Trouble in Berriane

Four hours after Bouteflika’s visit to Berriane, part of his tour of the M’zab valley where he inspected the efforts to repair the region after October’s heavy flooding and discussed the looming financial crisis, violence returned to the town, pitting M’zabites against Arabs and the both of them against the state security forces.

Berriane saw clashes in March, April and May of this year between the M’zabite Berber-speaking Ibadite community and Arab (Chaamba) Sunni residents, the result of tensions building on and off over the last twenty years. The violence was tied to several factors: an attack on a M’zabite woman, the announcement of corruption in the local government and general population and social pressures. This fall, Berriane, like the rest of the M’zab valley, saw heavy rains and subsequent flooding leading to massive damage and displacement. The situation there is certainly tense.

Sufis will outlast Salafis, Islamists

From The Economist: “The Islam of the Taliban is far removed from the popular Sufism practised by most South Asian Muslims”.

This is true in most of the Muslims world. There are few places (aside from the obvious ones) where the practice of Islam at all resembles that of the Taliban, especially as far as traditional Islam is concerned. The reformist and Salafist movements have attempted to do away with Sufism and Sufi orders — sometimes on nationalist grounds (accusing them of facilitating foreign domination), other times on theological ones (considering them decadent, degenerate and pagan), and still others on simple power calculations (they allow for the growth of alternate power centers based around the brotherhoods which can compete with central/government/urban control schemes). The colorful and well written Economist piece would do well to more explicitly mention that mysticism and Sufism are not eastern phenomena alone: They are present in all Muslim societies and tradition in one form or the other.

Black-lunged Belkheir, Ambitious Boutef and so on

Smoking causes cancer, as Gen. Larbi Belkheir is learning. The notorious General and ambassador to Morocco was hospitalized in Algiers last week. Belkheir, who helped plan and lead the 1992, and who was an important force in inflicting Chadli on Algeria, is one of the most important post-Boumediene politicians in Algeria — and one of the most corrupt and hated. He has been accused by opponents of having participated in nefarious acts while during the War of Independence in service of the French army. Belkheir is believed to be connected to the assassination of Kasdi Merbah, in 1993, and others blame him for the assassination of Boudiaf. Of most recent relevance, he is widely believed to have been deeply involved in the Khalifa and Mecili Affairs. Earlier in the decade he was sued by an Algerian refugee for torture. When Zeroual came to power he went into exile in Switzerland, but returned in 1999, as a part of Bouteflika’s administration.

When observers speak of Bouteflika’s backing from “the military,” they are speaking of men like Belkheir, Mohamed Médiène (Toufik), Smain Lamari (d. 2007), Mohamed Lamari, and the like — most of whom were forced into retirement, sent abroad, or otherwise marginalized. The power of those who were allowed to stay on, Médiène and S. Lamari in particular, remained but was significantly quieted. Those who, like Belkheir (and M. Lamari, who was replaced by Gen. Ahmed Salah Gaid, a close Bouteflika ally), were sent abroad, made to retire, or otherwise demoted were protected in their corruption and their violence by the National Reconciliation Charter and the shadow of Bouteflika’s ambition.

Some things to read and to think about

Be sure to have a look at these articles, current as the last half-month or so.

Back

Farewell to the Highlands, farewell to the North,

The birth-place of valor, the country of worth!

Wherever I wander, wherever I rove,

The hills of the Highlands for ever I love.

– “My Heart’s in the Highlands,” Robert Burns.

TMND on OTSIM

This clever Moroccan site — Obama to Speak in Morcco — is marketing that country as the best candidate for Obama’s proposed Islamic world speech. They’ve even drafted my post on the issue to their cause. Note that I have no realtionship with “Obama to Speak in Morocco,” whatsoever, and operate this blog and write on my own behalf and no one else’s, and recieve no financial or material gifts or compensation from any individual or organization. Other posts have been aped by the Muslim Brotherhood’s English website, Amazigh web pages and some others, always without my permission or knowledge (beforehand).

The new coup

Readers are invited to comment on the potential affects of the recent coup in Guinea on Mauritania, both internally and externally.

Update: Here is the Algerian postition, such as it exits at the moment.

Walid al-Hyperbole

What a goofy post. As with many things written by Walid Phares, it contains what appear to be reasonable claims but are really fantastic exaggerations about…fantastic exaggerations.

