations’ causes or the “oder” that these leader proport to uphold, censures such as this one are nevertheless evidence of the fundamental crises of legitimacy facing the more geriatric and centrist among the NAM and other weak states. It would be the behavior of any regime in a similar circumstance, indeed many of the other states supporting the motion were likely looking at it not so differently than Algeria.

Algerian diplomats would like to claim that this and the recent aversion on the part of the United States to undersigning its statements on the Western Sahara and letters to King Mohamed VI with declarations of support for Morocco’s autonomy proposal (as was the protocol under Bush) to be evidence of Algeria’s growing “prestige” and the righteousness of its policy. No doubt the Algeria of 2009 has more credibility and more influence internationally than did the Algeria of 1999 or that this is surely due to the good wits of president Bouteflika, or at least those very close to him. What remains to be seen is if Bouteflika’s domestic solution to the dark decade will be able to sustain the international designs he’s set up for the country. All the progress Algerian diplomacy has made over the last nine years was predicated on the re-establishment of order inside the country and at least the impression of a process of reconciliation between the state and its people. Without any real reconciliation between the people and the state, or at least certain powerful cliques therein, the possibility for open tensions between the youth and the authorities in the medium term remains quite powerful. While Bouteflika has put an end to broad macro-economic ills and macro-political disputes, he has not resolved any of the fundamental sticking points that make so many Algerians so restive.

A face, it seems, is not enough: Barack Obama and Muslim opinion

Much has been made of Barack Obama’s ability to woo tough crowds. He has had impressive showings in Europe and America. Much was made of interest in his candidacy and election in the Muslim world. His speeches in Ankara and Cairo won kudos in America, Europe and beyond. But much of this has come in a euphoric tone, more interested in the spin around big talk than what the words actually mean or what might come of them in real terms. A primary assumption about Barack Obama and the Muslim world has been that he could challenge and change the mistrust that existed between many Muslim populations and the United States. That assumption has gone largely unchallenged and has assumed a position near to fact in the heads of some American policy thinkers. His foreign policy has turned out to be more realistic than many of the public diplomacy-obsessed had anticipated. And significant numbers of Muslims in key demographics seem unmoved by the President’s use of local color on YouTube and in Cairo.

Some ways not to look at Mauritania

The first major statement General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz made after the 18 July election was a promise to fight terrorism in Mauritania. This was for an international audience, aimed especially at the Untied States and Europeans. Having had little stomach for the 8 August coup and having rather consistently opposed the junta politically, the Americans have kept up their military cooperation with Mauritania, in an effort to combat the proliferation of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as well as other smuggling networks in the region. It is his hope that by appealing to this common interest, he will be able to convince the Western powers of his utility thereby encouraging them to extend a warmer welcome to the contested election results and to his poorly regarded leadership generally.

There is no public discussion, let alone debate, about Mauritania in the United States. The 8 August coup engendered about as much conversation as the later Madagascar coup. The country is primarily discussed in terms of terrorism and military operations. Writing on the country is infrequent, and only one major opinion piece came out about the elections, a hatchetjob on Ould Abdel Aziz, labeling him Ahmadinejad’s North African protege, in the Wall Street Journal. While the piece was not inaccurate in its description of the situation, it centered on the country’s Israel policy, and its drift toward the radical Arabs and Iran. It does not place these moves in the context of Mauritanian diplomatic history, which is replete with “moderate,” “radical” or neutral shifts most of which scarcely relate to ideology. It described what are essentially long standing elements of Mauritanian policy, without informing the reader of that context. Nevertheless, it was, in this blogger’s view, one of the best informed pieces written on the country in an American paper over the last two or more months.

Already there are some who view Ould Abdel Aziz’s electoral victory (and perhaps even the 8 August coup itself) through the lens of counter terrorism and regional stability. One blogger wrote that because Mauritania, as a part of the Islamic world generally, is “facing an existential threat” which necessitates not only acceptance but support for the process that has lead the situation to where it is now since 8 August of last year.º That blogger’s narrative around the coup and last weekend’s election evidences a confused understanding of the country’s situation and recent history. The conclusion that this understanding produces holds unfortunate prospects not only for Mauritanians but also for American policy in the region generally.

