The campaign is his: Obstruction and accusations

Most of the candidates have criticized the state media and the Bouteflika campaign for monopolizing ad space and for using intimidation to muscle out the other candidates’ messages. El Khabar reported on elements of the Bouteflika campaign using blackmail to pressure local officials and businesspeople into backing the campaign infrastructure (you could call it Bouteflintimidation), and today Djahid Younsi (El-Islah) criticized television bias and Mohamed Said called on PM Ahmed Ouyahia specifically for violating campaign laws by publicly endorsing Bouteflika and asking voters to support him. Le Soir notes Said’s early criticism and Louisa Hanoune’s paucity: The PT candidate generally refrains from mentioning Bouteflika (or others) by name, even if she criticizes the ruling establishment in general she evades direct attacks on the president. This is related to concerns that Hanoune is acting as a proxy of the regime, legitimizing the contest by providing court opposition. Mousa Touati (FNA), when asked where Bouteflika’s piles of cash came from, responded  “tax evasion and bribery“. Fawzi Rebiane (Ahd 54) also accused the Bouteflika campaign of “abusing state resources,” with talk of withdrawal coming up in the face of perceived and real bias. Television broadcasts imagery of Bouteflika, with minimal attention paid to others. State print media extols Bouteflika’s accomplishments, and seldom mentions the other candidates. Posters of Bouteflika with his trademark dove adorn building facades, walls, windows and light posts in major cities.

Rushing to the regime’s defense, the Interior Minister and longtime Boutefista, Yazid Zerhouni, has said that the candidates are “operating in an atmosphere of freedom of expression” and said he regretted that all but Bouteflika have complained that they are “just getting by” in terms of funding. (The state allocates some funds for campaigns and sets the price for ad space on television and other public fora.) The always callus Zerhouni may have done better to have simply said, “tough luck.”

The Tamazight issue in 2009

Louisa Hanoune recently promised voters in Bouira that if she were elected president she would make Tamazight an official language of Algeria. In Ouargla, president Bouteflika told voters that “we are Amazigh and Islam Arabized us,” going on to say that recognition of Berber identity is part of his program: “If the subject is an Academy Amazighité, we create! Or a High Council for Amazighité we create! If it is Ennayer [the Berber New Year], we all celebrate.” He also proclaimed that “we are all Salafists” in the spirit of national reconciliation, pledging to unify Algerians of all political, ethnic and religious persuasions. This is the message he will attempt to take on his visits to Kabylia in coming days: A president of all Algerians.

Raqs Boutef

Abdelaziz Bouteflika is perhaps taking a cue from his Sudanese comrade that a befitting way of pleasing or at least distracting the masses whilst committing human rights violations, destroying democratic institutions, starving a people, or committing genocide taking unpopular measures is to be seen dancing before throngs of supporters wiggling  his derrière. At a rally in Ouargla, the president was photographed dancing with children in traditional clothes.

Algeria election 09, round up 1

The “campaign season” is officially underway, as of this past weekend. It makes sense to outline where the candidates (aside from Bouteflika) stand. El Khabar has some article briefly summarizing the views of the various candidates (except for Fawzi Rebaine). Here is a round up of some campaign happenings.

AFP on Algeria’s elections: Malou

After Bouteflika held his first major rally in Batna, a flurry of stories came out, providing historical and political context to readers. The AFP article on the elections, however, falls short in this effort by way of its numerous factual errors, mainly regarding the nature of the candidates and the Berber minority. I see five main problems with it.

How long will Qadhafi stay?

The Africans are increasingly disappointed with Qadhafi’s performance as AU President. He antics and rhetoric in Mauritania, Niger, Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere have caused embarrassment to many AU statesmen. His defense of coups, life time rule and general disruptiveness have caused some people to consider investigating ways of dethroning (by mechanisms within the AU) the King of Kings. Keep a look out.