To Obama on Mauritania

Mauritania ranks low on the list of national priorities facing president-elect Obama. The world financial crisis, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia policy, and other priorities in the Middle East, the Balkans and elsewhere will assert themselves before the president hears anything about Nouakchott or Zouerate. Nevertheless, the time will come when he (or at least those under him) will have to consider the issue. A recent meeting in Washington, among members of the Mauritania scene in the US — former and current desk officers, USAID people, the ambassador, opposition members and the like — met and considered the Bush administration’s policy. The consensus was, from  talking to some of those in attendance, was that not much could or is going to change on the US side. Since Sidi Ould Sheikh Abdallahi has been released, amid protests (of suspicious instigation), and the French are now demanding that al-Waghef be released (and the Americans are curiously persisting in the demand that Abdallahi be restored to power), I will not go too far in depth in this post — I will reserve that for another time — and focus on a rough sketch of what I hope the President-elect and his team will keep in mind.

TMND’s Winter Reading List

With snow piling up quickly, it makes sense to find worthy books and prepare for the coming months. Here are some books worth reading before the start of the new year.

Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed, John Philips and Martin Evans (Yale University Press) offers perhaps one of the most up to date and artful looks into recent Algerian history and politics in English. It rivals the work of Hugh Roberts and William Quandt in its level of in-depth understanding and empathy with various segments of the Algerian political scene. Unlike John Entelis’s work on the Boumediene and Chadli periods (Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized, 1986), and the Ottaway’s earlier work on the immediate post-independence period (Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution, 1970), Philips and Martin write their political history from the bottom up, rather than top down, integrating on the ground observations and interviews — from bumper stickers to protest songs to political humor — with more standard political science methodology.. In this, it is similar to Michael WiIlis’s The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, though its narrative and anylitical style lead it to do less of the reading history backwards one encounters with Willis. It combines a journalistic pace with scholarly depth to produce one of the most critical accounts published on Algeria for the American context. 1988, the year of Black October and bread riots that shook the base of the Algerian political hierarchy, is the locus of its narrative. Its critique of American policy towards Bouteflika after 9/11 is for the most part sensical but the role of the US posture is overplayed and given too much credit. Though many reviewers have read the book with Iraq in mind, drawing parallels between the countries’ history of colonization, dictatorship, socialism, and Islamism, there is quite little to be learned about Iraq in Algeria, and Phillips and Evans have written one of the few books addressing Algeria’s troubles on Algerian terms, and for this they deserve praise.

To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, Eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Oxford University Press) summaries the various foreign policy debates swirling around in the wake of the Bush presidency. It features essays from leading foreign policy voices in every corner of the ring, from realists to neoconservatives to liberal internationalists to trade hawks. It is valuable for students and practitioners, and is a solid survey of American foreign policy thinking at this moment in history — especially as Inauguration Day approaches.

The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, Parag Khanna (Random House) is one of the most interesting books published in 2008, and one of the best written. Khanna offers snapshots of his travels to several tens of countries across the “Second World” — the middle powers and up and coming state in upper reaches of the development process — and assess their rise in the world power system. Three entities will define the coming years, the United States, the EU and China, and his narrative analyzes the development of today’s middle powers in the context of these “empires’” competition for influence in the world of today and tomorrow. Luke Brezinsky, Kissinger and others, argues that the center of geopolitical and economic gravity is and will continue to shift dramatically to the East over the course of the next century. He finds special potential in Turkey, Brazil, Kazakhstan, the leading ASEAN states, and a few others. His section on the Maghreb is lagging, lacking the evident depth of understanding found in other section of Second World, and he is too pessimistic with respect to India’s internal “chaos” and leaves South Africa floating, critical errors of underestimation. But he accurately describes the pity that is the Russian predicament, though he under-appreciates that country’s sense of entitlement at times. He offers sound advise on how Americans should restructure themselves for the early part of this century, and Second World proceeds in a readable, enjoyable and clear fashion that makes it especially accessible young and old alike.

Anthology of Islamic Literature, From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, John Ashberry (The New American Library) is full of beautifully translated poems, short stories and historical source material. Published in 1966 by the renowned British orientalist, Anthology of Islamic Literature renders some of the greatest works of Mutanabbi, al-Jahiz, the Arab historians of the Crusades and beyond, often in colorful and rhymed verse, whilst preserving the true sense of the authors’ works. Assiduously metered and rhymed with lyrical grace, the early and medieval poetry in Anthology of Islamic Literature shames more recent attempts at similar goals in style and finesse.