Why Ely Vall was a non-factor

It was written previously that, contrary to the views of some observers and media outlets (though not the BBC, mentioned him as an “also running” candidate), Ely Ould Mohamed Vall was not ever a serious contender in the election in Mauritania on 18 July last. There was a belief among some reporters, without a strong foundation in fact or the general Mauritanian sentiment, that Vall is or was some kind of political force in and of himself. As the face of the 2005 coup, the Good Coup, he is associated with the transition to democracy. In a way similar to how Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdellahi was portrayed with great sympathy in Western media for his being the “first democratically elected president” of Mauritania, Vall was seen like a facilitator of civilian rule. In reality, both men were faces for stronger forces within the military clique that launched the 2005 coup. And most Mauritanians were well aware of this.

So why was he not to be “regarded as a serious challenger“? That the results were tampered with has been mentioned, and will continue to be. Still, to deflate Vall’s numbers would not have required a magnificent feat of engineering, such as it did to set up the “fraud factory” that helped to conspire against the other, major candidates. The posting here on the fellow described his record, unpopular with the public and alienated among the elite for his forked tongue. An additional element, which was perhaps under-emphasized there but was touched on in later postings here, was the tribal component. He is a “cousin” of Ould Abdel Aziz, hailing from the same Oulad Bou S’ba’a tribe and having collaborated with the General (then a Colonel) and others in 2005 to unseat the dictator Ould Taya. He enjoys the patronage of the head family in Qatar, who see him as a democrat worthy of trust. The French view him as a conscientious steward of their interests in the country. And yet he won only 3.81% of the vote nationally. In no region did his share exceed 8%. Though he was among the first to shout of fraud, few Mauritanians view him with sympathy or see his complaints as relevant and credulous.

His chances might have been greater had he had a modicum of tribal support: the Oulad Bou S’ba’a are the country’s second wealthiest tribe. As has been said here, somewhat tongue and cheek, is that members of this tribe have historically own rental car and busing services. These were by all accounts well used by Aziz’s campaign, not just to transport legitimate supporters to their polling stations, but also to bring those looking to vote where they did not belong or heading back for “seconds” (or more). For good measure, Vall has his own such companies, along with other capital producing industries. But given that the Oulad Bou S’ba’a so aggressively backed the younger cousin. It is said that by those who watched the count in the polling station where Vall and his immediate family voted, only one vote was counted for the former Colonel. The implication, the observer said was either that (a) he has a troubled home life, or (b) he was subject to the most embarrassing sort of subversion. It is probably a combination of both. Early on, the junta sought means of undermining his candidacy not because he posed a threat to Ould Abdel Aziz, but likely as a way of marginalizing him within the tribe and with the wider political class. It was a demonstration of power and a pointer as to in what direction loyalty should have been directed. In part it was a kind of punishment.

The reasons are numerous and in common with the political and elite classes outside of the tribe: he is seen as being a thief, who ought not be trusted to watch over a single ougiya over night, a liar, who made many promises and kept few, even to family. It is commonnly said that Vall lied to anyone and everyone he spoke to during his time at the head of the transitional government from 2005 to 2007. Perhaps most importantly, he was not at the head of the government during the campaign period and thus did not have access to the state infrastructure in his effort. Ould Abdel Aziz was, as it were, the better investment of the two.

Post-election Mauritania Brief

Brief analysis of and thoughts on the 18 July, 2009 elections as things stand on 20 July, 2009. Corroborated through contacts in Mauritania, Algeria and the US.

Congradulations from cousins in the north

The first government to congradulate General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz on his “victory” in yestday’s election: Mohamed VI of Morocco. More on this later.

Fraud on its way?

The Ould Daddah and Boulkheir campaigns are now best described as “in shock”: the numbers coming out since the polls closed are showing massive majorities for General Ould Abdel Aziz. In Nouadhibou, sixty-five precincts are showing the same results in favor of Ould Abdel Aziz. The question: how? The answer: fraud. Their reactions now will determine what is possible tomorrow and in the days afterward.

Possible outcomes, at this stage: (1) Ould Abdel Aziz wins in the first round, slightly but decisively; (2) a second round contest between Ould Abdel Aziz and Boulkheir, where Ould Abdel Aziz wins by a large and decisive victory, in excess of 15 or 20 percent; (3) repeat the second, with Ould Daddah or another candidate. In any case, all three scenarios are possible only by means of fraud and will continue, if not broaden, concerns surrounding Ould Abdel Aziz’s legitimacy.