Mauritania’s internet media under fire

Abbass Ould Braham, a University of Nouakchott professor and writer for Taqadoumy — the leftist Mauritanian news website often cited here — was arrested this Monday after writing a lengthly piece accosting the junta. Ould Braham was taken into custody in a cafe in the capital, though no official warrant was put out for his arrest: Taqadoumy reports that “When his friend asked why they were taking Abbass away, the police answered that in was in relation to the articles he writes regularly for Taqadoumy“. Reporters held a sit in to show solidarity with Ould Braham, to which the authorities responded with tear gas, beating some protestors with batons. Taqadoumy, likely the second largest news site in Mauritania, has now been blocked and banned by Chinguitel and Mauritel servers, on the orders of the General Prosecutor. The spokesman of junta-leader Mohamed Abdel Aziz apologized today for both the arrest of Ould Braham and the “inappropriate” treatment of journalists’ protest but stopped short of anything else. Ould Braham’s case, he said, was not the president’s responsibility but rather that of the judiciary. In other words, do not expect anything much. The Justice Ministry has said that it pursued Taqadoumy after receiving numerous complaints alleging that “the newspaper published false rumors increasingly detrimental to the public and private interests and the values and morality” and that Taqadoumy has “come so far out of the limits of the freedom of the press law and offers to set the community, security and stability at risk.” There is pressure building.

The Qadhafi Virus Strikes Mauritania

Some points in the wake of Qadhafi’s visit to Mauritania. 

1. The opposition is increasingly united in it irritation with Qadhafi’s mediation, which has been characterized variously as biased, “reckless,” and “dangerous”. His speech was in typical fashion: Harkening to Fatimid glory, the role of Mauritania in spreading Islam through Africa, the folly of democracy and the Mauritanian project in particular: “There is no difference between elections and coups” claiming that “elections lead to undermining the stability of countries, which is the most important thing in nations’ lives”. Opposition leaders Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ahmed Ould Daddah and others walked out. Mauritanians appear to have dismissed Qadhafi’s seven point plan for the resolution of the crisis: His remarks in support of the junta have rendered it without credibility. Instead of resolving the crisis, Qadhafi’s arrival seems to have brought opposition elements closer together in their opposition to the junta and to Libya’s attempt to move in. Despite his own appeals to the contrary it is widely believed that the visit was intended to aggrandize Qadhafi rather than to solve anything in Mauritania. According to elements from the opposition who were contacted by Qadhafi, Aziz told the Brother Leader flat out that he intends to run for president in this year’s election. Irritation with the junta’s external backers — at present Libya is the strongest — has turned a great deal of opinion, both within the opposition and among the people, against the junta. Factions within Ould Boulkheir’s party (e.g. Nasserists) have been working to bring the APP to Abdel Aziz, with little luck.
2. The American policy holds increasing relevance in Mauritania, especially in the wake of the visit. Opposition figures wonder what the American position is, how or if it will change. A general sense is growing that the Europeans will compromise for a legal return to the status quo ante, without a resolution or reform of the country’s structural problems, that the African Union has let the country down (and that that it is incapable of doing anything else with Qadhafi at its head), and that the Arabs have used the country as a means of displaying their recurrent irrelevance (a former Mauritanian diplomat involved with the Arab League described the body as “an empty shell”). The United States’ uncompromising position that some Mauritanians are beginning to associate with a way out of the crisis and with a stand for legitimate rule. More on this in a later post, however. If this visit is any indication of how Qadhafi will handle crises as AU chairman going forward, the African Union is in for serious trouble: Like a certain virus, Qadhafi’s strategic ambitions generally require a host body (or institution) — be it of Arab nationalist or pan-Africanist form — and once the course has been run, the host institution dies, with chaos in its wake.
3. Ironically, the country’s most fiercely anti-US political organization, the Islamist Tawassoul, is one of the prime beneficiaries of the stand against the junta. It should also be mentioned that the junta, having aped one of Tawassoul’s main issues — relations with Israel — has taken away much of its relevance from a populist standpoint. It is also notable that the responses to the closing of the Israeli embassy from the eastern Arabs — KSA, Jordan and Egypt — were especially muted. Even leftists seem to have ignored the move. The point was firstly for domestic consumption and secondarily a means of securing support from the better monied radical states like Libya and Iran. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, for its part, has blamed Algeria, Libya and Iran for Mauritania’s sour attitude: Naming Algeria does little to help their cause, as Algiers has been active in working to undermine the junta in Africa and abroad. 
4. A note on turn out. It must be said that Qadhafi’s personnel took over security in the Nouakchott’s Olympic Stadium during the visit. A Mauritanian related a story in which he was asked somewhat gruffly by a Libyan security guard if he wanted to enter the stadium to see Qadhafi’s speech. He said no. Others were invited in, and many went on their way. Those who were in attendance, aside from the regular political jumble, were mostly poor locals, often paid to show up to [state-sponsored] political rallies or to greet foreign dignitaries in throngs at the airport or roadside. The mood was not described as hot with wonder at the robbed Libyan’s arrival. Rather, his arrival was described in terms of indignation — how dare the Libyans come into Mauritania with their guards and soldiers, try to impose a solution in support of an illegitimate military regime. “Another foreigner trying to outsmart us” is how one termed the visit. As for why Qadhafi turned in Nouakchott and not Azougui as was originally planned, the best bet is that he changed his mind at the last minute (Libya’s foreign policy seems to be made half from rational calculation and half on the basis of Qadhafi’s mood), considering the harshness and obscurity of that locale (a Mauritanian grumbled that “he is no real bedouin”) and that the capital would deliver his message more clearly. 

