Our African Brother Leader’s Mediation

Libya’s mediation in the Mauritania crisis reflects fundamental issues in Libyan foreign policy since the birth of the “Libyan model” in 2003. Qadhafi would like to be treated as a key African actor by the the US and the EU, and to have this recognized by those powers. Rapprochement with the United States is seen as an essential means to this end, but the speed of that rapprochement has been too slow for the Brother Leader. Their concerns have been heightened with the rise of Joe Biden to Vice President, the result of Biden’s time on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he irritated the Libyans by helping to stall the process of normalization raising human rights concerns and compensation for victims of terrorism. His impatience with Libya was evident in his visit to that country in 2004, and it is relevant to consider the the Libyans made multiple efforts to speed up the process in the twilight of the Bush administration (see Saif al-Islam’s visit to Washington, in November). Still not seeing the progress they would like, the Libyans are seeking to use their African Union presidency as a means of obstructing certain US initiatives in Africa, forcing the new administration to recognize Libya’s status on the continent.

Mauritania is a part of this process. By taking a line that would appear to be more broadly conciliatory towards the junta, rather than one of outright hostility, in contradiction to the American effort to reinstate Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi by isolating General Mohamed Abdel Aziz and his cohorts. (Whose approach appears to be hoping for change, by means of epistles along the lines of “yes, we can.”) The AU consensus built during autumn/winter of last year will make this difficult, given that the existing sanctions on the junta were cooked up with a 2/3+ vote by AU member states and that relevant states are acting contra to the junta by many means. But the Libyans clearly think it is worth an attempt. And if that doesn’t work, the Libyans could still use their position to try and push the situation towards a resolution that would put them on better footing with the Americans, using their efforts as evidence of pragmatism (as Qatar played its efforts on Lebanon). The goal is to make the Americans more easily facilitate Libya’s African ambitions.

This also marks both the junta’s and Qadhafi’s perception of where the divide lies between the Americans and the Europeans: Where the Americans are set on the process of rendering a legal and legitimate government (which entails resolving the status of the HCE), the Europeans, French and the Germans in particular, are are more willing to compromise on legitimacy if a “legal” process is set forth. This stems from a lack of a belief in a return of Abdallahi outside of anything other than a face-saving measure. (Indeed, individuals close to Khatou quote her as having recently said that “We do not even want to return anymore, we only want to clear our names and move on.” Note this, also, for a different angle on the sanctions.) There are considerations in the Sahara that may make the Europeans more willing to compromise, though this is somewhat remote. The Americans have dug their heels in and movement does not appear to be free flowing, due to a lack of hard interest in the region compared to the Europeans. The junta has been attempting to capitalize on this, and the Libyans would like to exploit this situation with in the context of their own game.

Boutefistas on the March

To follow up on the posting on the Benjamin Stora interview (see more Stora here), and the previous post on the Algerian elections (updated), it is helpful to have a look at some snapshots of the campaign trail, using some of the major Algerian newspapers. This first post will look at Bouteflika’s campaign, as it appears to be the only one the big papers are covering.

Bouteflika is reportedly reaching out to the youth vote as ود” الشباب” “Dr. Chebaab” (Dr. Youth), in an attempt to woo young voters away from Louisa Hannoun of the PT. El Khabar describes Boutelflika as meeting with young people in the streets and in cafes. The goal is to “increase communication between the revolutionary generation and the young generation”. This will likely fail. There are already concerns about low voter turnout — as there are with all Algerian elections. Promises of creating 3 million new jobs through massive spending and  ”strengthening the rule of law” do not appeal to those who have been promised as much before and seen no results. El Watan asks sharply: “Will Algerians resolve to believe in a one-day speech denied by a decade of bitter illusions?” El Khabar English comments that the President’s comments at Arzew on the sluggishness of the east-west highway project “reflect how much he tends to evade his responsibility as the initiator of such a project which he promised to fulfil before April 2009, i.e. before the end of his second term.” (Note that the new El Khabar English is rather opinionated: Compare El Moudjahid‘s report (or El Watan‘s) on the speech in Arzew, to the El Khabar piece. Also have a look at this article on the property declarations of the candidates, which grudgingly compares their stated assets to those of an “owner of a fast food shop or small restaurant”.) 

The (essentially) official El Moudjahid reports on Bouteflika’s campaign from Soummam, where he is “carries a message of hope and renewed confidence” and where young Boutefistas say that while collecting signatures for his candidacy ”it was very easy to double this figure in barely a week” because of his eloquence and popularity. If there is not enough historical irony in the article on Soummam, one can find plenty on this article on the campaign’s initiatives in Tizi Ouzou. The same newspaper is stressing Bouteflika’s independent candidacy — though he is supported by three of the country’s largest political machines — noting that his campaign’s theme is “work and social justice“. His inevitable partnership with the UTGA is also emphasized.