Arab on Radar, Angele Ellis (Six Gallery Press) is a slim collection of poems by an Arab American poetess. Written in a mixture of prose and well rhymed verse, these poems tackle Arab American identity from the Lebanese perspective. It hops from North America to Lebanon, from cities to villages, from wartime to downtime, ably capturing the emotional ups and downs associated with being of a suspicious heritage.

Ba`athonostalgia?

Gvosdev asks: 

I read with interest the reports about the Ba’ath restorationists within the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior–lower level officers apparently interested in some sort of revival of the Ba’ath Party. It raises an interesting question–and I don’t know whether there is any sort of polling on this–the level of nostalgia for the past in Iraq, compared with the security and economic situation of the present. 

It also raises the question as to whether at least some elements of Ba’ath ideology–particularly secularism and nationalism–might still have some appeal, especially against the sectarian divide of the current government.

I’ve read about the rise in Yugo-nostalgia even in Slovenia, which by all accounts has done much better for itself since it separated from Yugoslavia. Is there a similar phenomenon at work here?

It would be surprising, given Iraq’s circumstances since the Fall, if such sentiments did not exist within the Sunni community. Ideologically, the Ba`th never held a wide sway over most of the Iraqis, it was a radical minority party for most of its existence there and it is the result of cunning and brute force that it was able to over come the more numerous and popular Communist Party and other minor factions. If Iraqis miss the Ba`th, it is probably the economic and political stability it facilitated early on (after a tumultuous period in the country’s history, it must be remembered), not so much its principles, though surely some do.  The Ba`th and its specific articulation of these principles, have likely had their time.  The Ba`th was never successful in eliminating sectarianism, and it long served largely as a partisan entity within the sectarian context, and years of religious conflict may make this specific ideal more appealing. Or not. It could have just the opposite result, as it seems to have in Lebanon: While objectively most agree that sectarian rivalries and distinctions are a major source of instability and strife, just as many probably would not be willing to give up their communal fidelities regardless of the potential benefits because of the lack of inter-communal trust as a result of the savage violence prosecuted between ethno-sectarian lines. Anti-sectarian forces tend to be weak — if they are genuine — or fronts for ulterior motives — if they are anything else — with the latter being most common in places like Iraq. If most people wanted to move away from identity politics, they are either unwilling or unable to move in that direction. At the same time, sectarian politics and sectarian and particularist leaders have gained power over secular and nationalist ones in Iraq. These were the most well and rapidly organized political forces after the invasion, and secular movements have not been successful. I therefore doubt that Ba`thonostalgia has arisen quite yet outside of the Sunni community, which has felt it practically since day one after the Fall.

On Obama’s Islamic world speech

President-elect Obama is slated to give a major speech addressing US-Muslim world relations, sometime early in his term, in some major Islamic city. Much speculation, with Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia (as well as others) receiving a great deal of attention from those interested and speculating. (See here for several) All fine and good. I have some suggestions of my own (which I will get to later). Rob at the Arab Media Shack has made some interesting comments concerning this idea over the last month. On 4 December, on the occasion of an NYT article by Helene Cooper arguing for Cairo, he concurred because of the Egyptian capital’s Islamic and political credentials. Today, he argued, somewhat problematically, against an op-ed pushing for Indonesia.

The op-ed, by Michael Fullilove argues the following:

Choosing Indonesia would throw light on the diversity and richness of Islam, which is not, contrary to lingering perceptions, practiced solely by Arabs or only in the Middle East. The country, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, does a reasonable job of managing its considerable religious heterogeneity. Going there would help Mr. Obama to reframe the debate in the West about Islam and terrorism.

An Indonesian audience would also make sense. Indonesians have been both victims and perpetrators of terrorist attacks, including the deadly Bali bombings. The government in Jakarta is an important partner in the effort against terrorism.

Selecting Indonesia would demonstrate that Mr. Obama takes democracy seriously, given that Indonesia is a rowdy democracy — the third-largest in the world. It would show that President Bush’s misshapen democratization agenda has not turned his successor into an icy realist.