Qadhafi in Azougui: Why?

Muamar al-Qadhafi, the Brother Leader of the Libyan Revolution and current Chairman of the African Union, will be visiting Mauritania next week. The visit has presented the Mauritanian junta with a host of problems. A simple visit to Nouakchott would confer too much legitimacy on the junta, considering Libya’s presidency of the AU, and would not provide the Islamic symbolism Qadhafi wants. Ensuring Qadhafi’s security is a big task and the Libyans have taken to measures bordering on subterfuge to make sure that the visit goes off without a bang or boom: Even attempting to send in security teams ahead of the visit without notifying the Mauritanians or registering their weapons. On the Mauritanian side, young men in Nouakchott are primping and lathering on their finest cologne in hopes of seducing some of Qadhafi’s famed “Amazons.”

The visit is intended to illustrate Libya’s role as a mediator, and to allow Qadhafi to lead prayers in an Islamically significant locale during مولد النبي the Prophet’s Birthday, puffing up his religious credentials. It also signals the direction in which Libya’s Mauritania policy is moving, regardless of the official AU line.

Add-on

A brief add-on to the Libya post, and some updates on Mauritania’s relations with Israel .

• Sources in Nouakchott are saying that results seem to indicate that the main purpose of accenting to Libyan mediation was to “secure Qadhafi’s endorsement.” It was said that Aziz told the Libyans he will be running. That Aziz and his Foreign Minister were able to go to Libya is significant and appears somewhat logical given Qadhafi’s belief that coups are “fine as long as they are staged peacefully”. It is important because this makes Libya, after Morocco, the only place outside of Mauritania the junta has been received. The junta is now preparing furiously to find a way to secure a visit from the AU president to Nouakchott, safely and quickly. A visit by the Brother Leader to Chinquiti has been canceled (because of “rugged terrain”); he would have prayed there during `eid. This would confer onto the junta a degree of legitimacy unseen since it took power. Or it could simply discredit Libya early in its AU term. He will not be staying in Nouakchott, but rather in Azougui, known for its Almoravid connections and for being in the middle of nowhere. The visit is causing  some embarrassment.
• Sources proximate to the parties that traveled to the talks in Libya note that Qadhafi’s people are increasingly suffering from “Mauritania fatigue”. The tidal-wave of Mauritanians, “each of whom comes with a poem” to present to the Libyans before asking for money, is a source of exacerbation.
• Sidi Ould Chiekh Abdallahi is being received in Libya, with ceremony where Libyan media is referring to him as الرئيس الموريتاني “the Mauritanian president”.
• The Israeli embassy in Nouakchott is closed. (This process has gotten Mauritania some coverage outside of the Maghrebosphere this year.) Keep in mind that Gen. Abdel Aziz met with Ahmadinejad on the sidelines of the Doha summit. After the meeting, Abdel Aziz noted that the summit had allowed the Mauritanians to confer with partners with whom the Moorish state had been out of touch with and with whom relations would be re-kindled. The results seems to be Mauritania’s hardened stance on its Israel relations and Iran’s assistance in the medical field. For background, see here. Rumors that Ely Mohamed Vall criticized the move are incorrect, according to Taqadoumy. The Minister of Information told Sahara Media that the move was only a matter of time, as “the High Council of State never welcomeed relations with Tel Aviv, and it was necessary to cut them to be in line with aspirations at the Arab, Islamic and national levels, especially after the attacks on Gaza.”