Perhaps the ultimate evidence of potential fraud: sources in Nouakchott are saying that the results are being released by the Secretary General of the Interior Ministry, not the Interior Minister; the Interior Minister is “missing,” and believed to have been arrested on undisclosed (or non-existent) charges. All of this is pending confirmation, however.

General Ould Abdel Aziz has lead Mauritania in three substantial campaigns: The Good Coup (2005), the Rejected Coup (2008) and, now, the Constitutional Coup (2009).

Pre-election projections in Mauritania: Daddah, Aziz and Boulkheir on top

A poll done by the National Gendarmerie within the last 24-48 hours, projects the electoral map (though not Inichiri). Here is the list by region, with its voter population, based generally on data from 2007:

• Hodh al-Sharqi: (1) Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz; (2) Ahmed Ould Daddah; (3) Messaoud Boulkheir. Projected to be close. (South-east interior; +/- 70,000)
• Hodh al-Gharbi: (1/2) Close competition between Ould Daddah and Ould Abdel Aziz; (3) Hamadi Ould Saleh Ould Hannena and Boulkheir in close competition; (4/5) Ely Ould Mohamed Vall and Jamil Mansour. (South-west interior; +/- 61,200)
• Assaba: (1) Ould Daddah; (2) Ould Abdel Aziz; (3) tough competition between Boulkheir and Mansour. (South central interior; +/- 60,500)
• Brakna: (1) Ould Daddah; (2) Ould Abdel Aziz closely behind; (3) Boulkheir showing strongly. (Western south-central interior; +/- 72,789)
• Trarza: (1) Ould Daddah; (2) Ould Abdel Aziz is the closest challenger; “average” showing by other candidates. (South-western coastal; +/- 100,000)
• Ghorghoul: (1/2) Boulkheir and Ould Abdel Aziz in tight competition; (3/4) close race between Sarr Ibrahima Mokhtar Sarr and Ould Daddah. Projected to be close. (South-central interior; +/- 47,000 )
• Guidimagha: Ould Abdel Aziz. (Far south central interior; +/- 29,007)
• Tagant: (1/2) Boulkheir or Ould Abdel Aziz; (3) Ould Daddah. (Central interior; +/- 24,000)
• Adrar: (1) Ould Daddah; (2) Boulkheir; (3) Ould Abdel Aziz. (Central interior; +/- 22,000)
• Tiris al-Zemmour: (1) Ould Daddah; (2) Boulkheir; third place is not mentioned. (North-east interior; +/- 14,000)
• Nouadhibou: (1) Boulkheir; (2) Ould Daddah; (3) Ould Abdel Aziz and Vall in close competition. (Northwest coastal; +/- 31,200)
• Nouakchott: (1) Ould Daddah; (2) Boulkheir; (3) Ould Abdel Aziz; (4/5/6, etc.) toss up between various others, Vall, Sarr, Mansour, etc. (South-central coastal, surrounded by Trarza; +/- 180,000)

A High Stakes Struggle: the Crescent, the Horse and the Tank

Ahmed Ould Daddah, head of the RFD and historic leader of Mauritania’s opposition, has run in practically every Mauritanian presidential election since 1991. His brother, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, was Mauritania’s single party president, was deposed in a military coup in the midst of the bungled war in the Western Sahara in 1979, having taken office at independence in 1960. Ahmed Ould Daddah had dedicated himself to opposing military coups and military governments before the 6 August coup last year. He was at the forefront of organized opposition to the dictatorship of Maaouiya Ould Taya, and stood against in elections many believe he would have (or did) won had he not been hampered by gratuitous  fraud. Ould Taya’s wealthy Smasside tribe used its fortunes to subvert and frustrate Ould Daddah’s presidential ambitions: it is popularly believed that Ould Daddah won the 1992 elections, but that the regime falsified the results beyond the voters’ recognition. In 2007, Ould Daddah came in second place to Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdellahi, winning the capital, Nouakchott, and most of the bigger towns but losing in the bulk of the scarcely populated regions in the eastern interior. His soft-spoken manner and thoughtful demeanor put him in contrast with some of his opponents’ more aggressive and boisterous personalities.