Reminding the world of Mr. Obama’s origins could help counter anti-Americanism. Who would have thought the United States would elect a president with memories of wandering barefoot through rice paddies and “the muezzin’s call at night”?

This is a good argument, and it is especially strong in that it recognizes that Islam is larger than the Arabs and larger than the Middle East. In any event US-Muslim relations, a somewhat nebulous concept because of its vastness of scope, is something that should be dealt with carefully and with the diversity of world Islam. US-Arab relations, with which Rob and many others are preoccupied, must be dealt with in their context and on their terms. There can be no Muslim world policy, as there can be no Catholic policy. What will placate Muslims in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Kenya or Senegal may not have the same results in the Arab world. With this in mind, it makes sense for Obama to give a major speech on US-Muslim relations in a non-Arabic-speaking country.

Rob disagrees, strongly.

Review of Colonial Histories, Post-Colonial Memories by A. Hannoum

Last year I read Abdelmajid Hannoum’s Colonial Histories, Post-Colonial Memories: The Legend of the Kahina, A North African Heroine. I did not review it, though, because of other priorities. The book, made up of several thoroughly researched and footnoted essays, deserves praise for its commitment to looking below official narratives and examining Tunisian, Israeli and Franco-Jewish narratives regarding the legend of the Kahina (Dhiya).¹ Those familiar with the Berber movement will likely also be aware of the story of the North African queen from the Aures Mountains in what is now eastern Algeria and Tunisia, who stood against the Arab Muslim invasion lead by `Uqba bin Nafi’ in the 7th century. The book is a valuable resource for those interested in the legend itself, Berber history and the history of North Africa generally.

Regarding the shoe tossing

Insulting.

To address something that has been raised by several people: Is there a culture in which throwing a shoe at someone is not highly offensive? The consensus would seem to be that in most cultures, throwing a shoe at someone at very least signals great hostility. It is true that in Arab culture, use of the shoe has a meaning somewhat different than it does in Anglo-Saxon culture: In the first place, it not as clear in Anglo-Saxon culture that the shoe is especially offensive as an instrument of abuse. Shoe throwing might be recognized as a hostile act, as a means of inflicting pain, but it would not insult the victim in the way that it would in Arab culture. In either case, the insult is obvious: Few people of any culture would take having a loafer or sneaker thrown at them as an expression of endearment. Is it necessary for a head line to describe the incident as “the worst Arab insult”? Perhaps, if only to inform culturally illiterate readers of the intent and significance of the act. But the result of describing every situation where an Arab throws, shows, or uses his shoe to bash something or someone as “a high insult in Arab culture” is that it presents something is easily appreciated as the particular behavior of an exotic people whose customs are [inordinately] Otherly and different from “world” conventions. This is not the case. Throwing shoes is seen as an insult in at least one other culture: “Throwing shoes is particularly insulting in Thai culture, which considers feet the dirtiest part of the body.” Still, given that in many Western European (and Anglo-American) cultures throwing shoes is associated with women (throwing heels, for instance) and irrational or strange behavior, mentions of the “importance” of the shoe as a device of insult in Arab culture is to a degree relevant and necessary. Regardless, it might be better informed to emphasize that in many cultures, including Arab culture, throwing shoes is especially insulting. Or something.

On orders of Ben Bella

Concerning the execution of Col. Chaabani.

“Amazigh American”

Amazigh Gothic (Algerian-American), 2008, acrylic on panel , 25 x 30 inches, by Gwenn Seemel.

Bendjedid on Nezzar and Nezzar on Bendjedid: Dirty History and Dirty Men

So we have history according to Col. Chadli and history according to Gen. Nezzar. Chadli’s remarks at the El Tarf conference regarding the divisions within the wartime FLN, and the execution of Colonel Mohamed Chaabani, the leader of an immediately post-independence rebellion in the Aures against the Ben Bella government, state the obvious — Boumediene informed Bendjedid that Chaabani was to be assassinated on the orders of Ben Bella (as were others) — and the ones regarding the Mohamed Come-Latelys of the War of Independence — those Algerians who had become officers in the French army and only defected to the FLN in the late 1950′, such as Khaled Nezzar — illustrate their political nature: Nezzar has long faulted Chadli for having been a weak and Islamist-enabling president, and now he has poked back. And he is drawing contrast between his rule and what came after (the junta), and before (Ben Bella).