A Bad Map and Stale Crackers

Three items.

1. Last week, Passsport mentioned a cartographic error on Newsweek‘s map “The State of Islam Around the Globe”: Rather than marking the Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza) it labeled Israel as such. While this is a sure fumble, it is easily changed. More problematic is that the map only includes 15 “Muslim” countries, concentrated in the Middle East and Central Asia. Only Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines break the mold. But even still here, the Philippines cannot be called a “Muslim country” with a straight face. It’s population is barely 5% Muslim. The struggle in the southern part of the country raises the community’s profile, but this still does not make it a Muslim country and it is disappointing that the Philippines is included in the tally but countries such as, say, Malaysia, Sudan, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia, Gambia or Bangladesh are not. This paucity of valuable information is the most troubling part of the map, not that a small country, with a small number of people is mislabeled on a map that is easily corrected.

2. Accompanying the map mentioned above is a medium sized article by Farid Zakaria which urges policy makers to “learn to live with radical Islam,” citing important trends in Islamist behavior in Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan and Afghanistan that suggest it is unwise to dismiss political Islam out of hand as reactionary or wholly unworkable. Instead, Zakaria contends that while “we should mount a spirited defense of our views and values,” noting that it is important to reject “the burning of girls’ schools, or the stoning of criminals”,  “the veil is not the suicide belt”. He concludes “all Islamists, violent or not, lack answers to the problems of the modern world. They do not have a world view that can satisfy the aspirations of modern men and women. We do.” Therefore, it fails whereever it is tried, much like communism. Muslims will get over political Islam in time and it is therefore more useful recognize and seek engagement with those Islamists who are not militant and those who merely use Islamism as a means towards more secular ends. Similar ideas have been around since the time first Bush adminstration (when they were dismissed or tabled until the second one), and the article would have been more useful then than now. Problematic is the following paragraph:

We have placed ourselves in armed opposition to Muslim fundamentalists stretching from North Africa to Indonesia, which has made this whole enterprise feel very much like a clash of civilizations, and a violent one at that. Certainly, many local despots would prefer to enlist the American armed forces to defeat their enemies, some of whom may be jihadists but others may not. Across the entire North African region, the United States and other Western powers are supporting secular autocrats who claim to be battling Islamist opposition forces. In return, those rulers have done little to advance genuine reform, state building or political openness. In Algeria, after the Islamists won an election in 1992, the military staged a coup, the Islamists were banned and a long civil war ensued in which 200,000 people died. The opposition has since become more militant, and where once it had no global interests, some elements are now aligned with Al Qaeda.

The point here is well taken, but poorly illustrated. While Algeria’s political process is not an open one, the fact remains that there are Islamists in the government, and that the “opposition” is not in fact “more militant”: It has, for the most part, been broken — with results that have not necessarily been positive. If Zakaria defines the Algerian “opposition” as the GSPC/AQIM, he is surely missing critical features of both Algerian and North African politics generally. Chief among these is the fact that the militant elements allied with al-Qaeda remain few in number, though still explosive, and their existence as truly independent organization (fully separate from government control or influence) is unclear. Zakaria’s piece would be more interesting if it were not so cliche. As is often the case with the Algerian anecdote, he offers no real discussion of the situation beyond an AFP blurb oversimplifying the Algerian problem. It is disappointing that 17 years after 1992 American observers still have yet to give North Africa the proper examination it is due (which is to say nothing of so much of what is written about other Muslim societies). The Algerian case would likely not have gone well with rest of Zakaria’s piece, given its particularities and unresolved problems (though the cases Zakaria uses are all unresolved or only partially resolved, solved only by his confidence in American ideology).