Liberte looks at the progress made in Oran during Bouteflika’s first two administrations, noting the large sums of money pumped into Oran and the surrounding wilayas with special attention paid to hydraulics. While its report is somewhat positive, it notes that many people have been waiting for 10 years to have access to clean drinking water. Another Liberte article notes Bouteflika’s use of “the language of the people” and his playing to many constituencies on visits round the country. It emphasizes that he improvised parts of his speech in Arzew and in his recent public appearances he has “opted for a radical change by [using speech that is] flexible and accessible to everyone, punctuated with anecdotes, humor and questioning someone in the audience every time, creating a relaxed and undeniably a close [link] between him and the audience”. This is a break from his well known formality. The moral of the story? That “Bouteflika is sometimes surprising and unpredictable.” It predicts that Bouteflika was appeal to peasants in Biskra. Le Matin accuses Bouteflika of using Zidane as a campaign prop by flying him to Algeria for a guided tour. Bouteflika has certainly attempted to use Zidane to reach the population before and it would not be beyond him to do it again — and the former Minister of Youth Sports would know how to. The Bouteflika campaign is robust. So much so that no one seems interested in the “opposition’s” preparations yet. But there seems to be a lack of interest, and, unless something big occurs, voter apathy will remain high regardless of who endorses Bouteflika.

Benjamin Stora on Bouteflika’s “Hollow Victory”

Benjamin Stora, the well known French Algerianist, gave an interview to Reuters on the upcoming Algerian elections. The interview covers five broad topics. My reactions are as follows.

Berriane, Hogra and the Spread of Berberism

A reader inquired as to my thoughts on the video released showing the conduct of the riots. To supplement the previous postings on Berriane, I would like to link to this interview with Kamaleddine Fekhar (a human rights activist and FFS member), posted originally at Le Quotidien d’Algérie on 10 February. He mentions a “media blackout” which is a fairly accurate description of the scant coverage Berriane has received in the national media (at the very least since the fighting died down). I think this interview is in some ways more valuable than the video in showing the events’ importance politically and socially. The highlights are as follows:

Staying power

The plot was laid out in Brussels. The proposal was made by Mauritanian Prime Minister Maoulay Ould Mohamed Laghdaf to the European Commission in Brussels on 20 February. It suggests that General Mohamed Ouled Abdel Aziz to resign his position as head of government at the end of April, allowing an interim government to oversee the June elections. This “solution” to the country’s crisis serves to benefit the junta by giving the regime legitimacy it does not deserve and by dividing Western opinion. The goal remains the same as ever: Maintaining the junta’s grip on power.

April 2009 Algeria elections

L’enfant essaya mais en vain.
-Et ça veut dire quoi, Ouria?
-Ça veut dire: liberté.
…
C’est trop dur à dire, la liberté, en arabe.

Le Quai aux Fleurs ne répond plus, Malek Haddad.

Mauritania and the Tuaregs

To respond something riased by a reader in the comments field of another post:

I don’t know where to put this query for your opinion, ladies and gentlemem. There is a security summit of heads of state of 6 countries from the sahara-sahel region: Mali (host), Algeria, Libya, Burkina, Niger, and Chad. It is all about the security situation re: touareg, AQMI and trafficking.

My question is why Mauritania and Morocco not invited? They are also concerned by this issue. Thanks if anyone can shed some light on this.

Manipultion of these groups by states are somehow confirmed: le Soir de Bamako accusing Mauritania of involvemnt in helping the Ag Bahanga group and President ATT of Mali accusing directly in an interviewwith RFI on 6 February Mauritania of involvement again in his troubles with the touaregs.

If small Mauritania is involved in aiding the touaregs, I am also thinking that Mali is involved in something that has to do with protecting the emirs (all algerians according to Kal) that were running those behind Lemgheity, Tourine and the murder of the 4 French tourists by Ould Sidna and Ould Chabarnou. Otherwise, the current “animosity” for quite some time between these two neighboring countries does not fly. I know there is some conspiracy theory in what I am saying, but I find this awkward. The 2 states (Mauritania and Mali) are mute on this, including Algeria, Libya, Morocco, the US and France. They all know who did what, but they are all keeping quiet about it, while innocent people are been killed.