Nezzar’s response should be taken with a grain of dirt, as it answers few of the charges Chadli raised at El Tarf. The accusation that Nezzar was an agent of the French, a spy, etc. is not new, and he and his cohorts have long faced such rumors. Nezzar’s personal story indicates longstanding connections to France — his father was an NCO in the French army, he himself trained with the same army and became an officer therein (along with several other native soldiers, as part of a kind of affirmative action program within the corps), quitting the French side in 1958 for the FLN. It is interesting that in his response to these charges Nezzar never mentions his time studying in the Strausburg school or at Saint-Cyr (or in Moscow for that matter), and that his “refutation” of Bendjedid’s comments relies on asking whether or not patriotism should be measured by when an individual joined the war but not the actual content of the charge that he and those around him very likely facilitated French influence within the country generally (through the military). What is bizarre about Chadli’s accusations of Nezzar having been a French pawn is that a man who counted Mitterrand among his close allies is admonishing someone for his connections to France.

There is little that is new in Nezzar’s response. It is true, as Nezzar writes, that Chadli “opened doors widely to mediocrity and irresponsibility,” and while Nezzar’s criticisms of Chadli’s administration are somewhat accurate — he blames Chadli’s time in office squarely for preparing the ground work for the civil war — one must wonder what on earth this individual was doing during that time. The brutality that pushed so many Algerians away from the historical and mainstream political movements and parties went on without opposition coming from Nezzar, Belkheir or other Generals. Violence and repression became most common place at Nezzar and his comrades’ initiative, especially after he became Chief of Staff in 1988 and reorganized the security infrastructure. Nezzar writes that he and other officers did not endorse Chadli for president in the late 1970s, and that his rise and its economic, social and political consequences should not be blamed on the General. He accuses Chadli and elements of the FLN of being sympathetic to the FIS and of having facilitated their rise, which would in Nezzar’s narrative justify his political behavior. Again, this has been Nezzar’s version of events for some time, and he has said before that “the arrival of Chadli completely reversed the hierarchy of values that existed during the time of Boumediene,” which is generally believed to be true among Algerians.¹ The brutality that Nezzar encouraged, facilitated and reveled in is not explained, nor is his enduring connection with France: He answers no questions and respects no authority above his own.

His disrespect for Chadli is not unlike the discomfort many in his clique have for Bouteflika. But that their opposition has been limited to op-eds and historical grumbling about who-started-what in the French-language media (with some in the Arabophone press) reveals something about the Bouteflika-era, during which these eradicators were pushed out and those who had previous colluded against Bouteflika (going way back to the decision making process that rendered Chadli to the presidency and Bouteflika into exile) have been marginalized to a great extent.² The duality of politics — between the various factions of the military and (semi-) civilian leadership — has largely been dispersed under Bouteflika, explaining why there are so few candidates likely to oppose him. The non-military opposition has been co-opted, some time ago, and that which remains is to differing extents under the influence of remaining military hard liners still in the country and do not have popular legitimacy sufficient enough to launch a national presidential campaign (this does include Said Sadi and his RCD).

Update: Louisa Hanoune adds her bit to the discussion, arguing that it is a distraction from more pressing economic and electoral issues (especially the reform of the electoral law).

For some perspective on Chadli’s comments and Nezzar’s comments regarding his efforts to marginalize the military and run the country into ruin deliberately, and his utter incompetence otherwise, see this 2007 interview with Anissa Boumediene, the widow of fmr. President Houari Boumediene. This seems to, in part, run contrary to Nezzar’s claim that Chadli did not even want to become president when he was approached by the military: She aleges that Chadli, together with other officers, decided to cut the late president’s life support without consulting his wife. In any event, the accusations thrown out by both Chadli, Nezzar and M. Boumediene seem to be aimed at character assassination and with the intent of preserving or fortifying the image of their respective institutional frameworks: for Nezzar it is the prestige and military (and his personal image, which is bad enough as is), for M. Boumediene it is her husband’s national status, and for Chadli his haphazard and [supposedly] freewheeling reforms. This “debate” has its origin in vested interests, though, and the public discussion of history in Algeria is almost always carried out with the intention of obscuring reason and whatever actual political activity might be going on, as such pronouncements tend not to have best of intentions behind them.

Al Sharq

I direct readers to the quite solid al-Sharq blog, written in German. Unlike many English-language blogs about the region, its authors devote a respectable portion of his writing to Maghrebine issues.