3. The Economist has a strong piece on Algeria’s upcoming elections, correctly labeling the country stable and stale. However, it is confused on the MSP’s inclusion in the ruling coalition. The paper writes:

Mr Bouteflika tries to surf the trend rather than resist it. His government includes the Islamists of the Social Movement for Peace, who trace their line back to Egypt’s Muslim Brothers. Their views are echoed in mosque sermons broadcast every Friday on state television.

This is true, but it should be noted that MSP was never a part of the FIS and that its inclusion is for more superficial reasons that substantive ones. While it has had success in making the police tougher on those munching during Ramadan and keeping women from regaining their rights usurped by the Family Status Law during the 1980′s, its influence is somewhat minimal and their views are rather moderate relative to the “hardcore” Islamist platform that was popular in the early 1990′s. They have become court theologians more than anything else and most people know this. Its final assessment that “[u]nder five more years of Mr Bouteflika, do not expect drastic change” is valid, though if there is any change — drastic or otherwise — it will be from the bottom up. The regime does not respond to demands for change until the eleventh hour after riots or massive strikes have occurred. It is not unthinkable that the government may be forced into making piecemeal changes that become larger as dissatisfaction grows.

On Al-Tayyib Salih

Al-Tayyib Salih was one of my favorite authors, and his passing on 18 February was quite disappointing. I do not usually comment on literature, but it worth the detour to reflect on one of the better Arab writers in recent years: The tardiness is the result of busyness. Being as young as I am, I was introduced to Salih’s Season of Migration to the North rather recently. This was the first work of modern Arab fiction I have enjoyed (aside from poetry). It is among two or three works of literature I have studied that was really enjoyable in an overwhelming way. The other two are The German Refugees and Things Fall Apart (I have a preference for the more modern). Season of Migration was especially valuable in my eyes because it spoke angry truth. It is direct: Independence is not necessarily liberation. Knowledge is not in and of itself power. Conditions, quality, circumstance and integrity all matter in the context of decolonization and post-colonial leadership has failed to ensure that decolonization truly took place on the terms of the colonized. Salih presented this even before many of the worst civil wars, coups, correctional movements and mass graves of the post-colonial era, though the processes that produced these were well underway by 1966. There is a very sober foresight in Season of Migration, and while other Arab authors attempt to achieve the same level of relevance these efforts are ultimately insufficient. Naguib Mahfouz often gets much praise for similar descriptions of life in Egypt, but the scope is narrow and ultimately too flowery (and yet base) to have the full impact that Salih had. (Which is not to deny his importance, though I cannot recall a Mahfouz novel that I would put on the same level with Salih’s; The comparison is somewhat strained, admittedly.) Much of the troubles described Season of Migration persist today throughout Africa, and much of the Arab world, though this  is true more so in Francophonie Arab Africa (particularly the Maghreb) than in the Levant.

[The British] sowed hatred in the hearts of the people for us, their kinsmen, and love for the colonisers, the intruders. Mark these words of mine, my son. Has not the country become independent? Have we not become free men in our own country? Be sure, though, that they will direct our affairs from afar. This is because they have left behind them people who think as they do. [Pg. 53]

This is not to blame colonialism for African maladies, though it surely to recognizes the role of the Europeans in setting the foundations for many of the great failures that would follow British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and American entanglement. It is a warning against the surrender of sovereignty — not just in terms of borders and economics but also minds.

A Hip Hop Junta?

This is hot stuff. Taqadoumy tells the story of Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou’s youthful love affair with hip hop in Paris and New York in the late 1980′s. The story (“Music with Balls”) was written exclusively for Jamaican-American rapper Kurtis Mantronix’s website by Kemal Mohamedou, the current Mauritanian Foreign Minister’s younger brother. While in the United States the brothers met a Jamaican rapper in New York, and before they knew it he and Kemal (his younger brother) were rapping over beats on “the first and most powerful drum machine ever used by rap groups” to that point — the German-made Oberheim DMX machine. This is where the group claims to have  picked up its name, The DMX Boys. FM Mohamedou apparently managed the group. The story is accompanied by a promotional shot (see right) of the brothers Mohamedou in fresh threads of the era, with the FM donning some fresh black shades. Below, the bards give many thanks to fans, fellow rappers, their wives and “all praises due to Allah.” It seems that Mohamedou’s experience with ferocious rhymes have not helped him to gain significant international support for his new employers, however.