It is to my knowledge correct to say that Mauritania is backing elements of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali. Last month I was told about a conversation between elements in the junta in which using the Tuaregs as a way of getting back at “the lekwar” (black Africans, e.g. Mali) was discussed and encouraged. I am told that the junta is providing weapons, logistics and even money (though I’m quite sure how much cash they’re able to provide). I haven’t seen news reports on it, but this what I have been told by people in Nouakchott. So I think that might be an important part of their abscence, along with other factions. As to why it was abruptly canceled, I’m not sure. I encourage informed readers to enlighten us all.

The Devil in Berriane wears black

Vous allez voir de vos propres yeux, que les émeutiers Chaambas, qui ont certainement été manipulés, et qui ne savaient pas qu’ils agissent dans les interêtes de clans mafieux, sont protégés, et même assistés, dans leurs tueries, et leurs dévastations, par la police algérienne. A vous de découvrir, par vos propres yeux, la vraie nature du régime qui opprime les algériens, et qui s’apprête à se faire réélire.

“L’horreur de Berriane: La video qui prouve l’existence du complot du régime contre le peuple algérien,” Le Quotidien d’Algérie, 3 February 2009.

“The illegitimacy of the Algerian state”

Discuss. See also.

Berriane in context

Michael Collins Dunn, editor of the prestigious Middle East Journal, wrote an interesting “Backgrounder” on the Berriane violence at his Middle East Institute Editor’s Blog. It is a strong piece, but imperfect (as all things are). While it provides a solid background on the more distant origins of Ghardaia’s Berber-speaking Ibadite Muslim community (though it is somewhat vague), it does not exactly provide guidance on the immediate conflict, or Ghardaia’s particular circumstance within the context of Algeria’s historically large Berber-speaking communities (Kabyle, Chaouia, Tumbazit and arguably Chenoua or Tuareg). In this regard it represents much of the conversation in Anglophone Near and Middle Eastern studies when it comes to North Africa: Well versed on theology and medieval nuances but lacking somewhat in the modern context.

Ould Daddah to junta: Scram

Not too surprising. More later.

Berriane: Why is it allowed to continue?

ثورات الفقراء

يسرقها في كل الازمان لصوص الثوراث

The violence in Berriane appears to be done for now. Large numbers of police reinforcements have been sent to Berriane. The aftermath is bleak: The schools have not re-opened and ” looted shops, burned houses, shells of tear gas are dispersed in the theater of conflict”. Youths “in their tens” congregate around reporters attempting to have someone put their views in print. Some shops reopened, but most remain closed or burned, particularly Mzabite owned ones.

The Minister for Local Government and Municipalities, Dahou Ould Kabila, visited Ghardaia, meeting with representatives from the Mzabite and Arab communities of Berriane. He did not visit Berriane, however. Community leaders differed on what started the violence. Liberte paraphrases two “Malikite representatives” as saying that two men were tied up and beaten on their way to Friday prayers. Mzabite leaders are said to have attributed the confrontation to an attack on a Mzabite woman. The Wali of Ghardaia, Fehim Yehia, claims that “foreign hands” are behind the disturbances. Mzabite community leaders, according to El Watan, believe that there is bias in the town’s management and want to see the municipal chief sacked “his departure will solve many problems,” Berriane’s mayor was quoted as saying. Others demand the “disarmament of the Malikites” and the establishment of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry to investigate the clashes. (There were attempts to round up loose arms in the town during last year, but they continue to be used in clashes: Shot guns and hunting rifles seem to most common.) Local authorities, the mayor and other leaders complain, has mismanaged the distribution of resources in the way of last autumn’s flooding. Mzabites criticize the fact that the daira head “distributed housing by setting it equal the two communities while everyone knows the victims most affected by the floods are Ibadites.” They accuse the police of doing nothing when clashes break out thereby endangering the Mzabite community. The major believes that the problem is totally local and that “the two communities should sit down and reach an agreement.” The mayor frankly told reporters that “there is no social justice in our city,” and that “it is impossible to construct a structure (hospital or house of culture for example) without provoking the ire of one of the two communities.” He emphatically wants the two communities to learn to coexist: “I cannot build a Berlin Wall. It is not possible. That is unacceptable.” According to Liberte, the tensions so prevalent in Berriane are not found just a few kilometers south in Ghardaia proper. El Watan‘s editorial writes: “The evil that corrodes Berriane is neither congenital nor communitarian or identity. It is political, economic, social. It is quite simply the claim to full citizenship, which bans all forms of exclusion, [and should] taken care of in the interests of all residents.”

My questions and thoughts on the issue are like this.

Why the lack of interest?

Note the disinterest in the Berriane violence, which if it continues through the spring will be a year of on and off ethnic violence and police brutality, in the Arab media circles.