A set of possible changes

This attitude leads Tacitus to distort history systematically by representing it as essentially a clash of characters, exaggeratedly good with exaggeratedly bad. History cannot be scientifically written unless the historian can re-enact in his own mind the experience of the people whose actions he is narrating. Tacitus never tried to do this: his characters are seen not from inside, with understanding and sympathy, but from outside, as as mere spectacles of virtue or vice. One can hardly read his descriptions of an Agricola or a Domitian without being reminded of Socrates’ laugh at Glaucon’s imaginary portraits of the perfectly good and the perfectly bad man: ‘My own word, Glaucon, how energetically you are polishing them up like statues for a prize competition!’

Tacitus has been praised for his character-drawing; but the principles on which he draws character are fundamentally vicious and make his character-drawing an outrage on historical truth. He found warrant for it, no doubt, in the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies of his age, to which I have already referred: the defeatist philosophies which, starting from the assumption that the good man cannot conquer or control a wicked world, taught him how to preserve himself unspotted from its wickedness. This false antithesis between the individual man’s character and his social environment justifies, in a sense, Tacitus’ method of exhibiting the actions of an historical figure as flowing simply from his own personal character, and making no allowance either for the way in which a man’s actions may be determined partly by his environment and only in part by his character, or for the way in which character itself may be moulded by the forces to which a man is subjected by his environment. Actually, as Socrates urged against Glaucon, the individual character considered in isolation from its environment is an abstraction, not a really existing thing. What a man does depends only to a limited extent on what kind of man he is. No one can resist the forces of his environment. Either he conquers the world or the world will conquer him.

R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, Revised Edition, with Lectures 1926-1928. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

It will be seen that at each point Burnham is predicting a continuation of the thing that is happening. Now the tendency to do this is not simply a bad habit, like inaccuracy or exaggeration, which one can correct by taking thought. It is a major mental disease, and its roots lie partly in cowardice and partly in the worship or power, which is not fully separable from cowardice.

Suppose in 1940 you had taken a Gallup poll, in England, on the question ‘Will Germany win the war?’ You would have found, curiously enough, that the group answering ‘Yes’ contained a far higher percentage of intelligent people – people with IQ of over 120, shall we say – than the group answering ‘No’. The same would have held good in the middle of 1942. In this case the figures would not have been so striking, but if you had made the question ‘Will the Germans capture Alexandria?’ or ‘Will the Japanese be able to hold on to the territories they have captured? ’, then once again there would have been a very marked tendency for intelligence to concentrate in the ‘Yes’ group. In every case the less-gifted person would have been likelier to give a right answer.

George Orwell, “James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution,” May 1946.

In the interview, Mr. Scowcroft said the Bush administration’s two terms were “difficult years.”

“The general mood of the last administration has been more a combination of idealism and self-assertion,” he said. “And if the election was a vote on foreign policy — and I’m not sure it was — then you can say, yes, that idea has been rejected in favor of realism.”

Sen. Lugar, in an interview, said the president-elect appears to have a “pragmatic” view of foreign policy. The Republican lawmaker took himself out of the running for secretary of state shortly after the election, but he said that he hoped to use his perch on Capitol Hill to help the new administration retool U.S. foreign policy.

“Scowcroft Protégés on Obama’s Radar,” Yochi J. Dreazen and Soibhan Gorman, The Wall Street Journal, 24 November, 2008.

Obama enters office signaling that he will continue the policies of President Bush’s late second term in Iraq and Afghanistan, and key architects of those policies, starting with Defense Secretary Robert Gates, will likely keep their jobs. That would leave Russia as the unexpected laboratory for Obama to shape his own foreign policy.

Leading Democratic Russia experts said they anticipate dramatic changes to a Bush policy that eschewed arms treaties, and shifted rapidly from viewing Russia as a key ally in the War on Terror to a hostile enemy of the freedom of its former satellites.

“There is right now a kind of gathering of the clan of the Russia wonks, some of whom will be in the administration,” said Strobe Talbott, who was President Clinton’s top Russia adviser. “The Obama administration is going to have to do something that the Bush administration avoided doing for years — and that is treating Russia as a first-class strategic challenge.”

“Russia poses challenge to Obama,” Ben Smith, Politico, 26 November, 2008.