Ould Abdel Aziz & the Jews

Mauritania’s campaign revolves around three candidates: Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Ahmed Ould Daddah and Messaoud Boulkheir. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall is also in play, but from at a Plutonian level relative to the others. Jamil Mansour (of Tawwasoul, the Mauritanian branch of the Muslim Brothers) and several other minor candidates float as well. Between these personalities there is a distinct difference in style between Ould Abdel Aziz and the others: pure and utterly shameless populism of a variety befitting of other times and other places. Playing on his record of routing the Israeli Embassy staff last winter (a victory which will put him in the annals of Arab military history), as well as popular sentiments in the country contra things Israel, Ould Abdel Aziz has made his distaste for Zionism part of his campaign persona. Not only has he attacked the opposition — Ould Daddah, but especially Ely Vall — but he has gone out of his way to bring the campaign to a place far off from what anyone in the Mauritanian electorate would ever describe as relating to their daily struggle. To recount some memorable moments in this facet of the campaign:

Is the Telegraph reading TMND?

With no intention of sounding or being presumptuous: Did the Sunday Telegraph ape my comparison of Boulkheir to Morgan Freeman for this long piece on Boulkheir’s candidacy (by Nick Meo)? Just who is reading this blog?

And like thousands of other slaves and freed slaves across the Saharan country, her hopes are fixed on an inspirational candidate, a man born to slave parents who has sworn to put an end to the practice of “owning” humans if he is elected president.

That candidate is Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, a 66-year-old former civil servant with a strong resemblance to the film actor Morgan Freeman. Mr Boulkheir has vowed that in power he would punish slave owners and do everything he can to free their human property.

His prospects of winning power are growing by the day – and he is being hailed as Mauritania’s brightest star by his supporters.

The peice is generally well put together (although it quotes a “Berber” taxi driver; it would interesting to see where this fellow is from, in Mauritania), and though I disagree with its assessment that Boulkheir will win (I am inclined to say that of the opposition, Ould Daddah has the best chances of going to the second round; Boulkheir comes next after him), it is the first article in a major paper that I can think of that deals with Mauritania in a serious way and on its own terms. It is also the first one to look at Boulkheir in terms of Mauritania’s history, and that is a good thing. One might to suppose that Boulkheir’s uncanny resemblence to Freeman is plain for all to see; I’ve not heard it with an frequency, though.

Whomsoever might come after

In light of Ouyahia’s representing Algeria at the G8 Summit, in place of Bouteflika, recall this post from last year.

Addendum on Boulkheir and Obama

To clarify the intention of the post “Messaoud Boulkheir: the real Obama story,” it is necessary to witness this occurrence, brought to this blogger’s attention by a reader: at a recent rally, Boulkheir was incapable of finishing a speech, overcome with emotion at the spirit with which his Moorish countrymen have embraced his campaign. He welled up with tears, as supporters chanted “Obama! Obama!” and he told the crowd:

لم أكن أظن يوما في حياتي أن الشعب الموريتاني يمكنه أن يقبلني فردا منه فبالأحرى رئيسا له..إنك شعب عظيم وأقدم اعتذاري لك

[. . .]

إن كنت يوما قد دعوة ضد العبودية في موريتانيا فإني بعد هذا اليوم، وهذا الحضور أهب نفسي عبدا لهذا الشعب العظيم

I did not think for one day in my life that the Mauritanian people would accept me as an individual, let alone as their president . . . I apologize to you great people, to this great people.

[. . .]

Daily I stood for the end of slavery in Mauritania and after this day I can say at this occasion that I am a slave of this great people.

He repeated this last line over and over until he shattered into tears. This is the sort of thing for hyperbolic history books and nationalist tracts (except that it is real). Still, the previous assessment stands in light of this incident: he will not be president. The commentary on the Taqadoumy article is generally sympathetic, but is also evidence of the folly of crying in public in Mauritania: readers wonder, Why does he cry so often? If he can’t get through a speech, what will he do in office?

Scoundrel or Statesman? The case of Ely Ould Mohamed Vall

It was a stirring start. Before some two thousand supporters, many of them former ministers and high power business people, fmr. Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall began his address. Immediately, the power at the convention center cut out, leaving the entire venue without light. Through the darkness, Vall announced to his supporters that not even electrical failure would stop him from being elected president of Mauritania.