In Mr Chávez’s wake, socialist presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua have also developed ties with Iran. Mr Ahmadinejad promised investments of $1.1 billion in developing Bolivia’s gas, and $350m to build a port in Nicaragua. But there is little sign of either investment materialising. Brazil’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, recently visited Tehran and delivered a letter from President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva inviting Mr Ahmadinejad to visit. Since Iran is the subject of United Nations sanctions, and Brazil has been actively, if fruitlessly, pursuing a permanent seat at the UN, this raised eyebrows in Brazil. Mr Amorim’s visit was “inexplicable” and “gratuitous”, according to Luiz Felipe Lampreia, a former foreign minister.

The intercontinental ambitions of Iran, Russia and Venezuela have all been puffed up by oil, and so are vulnerable to the steep fall in its price. The lasting change for Latin America is its burgeoning ties with China. At the APEC summit, Mr Bush’s last trip abroad, it was Mr Hu who was the centre of attention. Mr García treated him to a parade around Lima’s colonial centre before they announced that they had wrapped up a free-trade agreement between their two countries. That matches a similar accord China concluded with Chile in 2005.

China’s total two-way trade with Latin America has shot up from just $12.2 billion in 2000 to $102 billion last year. Though Chinese investment—mainly in mining and oil—has grown more slowly, it is now picking up. Last month China became a member of the Inter-American Development Bank. But China has also disappointed some Latin Americans. Some Brazilians complain that Brazil sells raw materials to China while buying manufactures from it. Brazil is frustrated that neither China nor Russia has helped its Security Council bid.

All Latin American countries are naturally keen to diversify their economic relations, and some seek wider political ties. But Europe ($250 billion last year) and the United States ($560 billion) remain Latin America’s biggest trade partners. And the foreign leader that most Latin American politicians will be keenest to see over the coming year is Barack Obama.

“Friends of Opportunity,” The Economist, 27 November, 2008.

[A]ll three of his choices — Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton as the rival turned secretary of state; Gen. James L. Jones, the former NATO commander, as national security adviser, and Robert M. Gates, the current and future defense secretary — have embraced a sweeping shift of priorities and resources in the national security arena.

The shift would create a greatly expanded corps of diplomats and aid workers that, in the vision of the incoming Obama administration, would be engaged in projects around the world aimed at preventing conflicts and rebuilding failed states. However, it is unclear whether the financing would be shifted from the Pentagon; Mr. Obama has also committed to increasing the number of American combat troops. Whether they can make the change — one that Mr. Obama started talking about in the summer of 2007, when his candidacy was a long shot at best — “will be the great foreign policy experiment of the Obama presidency,” one of his senior advisers said recently.

The adviser, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said the three have all embraced “a rebalancing of America’s national security portfolio” after a huge investment in new combat capabilities during the Bush years.

Denis McDonough, a senior Obama foreign policy adviser, cast the issue slightly differently in an interview on Sunday.

“This is not an experiment, but a pragmatic solution to a long-acknowledged problem,” he said. “During the campaign the then-senator invested a lot of time reaching out to retired military and also younger officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan to draw on lessons learned. There wasn’t a meeting that didn’t include a discussion of the need to strengthen and integrate the other tools of national power to succeed against unconventional threats. It is critical to a long-term successful and sustainable national security strategy in the 21st century.”

“A Handpicked Team for a Sweeping Shift in Foreign Policy,” David E. Sanger, New York Times, 30 November, 2008.

My previous reservations about Obama’s realist tendencies (I called his disposition “liberal internationalism with realist characteristics”), I think are baring out. This may not, however, ultimately be the case. Obviously, it is impossible to predict the future, even with the most clear understanding of a subject’s history or policy. If Obama’s hands are free in areas outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, meaning that he leaves Iraq to be handled in the Pentagon and shifts the burden towards Afghanistan, there are many things that could happen. I think it will be interesting to examine a few possibilities.

Month end Mauritania runthrough

Nouakchott or Lemden?

A recent skit by a Mauritanian comedy team satirized the life and times of Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. After being sent home as a gift to his native Lemden, the former president settles in and begins hosting members of the opposition (i.e. the FNDD) and soon foreign diplomats follow. Sidi is pleased but others are not: “Thank you so much for visiting,” his brother tells them in exasperation, “but stop telling this guy he is our president, he’s not!”