Messaoud Boulkheir: the real Obama story?

If the campaign for the 18 July elections in Mauritania were an American movie, Messoud Boulkheir would be portrayed by Morgan Freeman. But the movie would be somewhat of a departure for Freeman: its ending would evoke cynicism more than hope.

A tale of two Historical Dictionaries

The following error was brought to my attention by Roger A. Payne at Duck of Minerva: At the Barnes and Noble website advertises the soon to be released Historical Dictionary of Terrorism by Sean K. Anderson using the image of Ludwig W. Adamec’s Historical Dictionary of Islam, 2nd Edition. Payne describes the mistake as “particularly clumsy”. I would concur. Having posted a link for friends to view on Facebook, many appear to be in disbelief, most feeling that it could not possibly be accidental — suggesting some kind of prank or vandalism. I would venture to give Barnes and Noble the benefit of the doubt, though I encourage others to contact customer service with an eye towards having the imagery changed for Anderson’s sake and Ludwig’s; not to mention other sensibilities that might spring up from this trouble.

A thing called “politics” carries on

It is easy to be too hopeful or too pessimistic about the possible outcomes in Mauritania’s upcoming election. The real significance is not that there will be “democratic elections” in the wake of the coup. It is instead that the 6 June elections were scratched and that since 6 August, 2008 the junta has not had an easy day. The process is more remarkable than the outcome, thus far. There was so little time spent contemplating whether or not to back the coup, to keep aloof or to do something else: there was constant militation against it both from within the country and from without.

Creativity helped to gain some quick cash and to allow for cheap but short lived victories over what had rapidly become consensus in the relevant corners of the international community. Still, running off to Libya or Iran or other conspicuously disruptive elements only served to worsen the junta’s isolation. In the end, there could be no fast track to pacification for Ould Abdel Aziz and friends. Now that the negotiations are through, we can reflect that Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdellahi’s presidency really was over on 6 August; that the coup d’etat is going the way of American Express — widely known but less often accepted for its high price to the merchant or here the citizen; that the RFD’s shift away from the junta marked a turning point in this process; that it was rejected directly by all relevant actors, save of course China, and opposition to it met challengers only in the most predictably derisible of quarters, such as the stream of consciousness foreign policy of Libya. The French, via the Dakar settlement, are likely feeling more enfranchised in Mauritanian politics than they have in some months.

The campaign period is short, too short for a real battle between the various factions. There really are two sets in this process: those for Abdel Aziz and those against Abdel Aziz. The level of cooperation among the opposition parties looks at first to be high. Yet one must consider that the settlement has changed little substantively within the country. Ould Abdel Aziz stands a formidable presidential candidate, but less so than he did on the eve of the tin can elections he had plotted for 6 June. More credible candidates may make all the difference in lending legitimacy to the vote, as a similar set up did in 2007. The old rivalries of ambitious men are the same with mentalities perhaps more mature than previously. A better coordinated opposition could take these elections beyond their potential to repeat a tired cycle. This post includes broad analyses of four electoral factors, with more to come.

Connections

Note that as the recent political settlement takes effect in Mauritania, the junta has cracked down on media figures whilst the sanctions evaporate. These are closely related: the desired order is taking shape, there is a new degree of comfort. Will comment more extensively soon.

The Arabist writes well

From the first of a series of posts on Obama’s policy, post-Sermon on the Nile:

But one thing it’s not is a principled foreign policy, and one thing Barack Obama is not is a holier-than-thou president. So let’s stop treating him as the second coming.

Serial rapist charged

Following up on the CIA officer (Andrew Warren) known to have raped at least two women during his time in the Algerian capital:

The CIA’s former top officer in Algeria has been indicted by a federal grand jury on a charge that he sexually assaulted a woman in the North African country last year.

Andrew Warren, 41, was released on personal recognizance after a brief appearance yesterday in the District’s federal court. The sexual-abuse charge carries a maximum sentence of life in prison.

[. . .]

If an assault is confirmed, it will be viewed as particularly serious because it could damage diplomatic relations with Algeria and undermine U.S. efforts to improve its image in the Muslim world, former diplomats and foreign policy experts said.